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Abstract 
Previous research has shown that individuals with autism spectrum disorder 
(ASD) appear to learn from social and non-social rewards at different rates compared to 
typically developing individuals. Several hypotheses have been developed to explain 
these differences, including the social motivation hypothesis, the weak central coherence 
hypothesis and hypotheses related to probabilistic learning ability. However, in all cases, 
the literature shows only mixed support for these ideas. This dissertation focuses on 
identifying which assumptions from these hypotheses replicate and what replication 
successes and failures mean for the study of autism-spectrum traits within the general 
population.  
This work takes a “spectrum” approach to autism that assumes ASD-related traits 
occur on a scale continuum. It therefore is designed to test the central predictions of each 
of these hypotheses amongst participants sampled from the general population. The use 
of general population samples confers the considerable advantage of allowing adequate 
statistical power for hypothesis tests. In addition to these hypotheses, this dissertation 
explores how social behavior and interaction outcomes relate to ASD-traits and task 
outcomes.  
 Interestingly, results ran contrary to many of the previous findings in the 
literature. Despite evidence of associations within the general population and ASD-traits, 
I failed to find clear associations between ASD-traits and predictions made by the Social 
Motivation Hypothesis, the Weak Central Coherence Hypothesis or hypotheses related to 
probabilistic learning ability. Despite these results, data on real social behavior and social 
outcomes did vary as a function of ASD-relevant traits. Specifically, the interaction 
partners of individuals who reported higher levels of ASD-traits experienced them as less 
likable and reported worse interaction quality. Additionally, individuals reporting higher 
levels of ASD-related traits were less expressive than those reporting fewer traits. 
  Overall, while predictions about ASD-traits and cognitive/motivational processes 
did not appear to replicate within the general population, ASD-traits do appear to be 
related to real-life social behavior and interaction outcomes associated. Together, these 
findings document subtle social behavior differences associated with ASD traits in the 
ii 
  
absence of social cognitive differences and suggest that major theories of autism may not 
sufficiently explain the causes of altered social behavior in those with autism-spectrum 
conditions.  
Keywords 
Autism, Weak Central Coherence, Social Motivation, Probabilistic Learning, Social 
Interactions 
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Summary for Lay Audience 
Autism spectrum disorder is a pervasive developmental disorder that deeply 
impacts the social lives of those diagnosed. Across the years, many hypotheses have been 
developed to explain how this disorder disrupts social function. This dissertation explores 
key predictions made by three major theories of autism: the social motivation hypothesis, 
the weak central coherence hypothesis and probabilistic learning hypotheses. Because 
research over the last decade suggests that autism traits occur on a spectrum, rather than 
representing a qualitative shift in function or symptoms with the presence of diagnosis, 
the samples in this set of studies come from the general population. 
This work examines three major research questions: 1) Do autism-spectrum traits 
affect how people value smiles? 2) Do autism-spectrum traits affect how you perceive the 
world? 3) Do autism-spectrum traits affect how people learn from ambiguous 
environments and feedback?  In addition to these questions, this dissertation also explores 
how social behavior and social interaction outcomes relate to autism-spectrum traits. 
Interestingly, the present results were generally contrary to the predictions made 
by major theories. Indeed, most of the findings showed little if any effect. Additionally, 
the tasks in these studies, which have been theorized to underpin social function showed 
no clear relationship to social interaction outcomes, suggesting that social interaction skill 
is not related to autism traits in nearly as straightforward a fashion as previous work has 
claimed. Nonetheless, findings did show a clear relationship between autism-spectrum 
traits and social interaction outcomes, as well as social behavior. More specifically, the 
more autism-spectrum traits an individual endorsed, the less their social interaction 
partner liked them and the more awkward their partner felt the interaction was. Lastly, 
autism-spectrum traits were found to be associated with key social behaviors including 
smiling and eye-gaze, such that those endorsing more autism-spectrum traits smiled less 
and gazed downward substantially more than did those endorsing fewer traits.  
Overall, while the major hypotheses of autism-spectrum disorder seem to fall 
short in their ability to explain the disorder, this dissertation upholds a clear link between 
autism spectrum traits and naturalistic social behavior and social outcomes.  
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Introduction 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a pervasive developmental disorder that 
affects millions of people around the world (Hansen, Schendel, & Parner, 2015). The 
American Psychological Association (APA) defines ASD as the presence of persistent 
impairments in reciprocal social communication and social interactions, as well as 
restricted repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, or activities. These symptoms are 
present from early childhood and limit or impair everyday functioning. Manifestations of 
the disorder also vary greatly depending on the severity of the condition, developmental 
level, and chronological age, hence the term spectrum. (American Psychological 
Association, 2013). More specifically, the literature characterizes ASD based on 
symptoms including prominent social interaction difficulties, behavior problems, 
difficulties in generalizing from exemplars to prototypes and communication deficits 
(Fountain, Winter & Bearman, 2012; Landa, Holman & Garrett-Mayer, 2007; Montes & 
Halterman, 2006). For example, people diagnosed with ASD may experience difficulty 
recognizing and interpreting nonverbal cues (e.g., gestures, prosodic cues and facial 
expressions), use language atypically, produce inappropriate emotional responses and 
may appear to lack empathy for others (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Matson, 
Kozlowski, Hattier, Horovitz & Sipes, 2012). ASD typically manifests early in 
childhood, leading to atypical developmental trajectories in both cognitive and behavioral 
domains (Anderson, Maye & Lord, 2011; Fountain, et al., 2012). 
In the social domain, the atypical behavior patterns many people with ASD 
display may contribute to difficulties in the formation and maintenance of social 
relationships (Jobe & White, 2007). In the cognitive domain, even when intellectual 
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disabilities are absent (e.g., “high functioning” autism), individuals with ASD often 
experience difficulty with the acquisition and understanding of abstract concepts, 
difficulties adapting to and learning from unpredictable environments and “executive 
function” deficits (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 
1991). Together, these difficulties create a social learning and interaction history that 
differs substantially from the experiences that characterize “typical” development and 
often results in delayed academic and social achievement (Jobe & White, 2007). 
These developmental differences often greatly influence an individual’s quality of 
life, and while there are no known cures for ASD, studies have found that early 
intervention and intensive treatment can improve cognitive ability, reduce inappropriate 
behaviors, and enhance longer-term functioning (Dawson & Burner 2011). For example, 
research has shown that simple operant learning strategies, such as reinforcement 
learning, can improve social behavioral outcomes (Matson, Matson & Rivet, 2007) and 
social interaction quality (Hastings, 2003) in children with ASD. These learning 
strategies form the foundation of a primary behavioral intervention in autism, Applied 
Behavioral Analysis (ABA). ABA-based treatments use reinforcement-learning strategies 
to reduce challenging behaviors and increase prosocial behaviors (Matson et al., 2012). 
ABA-styled treatments delivered early in childhood show medium to large effect sizes 
compared to control treatments when examining behavioral outcomes (Hastings, 2003; 
Matson et al., 2012). However, outcomes vary greatly, with some individuals/groups 
showing little improvement (Sallows & Graupner, 2005). Even though results from 
treatment are not totally consistent, this work generally shows that reliable administration 
of behavioral reinforcement likely enhances outcomes (Matson et al., 2012; Peters-
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Scheffer, Didden, Korzilius & Sturmey, 2011). This suggests that some aspects of 
reinforcement learning are conserved within ASD.   
Despite the fact that consistently applied reinforcement in the context of ABA 
treatments appears to be effective for at least some individuals with ASD, several studies 
in experimental settings have shown reinforcement-learning model failures in areas 
including visual learning (Harris et al., 2015; Scherf et al., 2018), social versus non-social 
rewards (Lin, Adolphs & Rangel, 2012; Scott Van Zeeland et al., 2010), and probabilistic 
learning (Robic et al., 2015; Solomon et al., 2015; Solomon, Smith, Frank, Ly & Carter, 
2011). Because the success of ABA treatments appears to relate to consistency in the 
application of reinforcements and many of the reinforcement-learning failures 
documented in the experimental literature occur in the context of probabilistic 
reinforcement, this suggests that atypical learning mechanisms may feature in ASD 
symptomatology. In particular, the social difficulties associated with ASD may stem from 
difficulties learning from probabilistic reinforcement. For example, associative learning 
may play a role in social learning. Evidence suggests that associative learning ability at 
one-month predicts social engagement at 5, 9, and 12 months (Reeb-Sutherland, Levitt & 
Fox, 2012). If these ideas are correct, atypical learning may by a central cause of the 
social behavioral differences in ASD. With these considerations in mind, this dissertation 
will focus on three central hypotheses that aim to explain the social deficits of ASD: the 
social motivation hypothesis; the weak central coherence hypothesis; and probabilistic 
hypotheses of learning and decision-making. I review each of these theories below. 
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1.1 The Social Motivation Hypothesis of Autism 
The social motivation hypothesis (SMH) of autism, states that individuals with ASD 
experience early deficits in social motivation, which reduces their ability to attend to, and 
learn from social information in their environment (Bottini, 2018; Chevallier, Kohls, 
Troiani, Brodkin & Schultz, 2012). The lack of basic social learning results in reduced 
understanding of social versus non-social stimuli and this further impairs social skill and 
cognitive development. The downstream effects caused by alterations in developmental 
trajectory are thought to lead to impaired socio-cognitive development in domains such 
as theory of mind (ToM; Burnside, Wright & Poulin-Dubois, 2017), which in turn leads 
to atypical social behaviors and responses (Chevallier, et al., 2012; Kohls, Chevallier & 
Schultz, 2012; Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling, Rinaldi & Brown, 1998; Miligan et al., 
2007; Rozga et al., 2011; Scheeren, de Rosnay, Koot & Begeer, 2013; Senju et al., 2012; 
Wellman et al., 2004). Moreover, proponents of this theory suggest that individual 
differences in the motivation for social rewards may play a role in shaping social 
responding across the full spectrum of the general population (Burnside et al., 2017; 
Chevallier, et al., 2012). Therefore, this theory formulates social motivation, and 
downstream effects on social ability, as an individual difference that is applicable 
regardless of the presence of any formal diagnosis. According to this idea, any 
differences in early motivation for social contact should result in altered social learning 
opportunities and, across time, result in measurable differences in social cognition, 
including ToM (Bottini, 2018; Chevallier, et al., 2012; Estes et al., 2015; Scott Van 
Zeeland et al., 2010). 
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 One of the biggest strengths of this theory is its ability to explain the social 
deficits of ASD. Proponents of the social motivation hypothesis suggest that social 
motivation provides the guidance for human social behavior and that it is the disruption 
of people’s social motivation that underpins the social deficits seen in ASD (Bottini, 
2018; Burnside et al., 2017; Chevallier, et al., 2012). More specifically, proponents of the 
theory suggest the capacity for social motivation explains individual differences in social 
behaviors including social orientation, seeking and liking behaviors, social maintenance, 
and smiling engagement (Bottini, 2018; Bowles, 2008; Chevallier, et al., 2012; Elsabbagh 
et al., 2013; Leary & Allen, 2011). When severe deficits in social motivation occur, ASD 
often result (Chevallier, et al., 2012; Choi et al., 2015; Dawson & Munson, 2002; Hobson 
& Lee, 1998; Riby & Hancock, 2008; Samson, 2013; Scott Van Zeeland et al., 2010; 
Supekar et al., 2013).  
 Social orientation, the degree to which people attend to social stimuli, is one 
critical domain of social behavior that the social motivation hypothesis may explain. For 
example, the ability to experience social information as rewarding may predict the 
tendency to orient toward sources of social information. Social motivation may drive 
people’s desire to engage in social orienting behaviors and may be present as early as 
infancy, driving infants’ preferences to attend to face-like stimuli (Elsabbagh et al., 2013; 
Gliga, Elsabbagh, Andravizou & Johnson, 2009). Additionally, another important aspect 
of social orientation is social gaze. For example, social gaze behavior, including direct 
gaze, both attracts attention and has been found to improve identification of relevant 
social cues such as a partner’s emotions and gender (Macrae, Hood, Milne, Rowe & 
Mason, 2002; Senju & Johnson, 2009; Vernetti et al., 2018).  
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Proponents of the social motivation hypothesis have claimed that if individuals 
with ASD have reduced social motivation they should engage in fewer social orientation 
behaviors (Chevallier, et al., 2012). This prediction is supported by findings in the 
literature suggesting that individuals with ASD show decreased eye contact, impairments 
in orienting to social stimuli and reduced gaze fixations on faces, especially in the eye 
region, compared to control groups (Galli et al., 2019; Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar & 
Cohen, 2002; Osterling, Dawson & Munson, 2002; Riby & Hancock, 2008). These 
findings all indicate reduced social orienting (Chevallier, et al., 2012; Clements et al., 
2018).  
In contrast to individuals with ASD, who show limited engagement in social 
orientation behaviors, individuals in the general population, seek out and engage in social 
behavior, such as social orienting behavior, frequently (Von Cranach, 1971). In fact, 
evidence suggests that people exert high levels of effort for a chance to engage in social 
interactions or access social rewards (Hayden, Parikh, Deaner & Platt, 2007; Tamir & 
Hughes, 2018; Tamir, Zaki & Mitchell, 2015). Supporting this idea, evidence also shows 
that people enjoy social interactions with both friends and strangers, especially when they 
involve the chance to cooperate and offer mutually satisfying outcomes (Fehr & Camerer, 
2007; Kawamichi et al., 2016; Tamir et al., 2015). One reason that social interactions 
may be so enjoyable is that social rewards such as smiles, agreement, trustworthy 
behavior, behavioral mimicry, etc., have been found to have intrinsic motivational value 
(Decety, Jackson, Sommerville, Chaminade & Meltzoff, 2004; Declerck, Boone & 
Emonds, 2013; Shore & Heerey, 2013; Tabibnia & Lieberman, 2007; Tamir et al., 2015).  
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Proponents also argued that people have an intrinsic motivation to engage in 
social behaviors. On average, studies have found that the exchange of social cues is 
intrinsically rewarding, whether it be engaging in general social activities such as talking 
with a group of friends, or engaging in pro-social behavior like helping others  (Carr & 
Walton, 2014; Chatzisarantis, Hagger, Smith & Sage, 2006; Chevallier, et al., 2012; 
Jaques et al., 2018; Kamalan, 2019). If this is the case, then individuals who lack social 
motivation should engage in fewer social or pro-social behaviors and put less effort into 
seeking out social rewards by behaving socially/pro-socially. Study findings supporting 
this idea show that individuals with ASD put less effort into engaging in collaborative 
activities, are less likely to seek out social rewards such as praise, initiate social 
interactions less frequently, and engage in fewer social engagement behaviors such as 
declarative pointing (Demurie, Roeyers, Baeyens & Sonuga‐Barke, 2011; Mundy, 2019; 
Mundy, Sullivan & Mastergeorge, 2009; Sepeta,Tsuchiya, Davies, Sigman, Bookheimer 
& Dapretto, 2012; Vulchanova, Ramos Cabo & Vulchanov, 2019).  
As one might predict from these results, many individuals with ASD also report 
having fewer friends than their more socially motivated peers (Howlin, Goode, Hutton & 
Rutter, 2004; Sedgewick, Hill, Yates, Pickering & Pellicano, 2016; Taheri, Perry & 
Minnes, 2016). Interestingly, despite having fewer friends, they report little to no increase 
in loneliness (Chamberlain, Kasari & Rotheram-Fuller, 2007).  This finding is consistent 
with the idea that social motivation is an important and intrinsic driver of the desire to 
form social connection by seeking social closeness with others.  
Researchers have also used the social motivation hypothesis framework to suggest 
that social maintenance behaviors, actions that elicit positive feelings in others, constitute 
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displays of social motivation. According to this idea, social motivation drives an 
individual’s ‘want’ to engage in social interactions over a prolonged period (Chevallier, 
et al., 2012; Leary & Allen, 2011). Supportive maintenance behaviors, including praise 
and flattery, help individuals connect with both social groups and other individuals by 
eliciting positive attitudes in receivers (Stafford & Canary, 1991). People who report 
higher levels of social motivation, also engage in social maintenance behaviors more 
often than do those reporting lower social motivation levels (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; 
Lakin & Chartrand, 2003, Molden, Lucas, Gardner, Dean & Knowles, 2009). Conversely, 
individuals with ASD engage in fewer social maintenance behaviors such as flattery, 
greeting behavior, and humor (Chevallier, Molesworth & Happe, 2012; Hobson & Lee, 
1998; Samson, 2013).  
Finally, proponents of the social motivation hypothesis suggest that individuals 
with ASD have deficits in representing the reward value of social stimuli and that this 
should lead to deficits in social reward processing (Bottini, 2018; Chevallier et al., 2012), 
which ultimately reduces the utility of social rewards such as eye-contact and smiles. A 
recent meta-analysis has found general support for this idea, though it also noted 
inconsistencies in some findings that appeared to relate to methodological differences 
(Bottini 2018). Specifically, studies that examined reward learning based on social 
rewards, defined as tasks that require participants to learn contingencies from social 
feedback (e.g., Choi et al., 2015; Scott Van Zeeland et al., 2010), found consistent 
support for the social motivation hypothesis. In contrast, studies that examined explicit 
reward valuation, defined as tasks in which participants rated their liking of the 
stimuli/rewards they saw (e.g., Benning et al., 2016; Ewing, Pellicano & Rhodes, 2013; 
9 
  
Gilbertson, Lutfi & Weismer, 2017), did not appear to support the social motivation 
hypothesis. That is, studies in which participants self-report their liking for social stimuli 
tend not to find ASD-related differences whereas those that examine learning from social 
rewards do appear to find such differences. Arguably, however, learning from social 
rewards requires attention to those rewards, positive valuation of those rewards, the 
ability to learn environmental contingencies, and memory for outcomes, etc. Thus, 
current research findings provide mixed support for the social motivation hypothesis, 
suggesting that further testing is needed to clarify whether individuals across the autism 
spectrum show differences in how they value social rewards. 
Importantly, there are several serious critiques against the social motivation 
hypothesis. Many of the critiques of this hypothesis suggest that deficits in social 
motivation may be far less common than typically reported (Livingston, Shah & Happé, 
2019), such that some individuals with ASD show no deficits in social motivation 
(Bottini, 2018; Garman et al., 2013; Livingston, Shah & Happé, 2019). Critiques also 
suggest that many of the ‘social deficits’ seen in individuals who experience high levels 
of ASD-related traits and individuals with ASD, have simpler, more straightforward 
explanations (Jaswal & Akhtar, 2019; Kapp, Goldknopf, Brooks, Kofner & Hossain, 
2019; Uljarević, Vivanti, Leekam & Hardan, 2019). Indeed, recent literature has shown 
that individuals with ASD, and those who experience high-levels of ASD-related traits 
use a variety of compensatory behaviors, causing them to perform as well as control 
groups in some studies. For example, many individuals with ASD learn general social 
rules that allow them to solve ToM tasks (Lai et al., 2017). A study by Livingston and 
colleagues (2019) found that individuals with ASD who showed deficits in ToM tasks, 
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were nonetheless able to overcome social challenges presented in the context of the 
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (Lord et al., 2000). In contrast to what would 
be expected by the social motivation hypothesis, these individuals used compensatory 
strategies to engage in social interactions (e.g. planning and rehearsing social 
interactions, using props, suppressing atypical behaviors, engaging in helpful behavior to 
get others to like them, etc.). Under the social motivation hypothesis framework, if one is 
not motivated to engage in social interactions, then one has no need to develop 
potentially costly compensatory behaviors for the purpose of gaining purely social 
rewards (e.g. friendships, smiles, social approval). These types of compensatory findings 
sit in contrast to the predictions proposed by the social motivation hypothesis (Jaswal & 
Akhtar, 2019; Livingston et al., 2019).  
Another critique of the social motivation hypothesis is that the behavioral 
differences thought to be caused by social motivation deficits may have simpler 
explanations. Instead of a complex explanation that involves early social deficits leading 
to downstream behavioral changes across a long period of time, critiques suggest that 
simple differences in motor control can be attributed to the social differences seen in 
ASD. Many of the claims made by the social motivation hypothesis suggest that 
individuals with ASD engage in less ‘socially motivated’ actions like eye-gaze, 
maintenance of joint attention, or declarative pointing (Abrams et al., 2013; Chevallier, et 
al., 2012; Elsabbagh et al., 2012). For example, many studies find that individuals with 
ASD engage in less declarative pointing (i.e., to share an experience) and more in 
imperative pointing (i.e., to obtain something; Baron‐Cohen, 1989; Mundy, Sigman, 
Ungerer & Sherman, 1986). However, on average individuals with ASD point less often 
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in general, especially children (Baron‐Cohen, 1989; Robins, Fein, Barton & Green, 
2001). Additionally, this lack of pointing can be easily explained by the well-documented 
finding that individuals with ASD have difficulties performing and coordinating 
intentional movements (i.e., movements that are not reactive, such as removing a hand 
from a burning stove) across their lifespan (Bhat, Landa & Galloway, 2011; Fournier, 
Hass, Naik, Lodha & Cauraugh, 2010; Grandin, 1992; MacDonald, Lord & Ulrich, 
2014). Thus, instead of lacking social motivation, it may be the case that individuals with 
ASD simply have greater difficulty performing these actions, and therefore engage in 
them less frequently.  
A similar explanation may also apply to other social behavioral deficits such as 
eye-contact. Interestingly, more socially competent individuals with ASD spend more 
time observing a speaker’s mouth compared to their eyes, suggesting that individuals 
with ASD might process social information better through speech than through eye gaze 
(Klin et al., 2002). Moreover, self-reports from individuals with ASD suggest that 
maintaining eye-contact is stressful and disrupts the processing of verbal information 
(Robledo, Donnellan & Strandt-Conroy, 2012). Thus, many of the ‘deficient’ social 
behaviors seen in individuals with ASD may be attributed to more basic explanations 
(e.g., motor control ability, trying to avoid stressful situations, etc.). Taken together, the 
social motivation hypothesis may be little more than a secondary explanation for 
phenomena that have more basic explanations.  
An additional difficulty for the social motivation hypothesis is that when 
researchers report asking individuals with ASD if they are motivated to engage in social 
interactions, the vast majority indicate they wish to participate more fully in social 
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activities (Biklen, 2005). For example, while some studies have claimed that individuals 
with ASD have no friends (Howlin et al., 2004; Sedgewick et al., 2016; Taheri et al., 
2016), a meta-analysis by Mendelson, Gates and Lerner (2016) instead finds that the vast 
majority of individuals with ASD report at least one friend. Moreover, Jaswal and Akhtar 
(2019) have suggested that for people with ASD, having fewer friends might be expected 
after a lifetime of people misunderstanding them and misinterpreting their actions. Such a 
life history might lead some individuals with ASD to no longer enjoy or seek out social 
interactions because the pain of social rejection may be greater than the pain of 
loneliness. This idea has some merit. For example, individuals with Parkinson’s Disease 
tend to speak in a slower and more controlled manner than do people without the disease 
(Benke, Hohenstein, Poewe & Butterworth, 2000). This may cause others to experience 
Parkinson’s patients as less supportive and less interested in relationships compared to 
those without Parkinson’s (Hemmesch, Tickle-Degnen & Zebrowitz, 2009). Indeed, even 
clinical practitioners tend to mischaracterize those with Parkinson’s as less extraverted, 
more neurotic, less socially interested, and less cognitively competent then they actually 
are (Lyons, Tickle-Degnen, Henry & Cohn, 2004; Tickle-Degnen & Lyons, 2004; Tickle-
Degnen, Zebrowitz & Ma, 2011). Thus, misinterpretation of the social cues individuals 
with ASD produce may lead to negative social outcomes, including fewer and lower 
quality friendships compared to non-clinical groups (Mendelson et al., 2016).  
A final critique of the social motivation hypothesis is that the findings that 
support the social motivation hypothesis may better fit a probabilistic learning framework 
(Scott Van Zeeland et al., 2010; Vernetti et al., 2018b). For example, Vernetti and 
colleagues (2018b) found that in toddlers with ASD, reward-seeking behavior towards 
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social stimuli in an eye-tracking task was intact and thereby inconsistent with the 
predictions of the social motivation hypothesis. In the task toddlers had the choice 
between two images on a screen (toy or face) and they made their selection by gazing at 
one of the images. They were then rewarded with a video of the image they looked at. 
Results showed that toddlers with ASD stared longer at videos of faces than of toys and 
smiled more at the faces then at the toys much like the non-clinical group. However, 
when the social task had a probabilistic learning element in it (i.e., rewards were not 
always gaze-contingent), toddlers with ASD then showed a lack of preference for social 
rewards. This led researchers to propose that difficulty processing event statistics, rather 
than social motivation might be driving these effects.  
Taken together, there are many reasons to question both the findings and 
theoretical underpinnings of the social motivation hypothesis. Yet despite such criticisms 
the social motivation hypothesis remains a highly influential hypothesis that is widely 
cited (Bottini, 2018; Chevallier et al., 2012; Uljarević, et al., 2019). As such, the 
assumptions of this hypothesis should be considered and further tested. Next, I 
investigate some cognitively based learning models of ASD that stand in contrast to the 
social motivation hypothesis. 
1.2 Learning and Decision Making 
Other literature takes a more cognitive view of ASD, suggesting that basic cognitive 
mechanisms rather than social reward deficits are associated with symptoms.  
Specifically, this work has suggested that cognitive abilities, such as cognitive-processing 
or learning ability are causal factors in the altered developmental trajectories and atypical 
behaviors found in individuals with ASD. Thus, cognitive theories posit that inherent 
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deficits in cognitive mechanisms (e.g., processing biases, probabilistic learning) cause 
reduced interest in and ability to learn from social interactions. Two major classes of 
cognitive hypotheses within this framework are 'cognitive processing' hypotheses, which 
generally suggest differences in processing biases account for ASD symptoms (e.g., the 
weak central coherence account; Frith, 2003; Happé & Frith, 2006)  and probabilistic 
learning hypotheses that suggest reduced ability to understand environmental event 
statistics result in ASD symptoms (Crewther & Crewther 2014; Pellicano & Burr, 2012; 
Sevgi, Diaconescu, Henco, Tittgemeyer & Schilbach, 2020; Solomon et al., 2011; 
Tzovara, Korn & Bach 2018). 
1.2.1 Weak Central Coherence Hypothesis 
The idea that people with ASD perceive and process the world in atypical ways has 
historically been a prominent cognitive theory in autism research. For example, research 
shows that people with ASD and those who report more ASD-related symptoms may 
have a bias toward “local” (perceiving fine details) versus “global” processing (tendency 
to see the big picture; Bolis & Schilbach 2018; Burghoorn, Dingemanse, van Lier & van 
Leeuwen, 2018; Crewther & Crewther, 2014; Frith & Happé, 1994; Grinter, Van Beek, 
Maybery & Badcock, 2009; Happé & Frith, 2006; López, Donnelly, Hadwin & Leekam, 
2004; Morgan, Maybery & Durkin, 2003; Pellicano et al., 2011; Van der Hallen, 
Chamberlain, de-Wit & Wagemans, 2018). This idea suggests that individuals with ASD 
have difficulty integrating details of a stimulus to obtain a gestalt or holistic impression 
leading to poor “central coherence” (Frith, 2003; Kana et al., 2013; Lovaas, Schreibman, 
Koegel, & Rhem, 1971; Van Boxtel & Lu, 2013).  
15 
  
Face processing is one domain in which holistic processing is important. People 
use holistic face processing skills every day in the context of day to day social 
interactions across the lifespan (Curby, Johnson & Tyson, 2012; Enea & Iancu, 2016; 
Kovács, Knakker, Hermann, Kovács & Vidnyánszky, 2017; Morgan & Hills, 2019). Face 
processing skills start developing early in infancy and impact how people understand 
emotions and social cues, as well as how they react in social situations. (Ke, Whalon & 
Yun, 2018; Kovács, Knakker, Hermann, Kovács & Vidnyánszky, 2017; Morgan & Hills, 
2019; Repacholi, Meltzoff, Toub & Ruba, 2016; Wang, 2019). When face processing is 
disrupted, as other clinical disorders such as schizophrenia, this disruption may lead to 
social difficulty (Chamberlain, McManus, Riley, Rankin & Brunswick, 2013; Dawson et 
al., 2005; De Crescenzo et al., 2019; Earls, Curran & Mittal, 2016; Lang, Lopez, Stahl, 
Tchanturia & Treasure, 2014; Lopez, Tchanturia, Stahl & Treasure, 2008; Silverstein et 
al., 2014).  
 The presence of processing biases in ASD has generated several hypotheses about 
autism. One of the more prevalent hypotheses is known as the weak central coherence 
hypothesis (Frith, 2003; Happé & Frith, 2006). The idea behind this hypothesis is that the 
cognitive systems responsible for integrating individual points of information into a 
‘whole’ context or gestalt is weak which results in a cognitive bias towards local 
information (individual aspects of a context) versus global or wholistic aspects of the 
entire context (Happé & Frith, 2006; Plaisted, Saksida, Alcántara & Weisblatt, 2003). 
From a neurological perspective, proponents of the ‘weak central coherence’ hypothesis 
point to studies that have shown there is poor neural connectivity between 
interhemispheric regions of the brain (e.g., distal and proximal regions including the 
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frontal lobe and parietal lobe; Belmonte, Allen, Beckel-Mitchener, Boulanger, Carper & 
Webb, 2004; Just, Cherkassky, Keller & Minshew, 2004; Rane, Cochran, Hodge, 
Haselgrove, Kennedy & Frazier, 2015), while intrahemispheric neural connectivity is 
increased (Belmonte et al., 2004; Rane et al., 2015; Rubenstein & Merzenich, 2003; 
Vissers, Cohen & Geurts, 2012;). Such findings suggest that these neural differences are, 
at least in part, responsible for the local processing biases seen in individuals with ASD 
(Happé, 2005; Happé & Frith, 2006 Just et al., 2004). This viewpoint has led to the 
central prediction that individuals with ASD should preferentially use local versus global 
processing pathways (Bolis & Schilbach 2018; Frith & Happé, 1994). This prediction 
must be true for the weak central coherence hypothesis to hold any merit, as it is the main 
explanation for the social symptoms associated with ASD.  
Additionally, if theories such as the central coherence hypothesis are to be 
supported, one should predict processing biases to occur regardless of domain being 
processed (e.g. social and non-social domains). This idea has been supported by research 
finding that individuals with ASD and those who report high levels of ASD-related traits 
in the general population, often have enhanced local processing and reduced global 
processing skill compared to those without ASD, or those with fewer traits (Burghoorn, 
Dingemanse, van Lier & van Leeuwen, 2018; Crewther & Crewther, 2014; Grinter, Van 
Beek, Maybery & Badcock, 2009; Happé & Frith, 2006; Pellicano et al., 2011). 
Moreover, literature in this area has grown considerably over time, suggesting that this 
finding is generally reliable (Simmons, Robertson, McKay, Toal, McAleer & Pollick, 
2009). Much of the literature assesses this hypothesis using non-social domain tasks like 
the "embedded figures" task (e.g., Burghoorn, et al., 2018; Van der Hallen, et al., 2018). 
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In addition, other tasks such as the block design subscale of the Wechsler Intelligence 
Scales, Mental Rotation task, Navon Figures task and the “homograph task” have also 
provided strong support for the idea that individuals with ASD, as well as those who 
report ASD-related traits, perform better on tasks that require local processing, rather 
global processing (Conson et al., 2013; Deruelle, Rondan, Gepner & Fagot, 2006; Grinter 
et al., 2009; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999; Pellicano, Maybery, Durkin & Maley, 2006; 
Snowling & Frith, 1989).   
This preference for local processing in ASD can also be found in social domains, 
using social versions of embedded figures and similar tasks (Hobson, Ouston & Lee, 
1988; Russell-Smith, Maybery, Bayliss & Sng, 2012), as well as other methodologies 
(Behrmann  et al., 2006; Skorich et al., 2016). An interesting study by Skorich and 
colleagues (2016) found a positive relationship between the number of autistic traits 
participants endorsed and the degree of local social categorization that occurred. 
Additionally, this relationship was predictive of the ability to make mental state 
inferences. This is an important link, as it shows that perceptual preferences not only 
affect social cognitive skills but may also affect the outcomes of social interactions. 
 Despite its supporting evidence, the theory is not without criticisms. One 
important criticism is that weak central coherence is not universally present in all 
individuals with ASD or those in the general population who show many ASD-related 
traits. Indeed, some people show fully intact global processing skills (Hayward, Fenerci 
& Ristic, 2018; Hoy et al., 2004; Mottron, Burack, Iarocci, Belleville & Enns, 2003). 
This is further emphasized in a meta-analysis by Muth, Hönekopp and Falter (2014), 
which found that the effect sizes of performances for tasks like EFT, Mental Rotation 
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task, Navon Figures task, and Block Design task were much smaller than expected and 
heterogeneity was high. Worse yet, when they removed outliers in the data, the enhanced 
performance of individuals with ASD disappeared. The large degree of heterogeneity in 
the processes that underlie ASD symptoms weaken the claims made by proponents of the 
weak central coherence hypothesis and suggest that, at best, they can only explain some 
features of this disorder.  
Another possibility that researchers have proposed is that enhanced local 
processing in the context of decreased global processing might not be evidence for a real 
cause of the disorder and might instead reflect another cognitive impairment (Bernardino 
et al., 2012; Gómez et al., 2014; Hayward, Fenerci & Ristic, 2018; Muth et al., 2014). For 
example, Bernardino and colleagues (2012) found that group differences between 
individuals with ASD and controls in local processing tasks disappeared when groups 
were matched for intellectual disabilities. Indeed, it might be the case that studies that 
ignore, or do not properly control for individual differences are the ones reporting the 
largest effects for these theories.  
Finally, Pellicano and Burr (2012) have suggested that the weak central coherence 
findings might be better explained in the framework of probabilistic learning theories, 
with the focus being more related to the ability to learn from probabilistically reinforced 
contingencies, rather than local versus global processing. Both theories suggest 
mechanisms to explain the differences in how individuals integrate information from the 
environment, but Pellicano and Burr (2012) have suggested predictive learning models 
might fit the data better. This is further supported by Gómez and colleagues (2014) who 
have suggested that neurological models of ASD cannot be explained by simple 
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processing biases, but require a probabilistic explanation either in conjunction with or as 
the main explanation for the social symptoms of ASD.   
1.2.2 Probabilistic Learning Hypotheses  
Reinforcement learning has been described as the process by which an individual 
learns stimulus-feedback predictions through trial and error (Atkinson & Wickens, 1971; 
Cohen, 2008; Erev, Bereby-Meyer & Roth, 1999; Erev & Roth, 1998; Sutton & Barto, 
2018). This process involves exploring actions and evaluating their outcomes. These 
predictions are then used to guide behavior. More specifically, this process involves 
learning action-outcome associations implicitly from the environment, as well as 
adopting the optimal balance of “exploration” and “exploitation” of behavioral options to 
achieve maximum reward (Sutton & Barto, 2018). Under reinforcement learning models, 
the consistency with which an action is rewarded, and the value of the reward drives the 
speed of learning (Evans & Over, 1996; Kaelbling, Littman & Moore, 1996; Niv, 2009). 
Based on this idea, more reliably reinforced actions (those with deterministic 
reinforcement schedules) lead to faster learning of an action-outcome contingency than 
do less reliably reinforced actions (more probabilistic; Bereby-Meyer & Roth, 2006; Erev 
et al., 1999).  
 As the majority of learning, developing contingencies and forming beliefs 
throughout life is not perfectly reliable or certain, cognitive research in learning has 
sought to create models for this process, which has led to a series of probabilistic models 
(Chanter, Tenenbaum & Yuille, 2006). These probabilistic learning models have been 
used to explain human learning for decades. While most of the early research supporting 
probabilistic learning models showed evidence that humans learn probabilistic 
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contingencies from both the stimuli and feedback in non-social environments (Evans & 
Over, 1996; Manktelow, Sutherland & Over, 1995; Oaksford & Chater, 2001), more 
recent work shows that it applies in social environments as well (Gaigg, & Bowler, 2007; 
Solomon et al., 2015; Solomon et al., 2011; Vascon et al., 2014).  Specifically, the ability 
to learn from probabilistically reinforced responses is important to many different aspects 
of people’s social ability including the understanding of social signals (e.g., approval, 
invitation, etc.), detecting and responding to facial expressions and emotions, inferring 
appropriate social behavior within a social context, and responding to social requests 
(Gaigg, & Bowler, 2007; Frank, 2014; Li, Xu, Gan, Tan & Lim, 2017; Stevens, Peters, 
Abraham & Hermann, 2014; Vascon et al., 2014; Vitale, Williams, Johnston & 
Boccignone, 2014). However, more recent research has expanded the scope of this work 
to ask how individual differences in the ability to learn from environmental stimuli 
influence social ability (Kaufman et al., 2010; Santesso et al., 2008; van den Bos, Crone 
& Güroğlu, 2012; Yechiam et al., 2010). Generally, this work tends to suggest that the 
better people are at learning from probabilistic contingencies, the better they should 
perform on tasks with elements of ambiguity, such as social interactions.  
One group of individuals who appear to show atypical probabilistic learning 
mechanisms are individuals with ASD. An interesting and reasonably consistent finding 
is that while those who report more ASD-traits, or are diagnosed with ASD, learn from 
perfectly reliable “deterministic” feedback at similar rates compared to those who report 
fewer traits, differences appear when feedback becomes less reliable (i.e., probabilistic; 
D’Cruz et al., 2013; Lawson, 2017; Palmer, Lawson & Hohwy, 2017; Pellicano & Burr, 
2012; Solomon et al., 2015; Solomon et al., 2011; Schuetze, Rohr, Dewey, McCrimmon 
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& Bray, 2017;Van Boxtel & Lu, 2013). Unreliable feedback is naturally more difficult 
for people to learn from (Chater et al., 2006; Oaksford & Chater, 2001; Shepard, 1987), 
but ASD-related traits seem to enhance the difficulty of learning under probabilistic 
feedback contingencies (Amoruso et al., 2019; D’Cruz et al., 2013; Gaigg, & Bowler, 
2007; Lawson, 2017; Solomon et al., 2015).  
Interestingly, people’s ability to learn from probabilistic feedback appears to be 
affected by the type of feedback from which they learn. For example, evidence shows 
that individuals with ASD performed worse on a probabilistic learning task when the 
feedback was social in nature (faces), compared to non-clinical groups. The same study 
found no performance differences for a monetary feedback condition (Van Zeeland, 
Dapretto, Ghahremani, Poldrack & Bookheimer, 2010). These results have been 
replicated in similar studies (Lin et al., 2012), leading researchers to suggest that 
individuals with ASD have impaired responses to social stimuli (Chambon et al., 2017; 
Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling, Rinaldi & Brown, 1998; Lin et al., 2012; Scott‐Van 
Zeeland et al., 2010). However, given that in at least some studies, individuals with ASD 
both report and show intact responses to social reward, it may be the case that the 
underlying difficulties are more related to learning under probabilistic reinforcement. 
There is some support for this idea in the literature. Specifically, research has found no 
differences in performance between groups when a task is simple and contingencies are 
easy to learn but demonstrated that differences arise when task contexts become more 
complex and therefore ambiguous (Yechiam et al., 2010). Thus, it may be that it is the 
ambiguous nature of the social situations, and not the social feedback itself that causes 
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the social deficits seen individual with ASD. If this is the case, then a probabilistic 
framework for ASD is likely the most appropriate approach.  
Demonstrating the impact of ambiguity and reliability, a study by Sevgi and 
colleagues (2020), found that there was a relationship in a general-population sample 
between the number of endorsed ASD-related traits and participants’ ability to learn 
during periods of high task uncertainty. Specifically, individuals who reported more 
ASD-related traits made poor use of environmental cues and performed worse on an 
associative learning task, compared to individuals who reported fewer ASD-traits. One 
reason for these performance differences, according to the researchers, was that low-
symptom participants appeared to update their expectations about the environmental 
contingencies more often. Specifically, when environmental contingencies were stable, 
these low-symptom participants relied on cues provided by the environment but when 
these cues became less reliable these participants explored the possibility that new 
contingencies were in operation. In contrast, participants who reported higher levels of 
ASD-traits showed much more difficulty adapting to changing environmental 
contingencies. 
The findings of Sevgi and colleagues (2020) also supports some probabilistic 
learning hypotheses that further clarify what constitutes this atypical learning, suggesting 
that this atypical probabilistic learning in individuals with ASD are driven by an altered 
use of environmental information to form contingencies (Pellicano & Burr, 2012). The 
idea is that individuals with ASD might inappropriately make estimates about the 
volatility of the environment and the cues it provides (Lawson, Rees, & Friston, 2014). 
This may lead to difficulty interpreting and learning from new information because the 
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estimates/expected outcomes associated with that information may not be updated 
accurately. That is, because contingencies in environments in the real world often change, 
individuals often must weigh new information in the context of prior expectations to 
come up with new/updated contingencies. Supporting this, studies have found that 
individuals who are diagnosed with ASD are more likely to over-estimate the volatility of 
the environment which results in impairments in the ability to learn stable expectations 
(Lawson, 2017; Palmer, Lawson & Hohwy, 2017). These findings not only apply to 
clinical populations but also to individuals within the general population (Bolis & 
Schilbach 2018; Sevgi et al., 2020). 
  Probabilistic learning challenges are not limited to the domain of learning new 
contingencies but are also found in the process of unlearning old contingencies and 
replacing them with new ones. For example, one study showed that in a probabilistic 
reversal-learning task, individuals who were diagnosed with ASD had trouble sticking to 
newly learned contingencies and reverted back to behaviors consistent with old 
contingencies more often than did participants without such diagnoses (D'Cruz et al., 
2013, South et al., 2014). This type of behavior has been likened to the rigid and 
repetitive behavior people with ASD often show in both the social and non-social 
domains (South, Ozonoff & McMahon, 2005). Thus, probabilistic learning difficulties 
may explain both the social behavior deficits and non-social behavioral impairments in 
ASD.   
Another strength to the probabilistic learning framework is that it can explain 
some of the non-social aspects of ASD. For example, individuals with ASD learn fear 
associations more slowly than do those without such diagnoses when the to-be-learned 
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association is less reliably reinforced (Chamberlain et al., 2013; Gaigg, & Bowler, 2007). 
In studies that have a deterministic link between the conditioned stimulus and the 
unconditioned stimulus, individuals with ASD learn the association between the two at 
the same rates as control groups (Bernier, Dawson, Panagiotides & Webb, 2005; Sterling 
et al., 2013). These findings emphasize how deficits in probabilistic learning mechanisms 
may underpin a variety of social and non-social behaviors across the autism spectrum.  
Even though these findings seem as though they might explain many of the social 
and non-social deficits in ASD, much of this work suffers from methodological 
limitations. For one, some of these findings rely on a common probabilistic learning task 
(see Frank, 2005), that suffers from stimulus-related irregularities that can cause poor 
test-retest reliability as well as confound findings (Baker et al., 2013; Schutte et al., 
2017). In addition, researchers have defined “social” and “non-social” stimuli in highly 
inconsistent ways. For example, stimuli defined as ‘social’ include many non-social 
elements, like flashing lights (Birmingham, Bischof & Kingstone, 2009; Chambon et al., 
2017; Robic et al., 2016), which can co-occur thus confounding results (social or non-
social elements). Still, other studies have relied on non-social objects such as emojis 
(Weiß, Mussel & Hewig, 2019), meaning that results are not necessarily strong tests of 
response differences to social stimuli. Thus, prior results might be confounded by the 
types of “social” stimuli used across different tasks (Aberg et al., 2016; Chambon et al., 
2017).  
An additional concern in this literature domain is that not all studies find support 
for probabilistic learning deficits in individuals with ASD (Brown, Aczel, Jiménez, 
Kaufman & Grant, 2010; Nemeth et al., 2014; South et al., 2014). For example, one study 
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found that that there were no differences in Iowa Gambling Task performance between 
children with and without ASD (Faja, Murias, Beauchaine, & Dawson, 2013). Another 
found that children with ASD develop and update their contingencies from probabilistic 
environments at a similar rate to controls (Manning, Kilner, Neil, Karaminis & Pellicano, 
2017). Lastly, South and colleagues (2014) found improved performance in participants 
with ASD during the Iowa Gambling Task, such that individuals in the ASD group were 
quicker to learn the deck contingencies and more likely to pick the advantageous deck, 
than were those in the control group. These inconsistencies suggest the possibility that 
learning mechanisms are intact in at least some people with ASD, although 
methodological differences might be responsible for these divergent results. 
1.3 What can we learn from these prominent autism 
hypotheses?  
This diverse set of theories rooted in learning mechanisms suggests several common 
themes associated with ASD-related traits. First, all these theories suggest that 
individuals with ASD have deficits in learning that are the result of alterations in how 
they incorporate information from the environment. Second, many of the studies 
described in this section also seem to suggest that individuals with ASD or ASD-related 
traits learn better from/show a preference for non-social stimuli and non-social feedback 
over social stimuli and social feedback. One explanation for this suggestion is that the 
social environment is more complex, more ambiguous, and less predictable than the non-
social environment. Therefore, it is more difficult to learn from social feedback and more 
difficult to develop a sense of the “value” or “utility” of this feedback, compared to non-
social feedback. Thus, learning deficits are most prominent when learning from 
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ambiguous stimuli or in contexts with an element of unpredictability, as is the case with 
both probabilistic feedback during contingency learning tasks and social feedback in the 
social environment. Because cause and effect relationships are weaker in social 
environments, the behavioral differences become more remarkable and prominent in the 
social domain between those with and without ASD.  
If people diagnosed with ASD and those that experience symptoms of ASD 
struggle to learn from probabilistic contingencies, this would explain why the primary 
symptoms of this disorder are social deficits. More specifically, in order to function in the 
world, it is necessary to understand the naturally occurring, probabilistically reinforced 
and ambiguous contingencies that operate within different social environments and across 
different social partners (Pellicano & Burr, 2012; Robic et al., 2015). For example, 
nonverbal social cues are particularly ambiguous both because their configuration 
depends on a sender’s physical characteristics and because individual senders use these 
cues differently in different situations. There is also a high degree of heterogeneity in the 
use of certain cues in particular types of situations (Bartz, Zaki, Bolger &Ochsner, 2011; 
Derks, Bos & Von Grumbkow, 2007; Tanis & Postmes, 2003). 
Furthermore, if stimuli (e.g., social situations) become too ambiguous, people 
must tolerate a certain degree of uncertainty (i.e., prediction error, surprise) to properly 
learn contingencies. If one views previous findings not from the proposed theoretical 
perspective (e.g., social motivation hypothesis, weak central coherence hypothesis), but 
instead from a probabilistic framework, the study data suggest that many of the ASD-
related social symptoms are better explained as a product of altered cognitive processes 
(Pellicano & Burr, 2012; Van de Cruys et al., 2014). As previously stated, the less 
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deterministic an environment is, the more difficulty individuals have learning the 
contingencies within it (Evans & Over, 1996; Manktelow, Sutherland & Over, 1995; 
Oaksford & Chater, 2001). Thus, the fact that the social world is less deterministic than 
the physical world (Derks, Bos & Von Grumbkow, 2007; Wyer & Srull, 1986) might be a 
better explanation of ASD-related social deficits than either reduced social motivation or 
weak central coherence. Specifically, the naturally probabilistic occurrence of social 
rewards (Fiedler, 1996) may make them more difficult to learn and therefore less 
valuable to those with ASD (Bottini, 2018; Chevallier, et al., 2012). In addition, the fact 
that they are more ambiguous may also make them more difficult to contextualize and 
generalize for those with ASD.  
1.3.1 General Theoretical and Methodological Limitations  
Despite their long history in the world of autism research, these theories share 
methodological limitations. One of the most glaring limitations across the research field 
is the use of small participant samples (e.g., Bottini, 2018; Dawson et al., 1998; Lin et al., 
2012; Manning et al., 2017; Muth et al., 2014; Sevgi et al., 2020; Solomon et al., 2015; 
Solomon et al., 2011, Van der Hallen et al., 2018). Indeed, several research groups have 
noted that small underpowered samples can have serious effects on the likelihood that a 
statistically significant finding reflects a true effect (Button et al., 2013; Camerer et al., 
2018; Kühberger, Fritz & Scherndl, 2014; Simonsohn, 2015). In addition, many of the 
studies in this literature have been conducted using non-double blind designs, in which 
participants are recruited based on the presence/absence of particular characteristics and 
then tested by researchers who know both the study group and the hypotheses. Evidence 
shows that researchers can inadvertently communicate this knowledge to participants, 
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thereby serving to magnify group differences in unintended ways (Canter, Hammond & 
Youngs, 2013; Gilder & Heerey, 2018; Rosenthal, 1994; Sheldrake, 1998). Thus, the 
field should work toward replication efforts using larger samples, double blind methods 
and methods that are more resistant to potential confounds.  
 There are also several theoretical limitations to these theories. The most serious of 
these relates to the generalization of research findings to everyday life. Much of the 
literature that reports differences between participants with and without ASD/ASD-traits 
links these differences theoretically to social function, and specifically to the deficits that 
most prominently characterize ASD. Unfortunately, however, the previous research 
offers few direct tests of the links between symptoms and/or cognitive function and 
natural, real-world social behavior. Additionally, the few direct tests that have occurred 
have typically included young children or early adolescents or have focused on 
constrained situations in which specific set of “social skills” can be measured 
(Bauminger, 2002; Dissanayake & Crossley, 1996; McLaughlin-Cheng, 1998; Van 
Wijngaarden-Cremers et al., 2014; White, Keonig & Scahill, 2007). Thus, these links are 
mostly theoretical. Empirically linking the theoretical cognitive and motivational 
underpinnings of social behavior with direct face-to-face social behavior would greatly 
strengthen these arguments and provide additional research and therapeutic targets. 
Without this, conclusions about how the empirical findings relate to actual behavior are 
merely theoretical.  
 A second issue in this literature is that there are many inconsistent findings within 
the context of each theory. That is, some studies confirm predictions whereas others find 
inconclusive or contrary results (Bottini, 2018; Chevallier, et al., 2012; Muth et al., 2014; 
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Obeid, Brooks, Powers, Gillespie-Lynch & Lum, 2016; Van der Hallen et al., 2018). 
Some of the inconsistencies, and heterogeneity of autism-symptomatology have been 
explained by the possibility that there are different ‘phenotypes’ of autism, such that no 
one theory might be able to explain the full spectrum of autism but each might be able to 
explain certain ‘phenotypes’ of autism (Charman et al., 2001; Happé & Ronald, 2008; 
Ronald & Hoekstra, 2011). Nonetheless, the existence of different ‘types’ of autism, and 
what those types might be, is currently unknown. Until such clarification occurs, 
ambiguity and inconsistency will need to be tolerated. 
1.4 Current Research 
The empirical chapters of this dissertation test several hypotheses related to 
understanding the relationships between social motivation, learning mechanisms and real-
life social behavior. All the samples reported here consist of members of the general 
population. I made this decision for several reasons. One reason was individuals in the 
general population are less likely to have co-morbidities, such as social anxiety and 
depression, as those who are clinically diagnosed with ASD and the effects of these co-
morbidities can be difficult to disentangle in the literature (Mazzone, Ruta & Reale, 
2012; Volkmar, State & Klin, 2009). More specifically, across the general population at 
any given point, common disorders such as anxiety and depression are 4.4% and 3.6% 
respectively, whereas in the adult population with ASD, the rates of these disorders, at 
any given point, are 27% and 33% respectively (Hollocks, Lerh, Magiati, Meiser-
Stedman & Brugha, 2019; World Health Organization, 2017). Thus, members of the 
general population are far less likely to be impacted by clinically significant anxiety and 
depression compared to those diagnosed with ASDs. Additionally, the use of a general 
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population sample allows large double blinded studies, thereby avoiding issues with 
underpowered studies that might be impacted by experimenter effects. Lastly, evidence 
suggests that autism symptoms occur along a spectrum, such that endorsement of those 
traits confers risk for deficits in proportion to the number of endorsed traits (Constantino, 
2011; Horder, Wilson, Mendez & Murphy, 2014; Ingersoll, 2010; Jones et al., 2013; 
Sevgi et al., 2020), rather than a more binary categorization that would sharply 
differentiate those with and without diagnoses (Jones et al., 2013; Lauritsen, 2013; 
Volkmar et al., 2009).  
To measure individuals’ autism traits across the spectrum, all participants 
completed the Autism-spectrum Quotient scale (Baron-Cohen, et al., 2001). This scale is 
commonly used across the literature to measure autism-traits, and while it is a non-
clinical scale, it has been found that individuals who score 32 or greater on it, out of a 
possible score of 50, have an 80% likelihood of meeting diagnostic the criteria for an 
ASD (Baron-Cohen, et al., 2001). This suggests it has reasonable validity for the traits it 
is measuring.  
Thus, from a methodological standpoint, the use of a general population sample 
enhances statistical power and reduces possible confounds. However, the use of non-
clinical samples precludes certain conclusions about autism as a disorder more generally. 
I discuss this limitation further in the discussion section (Chapter 6) of this work. 
The empirical chapters in this work are organized by the theoretical questions 
being answered, rather than by specific “studies”. Each chapter investigates different 
predictions made by the major theories of autism discussed in this introduction (i.e., the 
social motivation hypothesis, weak central coherence hypothesis and probabilistic 
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learning theories). I chose this organization because many of the samples I analyze speak 
to multiple theoretical questions. This layout choice has led to some samples of 
participants being referenced across several chapters, as participants often completed a 
series of tasks that help answer questions across several prominent ASD hypotheses. 
Figure 1 presents a conceptualization of how the participant samples are analyzed. 
 
In Chapter 2, I test two ideas related to the social motivation hypothesis. 
According to the predictions of this hypothesis, I would expect individuals who report 
higher-levels of ASD-related traits, especially in the domains of social skill and 
communication difficulties, to be less sensitive to social rewards compared to non-social 
 
Figure 1. Schematic of Dissertation Organization. 
Note: ALT = Associative Learning Task, ASD = Autism Spectrum Disorder, L-EFT = Leuven Embedded 
Figures Task, LDT = Line Discrimination Task, PST = Probabilistic Selection Task, SI = Social 
Interaction, SVT = Smile Valuation Task  
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rewards. To test this idea, I first examine these relationships in individuals from the 
general population to see whether self-reported autism-spectrum traits relate to sensitivity 
to social and non-social reinforcers in a reward sensitivity task (Pizzagalli, Jahn, & 
O’Shea, 2005). Second, I test the hypothesis that individuals who report more ASD-
related traits will show evidence of reduced perceptions of subjective value or utility for 
social versus non-social rewards. The goal of this hypothesis was to test whether, in the 
general population, there is a link between self-reported autism-spectrum traits and the 
degree to which specific social reinforcers (genuine and polite smiles) bias participants’ 
decisions in a smile valuation task (Heerey & Gilder, 2019). If data are consistent with 
these predictions, it will provide strong evidence for the social motivation hypothesis and 
expand upon the literature in that field.  
Chapter 3 examines the weak central coherence hypothesis suggestion that global 
versus local processing biases differ amongst those reporting high and low levels of ASD 
traits. Hypotheses that suggest weak central coherence as an explanation for ASD-related 
traits predict that individuals who report more ASD traits will have an advantage over 
those with fewer traits in terms of their ability to use local, relative to global processing 
pathways to parse complex stimuli. My goal is to test whether, in the general population, 
there is a link between self-reported autism-spectrum traits and participants' local 
processing ability using the Leuven Embedded Figures Task (de-Wit, et al., 2017). In this 
study, I use a larger variety of ASD-related trait measures, along with an additional 
measure of social ability: the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001). 
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Chapter 4 examines the predictions of probabilistic learning hypotheses which 
suggest that ASD traits are the product of altered probabilistic learning mechanisms. 
These hypotheses predict that individuals who report more ASD-related traits will learn 
better from non-social relative to social rewards and from reinforcement schedules that 
are more deterministic rather than probabilistic. To test this hypothesis, participants 
completed a probabilistic selection task (Frank, Seeberger & O'Reilly, 2004; Solomon et 
al., 2011) with social and non-social reinforcement. Additionally, I examined whether 
individuals who report higher-levels of ASD-related traits have deficits in the ability to 
make predictions and update their contingencies using social versus non-social cues 
during periods of volatility. To test this hypothesis, participants completed an associative 
learning task (Behrens, et al., 2008; Sevgi, et al., 2020) with social and non-social 
reinforcement blocks. If data are consistent with predictions it will demonstrate both 
evidence about the nature and cognitive underpinnings of social behavior, as well as 
provide a mechanism for understanding the social deficits that individuals with ASD 
manifest.  
Finally, in Chapter 5, I aim to relate cognitive performance to naturalistic social 
behavior. I do this by asking participants to complete a short, naturalistic social 
interaction with a partner, obtaining both participants ratings of interaction quality and 
liking for the partner, along with video recordings of participants’ social behavior. The 
data from these partner-ratings and behavior are then correlated with relevant 
performance metrics on the cognitive tasks. These data will allow us to better understand 
both the specific social outcomes associated with ASD, as well as the larger associations 
between cognitive performance and real social ability.  
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The overarching goal for this dissertation, is to find out which theories of autism 
the data in this dissertation best support and how these theories relate to social behavior. I 
also aim to test these ideas using large participant samples and double-blind research 
methods. This dissertation will provide evidence about what underlying general 
mechanisms drive social behavior and differences in social ability more generally. This 
will allow for future research to be directed towards theories that provide promising 
avenues for explaining the social deficits associated with ASD. Thus, I aim to lay the 
groundwork for how cognitive processes underpin and support people’s social behaviors. 
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2 Testing the Social Motivation Hypothesis of Autism  
Over the past few decades, theories about motivation, and reward value have been 
gaining momentum as possible explanations for the symptoms and behaviors associated 
with ASD-related traits (Chevallier et al., 2012; Damiano, Aloi, Treadway, Bodfish & 
Dichter, 2012; Senju et al., 2009; Turner-Brown et al., 2011; Wellman et al., 2012). 
Findings from this literature have largely coalesced into the social motivation theory of 
autism (Chevallier et al., 2012). The social motivation theory suggests that ASD are the 
result of early-onset deficits in attention to social stimuli that result in altered response 
patterns to these stimuli.  
In this chapter I investigate two central assumptions based on these theories in a 
general population sample. First, I address the question of whether individuals who 
endorse more ASD traits are less sensitive to social rewards compared to non-social 
rewards, relative to those who endorse fewer ASD traits. Second, I examine whether 
autism spectrum-traits are associated with how much people value social rewards. 
Specifically, I predict that those endorsing more ASD-traits should show reduced 
valuation of social rewards relative to those endorsing fewer traits. Importantly, the 
studies in this chapter test these ideas using double-blind conditions and well-powered 
samples.  
2.1 Research Question 1: Reward Sensitivity  
This study investigated the link between autism-spectrum traits and reward 
sensitivity in a general undergraduate sample and exposed them to a series of tasks under 
both social and non-social reinforcement. I examined participants’ general sensitivity to 
36 
  
reinforcement using an “asymmetric reinforcement” task (Pizzagalli, Jahn, & O’Shea, 
2005) that allowed us to assess the development of response bias in the presence of social 
versus non-social rewards.  
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Participants  
I recruited 160 participants (see Table 1 for demographic characteristics and 
group comparisons) from the Western Psychology Participant Pool (SONA; N=109) 
along with a mixed community sample recruited using advertisements and word of mouth 
(N=51). Sample size was determined by a power analysis (see Appendix B for details; 
similarly, all sample sizes were selected this way). Participants completed a line-
discrimination task alongside a series of questionnaires in the context of a larger study 
that included a probabilistic learning task and a social interaction, which are described in 
later chapters (See chapter 4 and chapter 5 respectively). In exchange for participation, 
participants received partial course credit or a small payment of $15 per study session. 
All participants also received a small monetary bonus earned in the tasks. Participants 
completed the task over two study sessions. Of the 160 participants recruited, 75 (47%) 
participants completed both sessions and the remaining 85 (53%) completed one session. 
This meant that I was unable to compare performance across sessions for 53% of 
participants. 
I removed 12 participants’ data from analysis due to inattentiveness, defined as 
failing to receive at least 85% of the available rewards in the task or if participants’ 
responses were faster than 250ms or slower than 5000ms on more than 30% of trials. I set 
this criterion to ensure participants attended to enough feedback to learn the task 
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contingencies. I classified participants as endorsing either low or high levels of autism 
spectrum traits based on a median split of their total score on the Autism-spectrum 
Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, et al., 2001). I classified participants who scored 17 or 
lower as “low ASD trait participants” and those who scored above 17 as “high ASD trait 
participants.” The Western University Nonmedical Ethics Board approved all study 
procedures and participants documented their informed consent prior to participating.  
Table 1. Participant characteristics and Demographic Information 
AQ Group High ASD 
traits 
(AQ > 17) 
Low ASD 
traits 
(AQ ≤ 17) 
F df p 
n 79 81    
Score Range 18-45 6-17    
Sex (Female:Male) * 46:31 45:36 0.28 1,155 .597 
Age in years 20.8 (4.4) 21.0 (4.5) 0.13 1,154 .723 
Autism-spectrum Quotient      
Total Score 23.7 (5.1) 13.7 (2.4) 250.65 1, 157 <.001 
Social Skills 4.0 (2.8) 1.3 (1.4) 61.96 1, 157 <.001 
Attention Shifting 6.3 (1.8) 3.6 (1.4) 107.73 1, 157 <.001 
Attention to Detail 6.56 (2.0) 5.36 (2.0) 14.32 1, 157 <.001 
Communication 3.7 (1.9) 1.7 (1.4) 61.69 1, 157 <.001 
Imagination 3.2 (1.8) 1.9 (1.3) 25.22 1, 157 <.001 
Big Five Inventory      
     Extraversion  28.7 (5.7) 22.1 (7.4) 9.72 1, 157 .003 
     Agreeableness 31.8 (5.0) 34.4 (6.1) 2.42 1, 157 .128 
     Conscientiousness 33.5 (4.1) 35.8 (4.4) 3.10 1, 157 .086 
     Neuroticism 26.5 (7.9) 24.8 (6.3) 0.57 1, 157 .454 
     Openness 35.2 (5.1) 37.3 (4.9) 1.83 1, 157 .184 
Behavioral Inhibition/ 
Behavioral Activation 
Scales (BIS/BAS) 
     
     BIS 28.3 (3.4) 26.3 (3.6) 9.79 1, 157 .002 
     Fun Seeking 15.7 (2.8) 17.4 (2.3) 16.92 1, 157 <.001 
     Drive 15.3 (2.3) 15.8 (1.9) 2.66 1, 157 .105 
     Reward Responsiveness 20.9 (2.4) 21.3 (2.4) 0.78 1, 157 .378 
Brief Fear of Negative 
Evaluation Scale 
35.5 (8.1) 37.7 (10.3) 2.29 1, 157 .132 
Note. Table reports means (SDs in parentheses) and comparison test statistics. 
Comparisons tested with ANOVA except where noted. Three participants did not report 
their ages; two did not report sex information. * Comparison tested with Chi-Squared. 
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2.2.2 Procedures  
This study involved two testing sessions, separated by a week. In the first session, 
participants completed a series of questionnaires (the AQ and several personality 
measures; see Table 1) and a version of the reward sensitivity task, with either monetary 
or social reinforcement. In the second session, participants completed a second version of 
reward sensitivity task with the reinforcer to which they had not been exposed in session 
1. Participants received monetary and social reinforcement in counterbalanced order. I 
used E-prime 2.0 to present the stimuli and collect responses (Psychology Software 
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Notably, this study used a double-blind design such that 
participants’ status as high or low ASD trait participants remained unknown until the end 
of data collection. 
2.2.2.1 Reward Sensitivity Task  
The goal of this task was to measure reward sensitivity based on the development 
of reward-related response bias over the course of the task (Pizzagalli, Jahn, & O’Shea, 
2005). The task instructed participants to earn as many rewards as possible by correctly 
identifying a line that appeared briefly on the screen as either “long” or “short”. 
Participants identified the line using a key press (either the “1” key or the “2” key; 
key/line-length mappings were counterbalanced across subjects and sessions).  
On each trial of the task, participants viewed a centrally presented fixation cross 
(1000ms duration). A frame (either a circle or a square, 18mm wide; for a participant 
seated .5 meter from the screen, this represents a visual angle of 2.062°) then appeared. 
After 500ms, a line appeared within the frame (either horizontally or vertically oriented). 
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The line remained visible for 100ms before disappearing. The frame was visible until 
participants made a response. Frame and line orientation were consistent for all the trials 
within a session, and participants experienced both frames and both line orientations 
across the two sessions in counterbalanced order. The long and short lines were similar in 
length (13mm as measured on screen [1.490°] and 12mm [1.375°] respectively), making 
the task relatively difficult. 
Participants completed three blocks of 100 trials. Within each block, participants 
experienced 50 “short-” and 50 “long-line” trials, randomly ordered. The computer 
provided rewards on a pseudo-random selection of 40 correct trials. The task never gave 
participants feedback if they chose incorrectly. If participants made an incorrect response 
on a trial that was scheduled for reward, the reward was dispensed on the next trial of the 
same type that was not scheduled for reinforcement. This meant that most participants 
earned 100% of the reinforcements.  
To encourage the development of a response bias, rewards were asymmetrically 
distributed such that correct responses to one of the lines received 30 of the 40 
reinforcements whereas correct responses to the other line received only 10 of the 
reinforcements. If participants are sensitive to this asymmetric reward contingency, they 
should show the development of a response bias across blocks of the task (McCarthy & 
Davison, 1979; Pizzagalli, Jahn, & O’Shea, 2005). That is, they should be increasingly 
likely to choose the more richly rewarded stimulus on trials in which they were not 
certain which stimulus appeared. The computer counterbalanced the more richly 
rewarded line (long or short) across sessions.  
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When participants received reinforcement in the social reinforcement version of 
this task, they saw attractive genuinely smiling faces. Attractiveness was determined in 
an independent pilot study. These faces were visible for 2 seconds. During the non-social 
reinforcement version of the task, when they received reinforcement on a trial, they 
received a small monetary reinforcer (+3 cents). Previous research has shown that the 
average value of a genuine smile relative to a neutral face is worth approximately 2 to 3 
cents (Heerey & Gilder, 2019), suggesting that both social and monetary rewards may be 
similar in value. Participants completed the social-reinforcement version of the task in 
one of the sessions and the non-social-reinforcement version of the task in the other 
session (in counterbalanced order). When participants completed the monetary version of 
the task, the experimenter paid them what they earned at the end of the study session.  
2.2.3 Questionnaires  
2.2.3.1 Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, et al., 2001) 
The Autism-spectrum Quotient is a fifty-item questionnaire that measures self-
reported autism-related traits that focus on aspects of everyday life such as social 
interactions, communication ability and style and interpersonal skill (e.g., “I enjoy social 
chit-chat.”). I used it to assess self-reported autism-spectrum traits. Baron-Cohen and 
colleagues (2001) designed this questionnaire for a general adult population. The 
questionnaire uses a 4-point response scale (1 = definitely agree, 4 = definitely disagree). 
In the present sample, the AQ showed acceptable reliability across four of its subscales 
(Communication, α = .65; Social, α = .60; Attention to Detail, α = .62; Attention 
Switching, α = .61) with the imagination subscale showing poorer reliably than the others 
(Imagination, α = .55). While these reliabilities are slightly lower than the original study, 
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these reliabilities are consistent with other studies using North American and world-wide 
samples (Hoekstra, Bartels, Cath & Boomsma, 2008; Hurst, Mitchell, Kimbrel, Kwapil & 
Nelson-Gray, 2007; Wakabayashi, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Tojo, 2006). The AQ 
correlates with clinicians’ assessments of ASD symptoms, supporting the validity of the 
AQ in terms of its ability to measure ASD traits (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, 
Martin & Clubley, 2001). 
2.2.3.2 Big-Five Inventory (BFI; John& Srivastava, 1999) 
This 44-item questionnaire measures personality assuming a five-factor model. It 
assesses extraversion (e.g., “I see myself as someone who is sociable”), agreeableness 
(e.g., “I see myself as someone who is helpful and unselfish with others”), 
conscientiousness (e.g., “I see myself as someone who does a thorough job”), neuroticism 
(e.g., “I see myself as someone who is depressed, blue”) and openness to experience 
(e.g., “I see myself as someone who is original, comes up with new ideas”). I used the 
BFI in the current study to assess whether aspects of the five-factor personality model 
such as extraversion differ across the ASD traits. Participants rated items on a 5-point 
Likert scale (1 = strongly agree; 5 = strongly disagree). In the present sample the BFI 
achieves high reliability across its 5 subscales (Extraversion, α = .84; Agreeableness, α = 
.78; Conscientiousness, α = .78; Neuroticism, α = .84; Openness, α = .78). Correlations 
with other established personality measures, such as the Neuroticism-Extraversion-
Openness Personality Inventory provide support for the validity of BFI (John & 
Srivastava, 1999; Rammstedt & John, 2007).  
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2.2.3.3 Behavioral Inhibition/Behavioral Activation Scales (BIS/BAS, 
Carver & White, 1994) 
This 24-item scale measures the degree to which people are motivated by rewards and 
punishments in the environment (e.g., “I go out of my way to get things I want,” 
“Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a lot”). I used the BIS/BAS to assess whether there 
were any group differences between high ASD trait individuals and low ASD trait 
individuals. The scale’s items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very true for me; 
5=very false for me). The BIS/BAS displays reasonable reliabilities across its 4 subscales 
(BIS, α = .73; BAS Reward Responsiveness, α = .72; BAS Drive, α = .65; BAS Fun 
Seeking, α = .73; Carver & White, 1994). Correlations with measures of anxiety, 
personality, and affect suggest that the scale is a valid measure of reward/punishment 
sensitivity (Campbell-Sills, Liverant & Brown, 2004; Carver & White, 1994; Jorm et al., 
1998). 
2.2.3.4 Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE, Leary, 1983) 
The BFNE is a 12-item questionnaire that measures individuals’ fear of negative 
social evaluation (e.g., “I am frequently afraid of other people noticing my 
shortcomings”). I used the BFNE to assess whether there were differences in fear of 
negative evaluation between high ASD trait individuals and low ASD trait individuals. 
The scale uses a 5-point Likert scale response (1=Not at all characteristic of me; 
5=Extremely characteristic of me). The BFNE displays high reliability (α = .86). 
Although it is not a direct measure of social anxiety, it measures a primary feature of 
social anxiety: concern about whether others hold negative evaluations of one’s behavior 
(Leary, 1983; Rodebaugh et al., 2004). Given issues associated with social presentation in 
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autism (e.g., Davis & Carter, 2014; Dawson et al., 2012; Sigman & Capps,1997; 
Volkmar, Cicchetti, Cohen & Bregman, 1992), I wanted to be able to statistically control 
for this potential confound.  
2.2.4 Data Analysis  
For the reward sensitivity task, I used a ‘signal detection theory’ approach to 
examine performance and the development of response bias over task blocks across the 
two reward types. I coded a response as a “hit” if participants correctly identified the 
more frequently rewarded (or “rich”) stimulus on a given trial. A “false alarm” was coded 
if participants mistakenly identified an instance of the less frequently rewarded (“lean”) 
stimulus as the rich one.  
To compute d’, I used the formula: 
d’= ZHR - ZFAR 
where HR represents a participant’s hit-rate within a block of trials and FAR represents 
the false alarm rate. ZHR is the z-transformed probability of correctly identifying the rich 
stimulus and ZFAR is the z-transformed probability of incorrectly identifying the lean 
stimulus as the rich one. For response bias, I used the formula for “criterion” or C (see 
Macmillan & Creelman, 2004): 
C= -1/2 (ZHR - ZFAR) 
I calculated these measures on a block-by-block basis for each participant; 
excluding trials in which a participant’s reaction time was shorter than 250ms or longer 
than 5000ms (see Pizzagalli, Jahn & O’Shea, 2005). I analyzed the resulting d’ and C 
values using linear mixed-model analyses. The model used random effects for 
participants and used a restricted maximum likelihood estimation for the fixed effects of 
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block (1, 2, 3), and reward-type (social, non-social). Block and reward-type were 
included as fixed within-subject measures, whereas AQ score ((<=17) versus high AQ 
score (>17)) was included as a between-subjects factor for the model. Importantly, the 
linear mixed-model analyses allowed me to examine the data in the context of the large 
amount of missing data across the sessions (i.e., 85 participants [53%] did not complete 
session 2 of the study).   
2.3 Reward Sensitivity Results/Discussion 
A linear mixed-model analysis of the line discrimination performance (d’) showed 
that both groups performed similarly across the task (see Figure 2A). Exact statistical 
results appear in Table 2. Participants did not differ in the degree to which they were able 
to discriminate the long from the short line across the task and there were no significant 
interactions. 
After establishing that participants did not differ in their ability to discriminate 
between the lines, I tested whether high- versus low-ASD trait participants differed in 
their sensitivity to social and non-social rewards by assessing the development of a 
response bias across blocks under different reward conditions. There were no significant 
effects of ASD traits or any significant interactions. However, there were significant main 
effects for feedback type, and a marginally significant main effect for block (see Figure 
2B). Specifically, for feedback type, the linear contrast across feedback types was 
significant, suggesting that both groups developed a response bias that was stronger for 
monetary than social reinforcement conditions (F(1,652) = 18.09, p = <.001). As for 
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block, participants showed evidence of greater response bias in block three compared to 
that in block one (F(1,652) = 6.15, p = .013). For exact results, see Table 2. 
Overall, these results indicate that participants developed a stronger response bias 
to non-social rewards compared to social rewards, which replicates some previous 
findings (Chevallier et al., 2016; Lin et al., 2012). However, contrary to our hypothesis, 
  
Figure 2.  Line Discrimination Task Results for high- and low-ASD trait 
participants. 
(A) Participant discriminability scores as a function of block and feedback 
type. (B) Response bias as a function of block and feedback type. Error bars 
show the 95% confidence interval.  
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there were no differences between high and low ASD-trait participants response biases in 
either reward condition. However, this study suffered from a couple limitations. In 
particular, only 47% of the sample received both monetary and social reinforcement 
conditions. This makes it difficult to compare across reinforcement types, the original 
goal of the task. In addition, because the dependency between autism-spectrum traits and 
reward sensitivity essentially relies on a correlation between these variables, it may be 
that even with the relatively large sample there was insufficient statistical power to detect 
these effects. 
Table 2. Effects of AQ, Feedback Type and Block on Participant Discriminability and 
Criterion 
Variable  
df F p B SE 
d’      
     ASD 1, 625.2 0.69 .408 -0.15 0.23 
     Feedback Type 1, 625.2 0.63 .426 -0.15 0.26 
     Block 2, 401.3 0.06 .942 -0.09 0.24 
     ASD*Feedback 1, 625.2 0.29 .589 0.10 0.33 
     ASD*Block 2, 401.3 0.03 .972 0.06 0.29 
     Block*Feedback 2, 401.3 0.04 .964 0.09 0.34 
     
ASD*Feedback*Block 
2, 401.3 0.03 .971 -0.06 0.44 
Criterion      
     ASD 1, 583.9 3.01 .083 0.10 0.10 
     Feedback Type 1, 583.9 14.59 <.001 -0.06 0.09 
     Block 2, 387.5 2.98 .052 0.14 0.09 
     ASD*Feedback 1, 583.9 0.62 .431 -0.09 0.11 
     ASD*Block 2, 387.5 <0.01 .996 -0.10 0.11 
     Block*Feedback 2, 387.5 0.03 .969 -0.11 0.11 
     
ASD*Feedback*Block 
2, 387.5 1.88 .154 -0.08 0.16 
Note. ASD = Autism-spectrum Disorder traits. Feedback Type refers to whether participants 
received social or non-social feedback during the task.  
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2.4 Smile Value 
If the social motivation theory is correct, then individuals who report more autism-
spectrum traits should value social rewards to a lesser degree. To test this hypothesis, I 
used a “smile valuation task” developed by our lab (e.g., Catalano, Heerey & Gold, 2018; 
Heerey & Gilder, 2019; Shore & Heerey, 2013) to assess how the subjective value of a 
smile relates to self-reported autism-spectrum traits. This task uses a choice method 
common in studies of economic utility (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) to examine 
how choice is shaped by social (smiles) and non-social (money) feedback. This project 
involved the secondary analysis of data from several samples collected between 2012 and 
2019. Importantly, in this task, participants learn and respond to both monetary and social 
cues simultaneously. Rather than measuring simple ratings of different stimuli, 
participants’ choices of one stimulus over another allow for the determination of social 
and nonsocial value (Catalano, Heerey & Gold, 2018; Heerey & Gilder, 2019).   
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2.5 Methods 
2.5.1 Participants  
Participants in this sample included a set of 509 individuals who completed a 
laboratory task designed to assess the degree to which participants value genuine and 
polite smiles, relative to neutral faces in monetary terms. Each of these participants had 
also completed the same self-report measure of autism-spectrum traits (the Autism 
Quotient Scale; see Table 3 for demographic characteristics). Participants completed 
these tasks in the context of a several of other studies designed to assess a number of 
different hypotheses. Even though AQ data were collected in each of these samples, 
relationships between task and autism-spectrum traits were never examined. This study 
represents the first systematic comparison of smile-valuation data and ASD traits 
amongst these individuals. This larger sample consists of six smaller samples of 
university students who completed 
the task in exchange for partial 
course credit and a small, 
performance-based monetary bonus. 
Across these studies, data were 
collected anonymously for initial 
research purposes. This secondary 
data analysis has therefore been 
granted a consent waiver by the 
NMREB at Western University. 
Table 3. Smile Valuation Task Demographic 
Information 
Participants 
 
n 509 
Sex (Female:Male) * 347:161 
Age in years 19.65 (3.09) 
Autism-spectrum 
Quotient 
 
Total Score 17.16 (5.56) 
Social Skills 2.17 (1.91) 
Attention Shifting 4.78 (2.07) 
Attention to Detail 5.43 (2.15) 
Communication 2.39 (1.78) 
Imagination 2.41 (1.60) 
Range of Scores 4-40 
Note. Table reports means (SDs in 
parentheses). One participant did not report 
their sex information. 
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2.5.2 Smile Valuation Task (Heerey & Gilder, 2019) 
 The Smile Valuation task participants completed is identical to the one used by 
Heerey and Gilder (2019). Briefly, the task has an exposure and a test phase. The reason 
for the exposure phase is to acquaint participants with a set of faces that differ in both 
social and monetary reward value. In this task phase, participants played a “guessing 
game” with a set of six opponents, each represented by a photograph of a face.  
 On each exposure-
phase trial, participants 
viewed a single opponent, 
neutrally posted, in the 
center of the screen (Fig 
3A). The images for this 
task were validated in a 
previous stimulus set 
(Heerey, 2014). All 
images showed an actor’s 
head and shoulders. 
Actors’ eye gaze was 
directed towards the 
viewer. Actors produced 
neutral expressions as 
well as polite and genuine 
smiles and frowns for the 
 
Figure 3. Example of the smile value task with female 
stimuli.  
(A) Learning phase/exposure phase of the smile value task. 
Participants attempted to win money by choosing the same 
size of a virtual coin as an opponent. (B) Social and 
monetary feedback contingencies active during the exposure 
phase. (C) Test phase of the smile valuation task in which 
participants choose the best partner before continuing as in 
the exposure phase. 
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images used in this task. Polite smiles were created by asking the actors to produce them 
after seeing them demonstrated. To create genuine smiles, actors were asked to recall an 
experience in which they were happy, and to display this happiness as if with someone 
they knew. These expressions were recorded with a high-definition digital video camera. 
Static images were then clipped from the video sequences at peak expression. These 
images were validated in a subsequent study for genuineness, prototypicality and for the 
genuine and polite smiles, the degree to which participants were able to correctly classify 
them as genuine or polite. The images were in color.  
Participants’ ostensible goal in the present task was to attempt to win money by 
choosing the same side of a virtual coin as the opponent. When a participant’s choice 
matched that of the opponent (i.e., a win trial), the opponent smiled genuinely (involving 
zygomaticus major and orbicularis oculi); smiled politely (zygomaticus major only); or 
remained in the neutral pose with text overlay indicating the win. Each win was worth 
$0.03. On non-match trials, participants gained $0.00. This feedback was indicated by the 
opponent frowning (previously smiling opponents), or a text overlay indicating a non-win 
(see Fig 3A).  
 In the exposure phase, task feedback did not depend on which side of the coin 
they chose. Instead, three of the opponents (randomly determined) provided ‘match’ 
feedback on 80% of trials while the remaining opponents provided ‘match’ feedback on 
60% of trials. This was not known by participants. Additionally, two opponents (one 80% 
and one 60%) always presented genuine smiles on match trials; two presented polite 
smiles (one 80% and one 60%) and the others kept neutral poses (see Fig 3B). These 
reward values remained the same across all phases. Participants completed three blocks 
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of 60 trials during the exposure phase, viewing opponents 10 times each per block in 
random order. 
 The test phase of the task allowed me to estimate, in monetary terms, how much 
participants valued polite and genuine smile feedback. In this phase of the task, 
participants chose which of two opponents they wanted to play on each trial. They were 
instructed to select the 'most valuable' opponents from amongst pairs of neutrally posed 
opponents presented side-by-side (see Fig 3C). After a participant chose an opponent, the 
trial continued in the same manner as the exposure phase. All fifteen possible opponent 
pairings manifested in random order, eight times each (120 test trials). Each opponent 
within a given pairing appeared as often in the left position as in the right position. 
 Opponent selection during the test phase served as the dependent variable in the 
task. Because participants chose between opponents in all 15 possible pairings, I was able 
to determine the degree to which money, genuine smiles, and polite smiles contributed to 
choice behavior. That is, if participants genuinely prefer one face to another in a given 
pairing, they will choose that face more often. If they have no preference for one face 
over another within a pairing, they will choose each face with about equal frequency. For 
example, if a participant prefers genuinely smiling to polite smiles, then that participant 
will select genuine smiling faces whenever they are asked to choose between a face that 
has a genuine smile and a face with a polite smile. This will be true even if the genuine 
smile has a lower chance of giving a monetary reward. Thus, this task measures the 
degree to which participants are willing to give up the chance to win money in favor of 
the chance to see genuine and polite smiles. Based on the relative differences between the 
monetary and social values of the faces in each pairing, and participants’ choice behavior, 
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it is possible to identify how smiles shape participants choices relative to neutral faces, 
and how much high versus low monetary value affects their decisions.  
 To minimize the change that specific opponent/value pairings might affect results, 
each opponent’s face appeared in each monetary/social value combination across 
participants with about equal frequency. Half of the participants viewed female 
opponents and half viewed male opponents, counterbalanced by participant gender. 
2.5.3 Data Analysis  
 The choice participants made in this task allowed me to identify how opponent 
characteristics (money versus genuine and polite smiles) affected the participants’ 
selection. I employed a logistic model to estimated how much money (lower value faces 
versus higher value faces) and smiles (genuine versus neutral; polite versus neutral) 
affected participants’ decisions in the test phase of the smile-valuation task. The model 
predicted a participant’s likelihood of choosing the left opponent, based on the relative 
differences between the opponents as follows: 
POpponentA=exp(θ)/1+exp(θ) 
In this function, POpponent A is the probability of choosing the left opponent over the 
right opponent in a given pair of opponents (see Fig 3C). θ is estimated as: 
θ = βMoneyXMoney + βGenuineXGenuine + βPoliteXPolite 
In this equation, βs are the unstandardized logistic regression weightings for each 
model component. The model coded XMoney as the difference between the left and right 
opponents’ expected monetary values. I calculated expected values by taking the win 
value and multiplying it by its win probability (Sutton and Barto, 1998). For example, 3 
cents multiplied by either an 80% or a 60% chance of winning. Based on these 
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calculations, XMoney received a value of ‘.6’ if the left opponent was better than the right, 
‘-.6’ if the right opponent was better, and ‘0’ if they were equal. XGenuine coded whether 
the opponents smiled genuinely (relative to neutral faces). It was set equal to 1 if the left 
opponent smiled genuinely and the right was neutral, -1 if the expressions were reversed 
and 0 if both or neither of the opponents smiled genuinely. XPolite coded for polite smiles 
in similar fashion to XGenuine (see Heerey & Gilder, 2019). The model estimated 
regression weights using an iteratively re-weighted least squares algorithm using a 
purpose written scripts for MATLAB (r2020a). The model calculated the maximum 
likelihood estimates for each value in the equation (Daubechies, DeVore, Fornasier & 
Güntürk, 2010). Participants’ data were fit individually to obtain values for both the 
utility of genuine smiles, polite smiles and money on a participant-by-participant basis. 
The current study examines the correlation between the unstandardized regression 
coefficients and self-reported ASD traits. Additionally, I examined which type of 
feedback were valued by participants (i.e. greater than 0). For this analysis I categorized 
participants as either high (AQ > 17) or low (AQ ≤ 17) ASD traits.    
2.6 Smile Valuation Results/Discussion 
First, I ran an analysis to see if participants valued the feedback they received, to 
ensure the task worked. Both high and low ASD trait participants placed value 
significantly above zero on both the money, genuine smile, while only high ASD trait 
participants placed value significantly above zero on polite smiles (see Figure 4A and 
Table 4 for more details). 
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  Contrary to predictions made under the social motivation theory of autism, 
results showed no relation between ASD traits and the utility of either smiles (genuine: 
r(509) = .-.042, p = .344; polite: r (509) = -.001, p =.991) or money (r(509) = -.058, p 
= .194; see Figure 4). Thus, in this large participant sample there was no relationship 
between ASD-related traits and the utility of either social or monetary value. These data 
suggest that individual differences in the degree to which participants value genuine and 
polite smiles are unlikely to relate to self-reported traits of autism.   
Table 4. Results of One-sample t-test of values for Money, Genuine Smiles 
and Polite Smiles  
Variable  df t Sig 
Low ASD Traits    
     Money 272 11.23 <.001 
     Genuine Smile 272 7.08 <.001 
     Polite Smile 272 1.60 .110 
High ASD Traits    
     Money 234 9.50 <.001 
     Genuine Smile 234 5.67 <.001 
     Polite Smile 234 2.69 .008 
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2.7 General Discussion  
Overall, I found no relationship between task performance and ASD-related traits 
(as measured by the AQ) on either the line discrimination task or the smile valuation task. 
These results are contrary to the social motivation hypothesis (Chevallier et al., 2012; 
Clements et al., 2018). Thus, autism-spectrum traits do not appear to affect the degree to 
 
Figure 4. Smile Valuation Task Correlations.  
(A) Feedback Values (B) AQ score correlation with Monetary feedback, (C) AQ score 
correlation with Genuine Smiles feedback, (D) AQ score correlation with Polite 
Smiles feedback 
Note: AQ = Autism-spectrum Quotient. Arbitrary Units (β) = Unstandardized logistic 
regression weightings for each feedback type. 
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which participants develop a response bias under social reinforcement nor do these traits 
relate to estimates of smile utility within the general population samples. Taken together, 
none of the findings in this chapter support a potential motivational mechanism that 
would explain the behavioral differences seen across the autism spectrum in individuals 
both with and without diagnoses. 
However, this the work in this chapter also has some limitations. For example, 
attrition was an issue in the study in which the line discrimination task was completed. 
That is, a large number of participants only completed one session out of two, making it 
challenging to directly compare social and non-social feedback within person. 
Additionally, the group that completed the line discrimination task displayed several 
unexpected group differences. For example, those who scored higher on the AQ reported 
a higher level of extraversion compared to those who reported fewer ASD traits. This is 
unusual response pattern, compared to what is typically found (Austin, 2005). This may 
impact the generalizability of these results.   
 I now shift focus to potential cognitive mechanisms that might explain ASD-
traits in Chapter 3, which investigates the weak central coherence hypothesis.  
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3 Testing the Weak Central Coherence Hypothesis of Autism 
Due to, in part, the conceptualizations of Frith (2003), research in the area of ASD 
has advanced several theories based upon the idea that people with ASD show a bias 
toward local, rather than global processing, the most prominent being the weak central 
coherence hypothesis (Happe, 2005; Iarocci & McDonald, 2006; Morgan, Maybery & 
Durkin, 2003; Muth, Hönekopp & Falter, 2014; Simmons, Robertson, McKay, Toal, 
McAleer & Pollick, 2009; Van der Hallen et al., 2015). This hypothesis has found 
widespread support in the literature as research shows that people with ASD and those 
who report higher levels of autism-related traits appear to have a bias toward “local” 
versus “global” processing. Specifically, individuals with more ASD-traits or with ASD 
diagnoses perform better compared to controls on tasks that require attention to fine 
detail (Bolis & Schilbach 2018; Burghoorn et al., 2018; Crewther & Crewther, 2014; 
Frith & Happé, 1994; Grinter et al., 2009; Happé & Frith, 2006; López et al., 2004; 
Morgan et al., 2003; Van der Hallen et al., 2018).  
In the current chapter I examine individual differences in the tendency to prefer 
global versus local processing in individuals who self-report autism-spectrum traits. I use 
the Leuven embedded figures task (L-EFT; de-Wit, et al., 2017) to explore this question. 
In the L-EFT, participants search for an abstract “target” shape embedded within a larger 
abstract image as quickly as possible. Importantly, this style of task has been widely used 
in the literature and evidence regularly shows support for the weak central coherence 
hypothesis (Cribb, Olaithe, Di Lorenzo, Dunlop & Maybery, 2016; Muth et al., 2014). 
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3.1 Methods 
3.1.1 Participants 
I recruited 207 participants (see Table 4 for demographic characteristics and 
group comparisons) from the Western Psychology Participant Pool (SONA; N=132) 
along with a mixed community sample recruited using advertisements and word of mouth 
(N=75). They participated in exchange for partial course credit or a monetary payment of 
$15. The Western University Nonmedical Ethics Board approved all study procedures 
and participants documented their informed consent prior to participating. 
I removed 3 participants’ L-EFT performance data from the analysis for 
inattentive responding using the same strategy as in previous research using the L-EFT 
(de-Wit, Huygelier, Van der Hallen, Chamberlain & Wagemans, 2017). Specifically, I 
defined fast errors as inaccurate trials in which the respondent answered within 1.5s. I 
used a cut-off of >15% fast errors. None of the remaining participants performed below 
chance level (<.33). Additionally, I removed one participant from all analyses for 
invariant questionnaire responding.   
For this analysis I classified participants as either low or high AQ based on a 
median split. I classified participants who scored 19 or lower as “low AQ participants” 
and those who scored above 19 as “high AQ participants.” Refer to Table 5 for 
demographic information. For demographic information based upon social competency 
groupings (as measured by the MSCS), refer to appendix C.  
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 Table 5. Demographic Information for L-EFT task 
AQ Group 
High AQ 
(AQ > 19) 
Low AQ 
(AQ ≤ 19) 
F df p 
n 97 109    
Score Range 20-39 6-19    
Sex (Female:Male) * 69:28 89:19 3.68 1,204 .055 
Age in years 20.0 (4.1) 21.3 (8.8) 1.87 1,204 .173 
Autism-spectrum Quotient      
     Total Score 25.4 (3.8) 15.0 (3.1) 466.35 1,205 <.001 
     Social Skills 5.3 (2.2) 1.8 (1.4) 186.30 1,205 <.001 
     Attention Shifting 6.69 (1.5) 4.2 (1.8) 109.59 1,205 <.001 
     Attention to Detail 6.1 (2.2) 5.6 (2.1) 3.23 1,205 .074 
     Communication 4.0 (1.9) 1.5 (1.3) 132.67 1,205 <.001 
     Imagination 3.4 (1.8) 1.9 (1.3) 44.25 1,205 <.001 
Big Five Inventory      
     Extraversion  35.5 (8.6) 26.3 (9.0) 56.44 1,205 <.001 
     Agreeableness 28.7 (8.0) 23.7 (6.6) 24.47 1,205 <.001 
     Conscientiousness 30.5 (7.4) 27.9 (8.3) 5.70 1,205 .018 
     Neuroticism 26.9 (9.0) 33.3 (8.5) 27.41 1,205 <.001 
     Openness 34.9 (8.6) 31.2 (8.4) 9.96 1,205 .002 
Behavioral Inhibition/ 
Behavioral Activation Scales 
(BIS/BAS) 
     
     BIS 23.1 (3.3) 21.8 (3.4) 8.72 1,205 .004 
     Fun Seeking 11.2 (2.2) 12.9 (2.2) 30.72 1,205 <.001 
     Drive 10.8 (2.2) 11.5 (2.3) 4.48 1,205 .036 
     Reward Responsiveness 17.7 (1.6) 17.9 (1.8) 0.27 1,205 .604 
Multidimensional Self 
Concept Scale (MSCS) 
     
Social Motivation 35.2 (3.3) 35.7 (5.3) 0.73 1,205 .394 
Demonstrating Empathetic 
Concern 
38.5 (5.2) 41.3 (5.6) 18.85 1,205 <.001 
Nonverbal Sending Skills 36.8 (3.9) 37.8 (6.6) 1.68 1,205 .197 
Social Inferencing 36.7 (3.3) 36.9 (5.5) 0.19 1,205 .661 
Social Knowledge 45.1 (5.3) 47.8 (6.4) 10.53 1,205 <.001 
Verbal Conversation Skills 32.3 (5.1) 31.80 (7.8) 0.31 1,205 .576 
Emotion Regulation 33.6 (4.8) 32.3 (7.4) 2.35 1,205 .127 
Reading the Mind In the 
Eyes Task (RMET) 
     
Total Score 24.6 (4.8) 26.9 (4.0) 13.45 1,205 <.001 
Letter Number Sequence 
Task (LNS) 
     
Total Score 14.9 (4.9) 15.1 (3.9) 0.10 1,198 .751 
 
Note. Table reports means (SDs in parentheses) and comparison test statistics. Comparisons tested with 
ANOVA except where noted. 1 participant did not report their age; 1 did not report sex information. 
*Comparison tested with Chi-Squared. 
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3.1.2 Procedures 
The study occurred in a single session of about 90 minutes. Participants 
completed a series of questionnaires (the AQ and several other measures; see Table 4.  
for a complete description), a computer-administered letter-number sequencing task as a 
proxy measure of IQ, as well as the Leuven Embedded Figures Task (L-EFT). They also 
completed a short video-recorded social interaction (See Chapter 5.2.2 for more details). 
Windows computers running E-prime 2.0 Professional (Psychology Software Tools; 
Sharpsburg, PA) presented the computerized tasks and collected responses. 
3.1.2.1 Leuven Embedded Figures Task (L-EFT; de-Wit, et al., 2017)  
The L-EFT (de-Wit, et al., 2017) consisted of 64 trials, presented in a random 
order, in which participants searched for an abstract “target” shape embedded within a 
larger abstract image. The L-EFT uses a matching-to-sample paradigm in which 
participants viewed a target image centered in the top half of the computer screen. Below 
the target, there were three “context” images, one of which contained the embedded 
target image (Figure 5). Participants chose which context contained the target as quickly 
and accurately as possible by clicking on the image using the computer mouse. Stimuli 
were continually visible until participants gave a correct response (i.e., there was no time 
limit for responding). If participants responded incorrectly, the computer provided visual 
feedback on their performance (a red frame appeared around the incorrect choice) and 
they were prompted to give a new response until they provided the correct answer. This 
helped to ensure that participants understood the task and did not simply click through the 
trials (see de-Wit, et al., 2017). Trials on which the first response was an error were 
excluded from analysis. This procedure is consistent with previous research and helped to 
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ensure that participants actively engaged in the task. The computer presented the three 
embedding contexts at three fixed locations on the lower half of the screen and the 
"correct" position was randomly determined on each trial. There were easy medium and 
hard trials that varied in image difficulty according to a computerized algorithm (de-Wit, 
et al., 2017). This algorithm defined image complexity as the number of ‘distractor lines’ 
the image contained. These lines were lines that continued from the target image itself 
into the surrounding context or vice versa. The more distractor lines the image contained, 
the more difficult it was (0, 1, 2 or 3 lines).  
3.1.2.2 Letter Number Sequencing Task (LNS; Wechsler, 1997) 
The LNS, a component of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Inventory (Wechsler, 
1997), was used as a proxy intelligence measure and to determine whether L-EFT 
 
Figure 5. Example of a L-EFT Trial.  
A) An example of a trial with 2 ‘distractor lines’. B) Example target shapes.   
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performance was associated with working memory (see de-Wit, et al., 2017). This 
version of the task used a computerized form developed by Mielicki, Koppel, Valencia & 
Wiley, (2018). In this version of the task, participants viewed scrambled letter-number 
sequences, one character at a time, on the computer screen and responded using the 
keyboard. Sequences were presented in a fixed order, similar to that in face-to-face 
administrations. The task included three sequences at each of eight difficulty levels (2-
digit, 3-digit, 4-digit, etc.) for a total of 24 trials. Participants completed all trials of the 
task regardless of performance. Each trial began with a fixation cross for 1000ms, 
followed by a 300ms blank screen. The characters of the sequence then appeared one-at-a 
time. Each of the characters in the sequence remained visible for 1000ms, separated by a 
blank screen (300ms duration) between characters. After of the final character of the trial, 
participants were instructed to type the numbers first in ascending order followed by the 
letters in alphabetical order. They pressed <ENTER> to register their response. 
3.1.3 Questionnaires  
Participants completed the Autism-spectrum Quotient, the Big-Five Inventory and the 
Behavioral Inhibition/Behavioral Activation Scales to measure autism traits, personality 
and reward seeking/punishment avoidance as in Chapter 2. They also completed the 
Multidimensional Social Competence Scale and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test 
(see below).  
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3.1.3.1 Multidimensional Social Competence Scale (MSCS; Yager, & 
Iarocci, 2013) 
The MSCS is a 77-item questionnaire that measures self-reported social competency 
traits that focus on aspects of social skills such as social motivation (e.g., “I enjoy 
meeting new people.”), social inferencing (e.g., “I can tell when people are joking.”), 
demonstrating empathic concern (e.g. “I am sensitive to the feelings and concerns of 
others.”), social knowledge (e.g. “I understand what makes a true friend.”), verbal 
conversation skills (e.g. “I give other people a chance to speak during conversations.”), 
nonverbal conversation skills (e.g., “I look at people in the eye when talking to them.”), 
and emotional regulation (e.g. “I get over setbacks or disappointments quickly.”). I used 
it to assess self-reported autism-spectrum traits in conjunction with the AQ. Trevisan and 
colleagues (2018) designed the measure for an adult general population. The 
questionnaire uses a 5-point response scale (1 = not true or almost never true, 5 = very 
true or almost always true). In the present sample the MSCS displayed excellent 
reliability overall (α = .912) with good reliability across it subscales (social motivation, α 
= .848; social inferencing, α = .746; demonstrating empathic concern, α = .811; social 
knowledge, α = .823; verbal conversation skills, α = .818; nonverbal conversation skills, 
α = .777; and emotional regulation α = .749. 
3.1.3.2 Reading the Mind In the Eyes Task (RMIET, Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001) 
This 36-item task measures the degree to which people can identify emotion in 
images of people’s eyes. I used to RMIET to assess whether there were any group 
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differences between high AQ and low AQ scorers on emotion perception, an important 
social skill thought to be related to social ability. For each trial of the task, the computer 
displayed a single photo of a person’s eyes with four possible 1-word descriptions for the 
affect depicted in the photo. Participants selected the word that they believed best 
described the emotion displayed on the face. The average performance of RMIET in non-
clinical samples ranges from 26.0 (4.2) items correct to 28.6 (3.2) (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001; Ferguson, F. J., & Austin, 2010). The current sample achieved consistent results. 
3.1.4 Data Analysis  
I examined how individuals endorsing high versus low levels of ASD traits 
differed in their local and global processing ability using both overall response times, as 
well as total errors made. To analyze these dependent variables, I conducted several 
analyses using standard mixed-model ANOVAs (SPSS 24.0; IBM Corp, 2016). As a 
general performance check, my first analysis investigated task difficulty (low, medium 
and high), which was defined as the number of lines of the target shape that continued 
into the surrounding context (de Wit et al., 2017) as a fixed, within-subjects measure, 
with AQ Group (Low AQ (<=19) versus High AQ score (>19)) included as a between-
subjects factor for the model. I expected the dependent variables of response time and 
errors to increase across difficulty levels but to do so to a greater degree for those in the 
Low AQ group, who are thought to have reduced local processing skill compared to high-
AQ individuals.  
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3.2 Results 
3.2.1 L-EFT RT (AQ) 
In this series of analyses, I examined whether ASD traits affected the response 
times on the L-EFT. Additionally, I investigated whether ASD traits interacted with any 
specific design feature (e.g. target image difficulty, target image complexity, shape 
openness or shape symmetry). For each of these analyses I conducted a 2 x 4 mixed-
model ANOVA with AQ Group (Low versus High) as the between-subjects variable 
(image difficulty, image complexity, shape openness, shape symmetry) as the within-
subjects variables and RT (ms) as the dependent variable. General task results were 
similar to previous findings such that there were significant effects of target difficulty, 
complexity, and symmetry on reaction times. Specifically, the more challenging it was to 
find the target shape within the image (more lines from the shape continuing into the 
surrounding context, the more lines that the shape had, if the shape was asymmetrical), 
the slower participants completed the trial (for exact results, see Table 6).  
Interestingly, I found no significant effects of ASD-traits and no significant 
interactions, such that ASD-traits appear to have no impact on participants’ response 
times, regardless of the features of the target shape (see Table 6). As results were not 
consistent with previous studies, I also conducted an exploratory analysis examining only 
the most difficult or most complex image results (i.e., target images that had 4 lines 
continue into the surrounding context and those target images that consisted of 8 lines). 
Again, I found no significant ASD-related differences impacting response time for the 
most difficult or complex images (p > .05).  
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3.2.2 L-EFT Total Errors (AQ) 
In this series of analyses, I examined whether ASD traits affected the number of 
errors people made on the L-EFT, as well as whether those traits interacted with any 
specific design feature as above (e.g., target image difficulty, target image complexity, 
shape openness or shape symmetry). As with the response time analyses, there were no 
significant effects for ASD-traits and no significant interactions (results appear in Table 
Table 6. Effects of AQ, Difficulty, Shape, and Symmetry on Participant 
Response Time and Errors 
Variable  
df F p ηp
2 
Response Time     
     AQ 1,202 0.70 .402 .003 
     Difficulty 3,202 228.77 <.001 .532 
     Complexity 3,202 70.76 <.001 .260 
     Shape Openness 1,202 0.03 .855 <.001 
     Symmetry 1,202 4.68 .032 .023 
     AQ*Difficulty 1,202 1.27 .275 .006 
     AQ*Complexity 1,202 1.85 .137 .009 
     AQ*Shape 1,202 0.43 .515 .002 
     AQ*Symmetry 1,202 2.60 .109 .013 
Errors     
     AQ 1,202 3.30 .071 .016 
     Difficulty 3,603 369.28 <.001 .648 
     Complexity 3,603 19.26 <.001 .087 
     Shape Openness  1,202 5.12 .025 .025 
     Symmetry 1,202 56.25 <.001 .219 
     AQ*Difficulty 3,603 1.60 .205 .008 
     AQ*Complexity 3,603 1.02 .381 .005 
     AQ*Shape 1,202 0.41 .521 .002 
     AQ*Symmetry 1,202 0.35 .554 .002 
Note. AQ = Autism-spectrum Quotient. Feedback Type refers to whether 
participants received social or non-social feedback during the task.  
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5). Thus, ASD-traits did not appear to affect the number of errors participants made in the 
task. 
As with response time, I also conducted an exploratory analysis looking at only the 
most difficult or most complex image results (i.e., target images that had 4 lines continue 
into the surrounding context and those target images that consisted of 8 lines) to see 
whether ASD traits affected errors to the most difficult shapes where previous results 
suggest that those with high levels of ASD-related traits should outperform those 
endorsing fewer traits (Burghoorn, et al., 2018; Jolliffe & Baron‐Cohen, 1997; Grinter et 
al., 2009; Happé & Frith, 2006; Van der Hallen, et al., 2018). In these very specific cases 
for high and low ASD trait individuals I found that there was a significant difference in 
error rates (F(1, 202) = 4.694, p = .031), such that individuals endorsing high levels of 
ASD traits made fewer errors compared to individuals endorsing fewer ASD traits (1.84 
vs 2.33 errors made). Thus, a bias toward local processing appeared to enhance 
performance at the most difficult task level for those with high levels of ASD traits. 
However, due to the exploratory nature of this analysis, these results must be interpreted 
with caution.  
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3.2.3 L-EFT Performance (MSCS) 
In addition to analyzing the results with the AQ, I also analyzed the results using a 
median split on the MSCS. As with the AQ, I examined both response times and errors as 
the dependent variables in the analyses. Generally, these exploratory analyses showed 
similar patterns as those of the AQ for both response time and number of errors. 
However, the interaction between MSCS group and image complexity for response time, 
did reach statistical threshold. Specifically, as the image became more complex, response 
Table 7. Effects of MSCS, Difficulty, Shape, and Symmetry on 
Participant Response Time and Error Rate 
Variable  
df F p ηp
2 
Response Time     
     MSCS 1,202 0.21 .647 .001 
     Difficulty 3,202 225.23 <.001 .528 
     Complexity 3,202 69.35 <.001 .257 
     Shape Openness 1,202 0.01 .921 <.001 
     Symmetry 1,202 4.00 .047 .020 
     MSCS*Difficulty 1,202 0.65 .585 .003 
     MSCS*Complexity 1,202 3.20 .043 .016 
     MSCS*Shape 1,202 0.78 .377 .004 
     MSCS*Symmetry 1,202 1.69 .195 .008 
Error Rate     
     MSCS 1,202 0.04 .844 <.001 
     Difficulty 3,603 368.95 <.001 .647 
     Complexity 3,603 19.23 <.001 .087 
     Shape Openness  1,202 5.36 .022 .026 
     Symmetry 1,202 57.24 <.001 .223 
     MSCS*Difficulty 3,603 0.26 .752 .001 
     MSCS*Complexity 3,603 0.77 .606 .003 
     MSCS*Shape 1,202 0.15 .704 .001 
     MSCS*Symmetry 1,202 0.54 .543 .002 
Note. MSCS = Multidimensional Social Competency Scale. 
Feedback Type refers to whether participants received social or non-
social feedback during the task.  
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times slowed for both high and low social competency individuals, but response times 
slowed significantly more for low social competency individuals compared to the high 
social competency individuals (See Table 7 for results). Note that because the 
directionality of the MSCS is opposite that of the AQ (i.e. it tests social competency 
instead of social deficits with higher scores denoting better social competency), then this 
result is contrary to predictions that the low social-competency group should perform 
better than the high social-competency group. No other differences emerged and due to 
the exploratory nature of this analysis, results should be interpreted with caution.  
3.3 Discussion  
As in previous chapters, I failed to find that differences in ASD traits related to 
task performance operationalized in terms of response times or error rates. Thus, the only 
significant modulator of performance in this sample of participants appeared to be task 
difficulty. That is, task performance declined as the task became harder, as previous 
research shows (de Wit et al., 2017, Van der Hallen et al., 2018), however, task 
difficulty-based performance decrements did not show the predicted interactions with 
ASD traits. 
This study has a couple of important limitations. First, like other samples I 
collected in this work, individuals who reported more autism-traits also reported being 
more extraverted compared to those endorsing fewer traits, which may make them 
unusual or atypical of individuals who experience higher levels of ASD traits. Second, 
conclusions for this chapter are based on a single task. There are a variety of other tasks 
that also measure central coherence and it might be that some of these other tasks would 
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have captured group differences (Conson et al., 2013; Deruelle et al., 2006; Grinter et al., 
2009; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999; Pellicano et al., 2006; Snowling & Frith, 1989). 
Ideally, I would have replicated this finding with a second task also measuring central 
coherence, However, Covid-19 interfered with any additional data collection I might 
have completed.  
Overall, none of the findings in this chapter show strong support for the idea that 
processing biases explain the social behavioral differences seen across the autism 
spectrum. I now turn to probabilistic learning mechanisms to investigate whether 
previous results based on the thinking behind probabilistic learning models replicate in 
large general population samples.  
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4 Testing the Probabilistic Learning Hypotheses of Autism 
Probabilistic models of human learning, including reinforcement learning models, 
have long been used to explain how humans learn from, adapt to, and make decisions 
based on contingencies within the natural environment (Bayer & Glimcher, 2005; 
Chamberlain et al., 2016; Cools, Clark, Owen & Robbins, 2002; Dayan & Jyu, 2003; 
Kriegeskorte, 2015; Friston, 2003; Mathys, Daunizeau, Friston & Stephan, 2011; Niv & 
Montague, 2009; O'reilly, 2001; Seymour, Daw, Roiser, Dayan & Dolan, 2012). More 
recently, such models been implemented in the emerging field of computational 
psychiatry, being applied to schizophrenia (Averbeck, Evans, Chouhan, Bristow & 
Shergill, 2011; Waltz & Gold, 2007; Waltz, Frank, Wiecki & Gold, 2011), addiction 
(Baker, Stockwell & Holroyd, 2013; Clark & Robbins, 2002; Izquierdo & Jentsch, 2012; 
Myers et al., 2016), and more recently, autism spectrum disorder as well (Aberg et al., 
2016; D’Cruz et al., 2013; Oaksford & Chater, 2001; Robic et al., 2016; Sevgi et al., 
2020; Solomon et al., 2011). Broadly, these models suggest that many aspects of human 
behavior can be understood in terms of how humans learn from, interact with and attempt 
to control outcomes within their environments (Chater et al., 2006; Griffiths, 2009; 
Meyniel, Schlunegger & Dehaene, 2015; Oaksford & Chater, 2001). These outcomes 
(e.g., rewards and punishments) vary in the degree to which they are predictably 
associated with actions and therefore learnable, both within and across environmental 
contexts (Meyniel et al., 2015; Pietschmann, Endrass, Czerwon & Kathmann, 2011; Koch 
et al., 2008; Schenk, Lech & Suchan, 2017).  
In the domain of autism, recent literature has found that individuals with autism-
spectrum traits appear to have particular difficulty appropriately responding when 
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rewards and punishments are probabilistic versus deterministic (Aberg et al., 2016; Robic 
et al., 2016; Sevgi et al., 2020; Solomon et al., 2011). This work suggests that these 
difficulties occur both when ‘environmental inputs’ (stimuli) are probabilistic in nature 
and when ‘environmental output’ (feedback) is probabilistic (Sevgi et al., 2020; Solomon 
et al., 2011). Additionally, a formal autism spectrum diagnosis is not necessary for these 
effects to appear, as similar findings regularly occur across both clinical and non-clinical 
populations (e.g., Bolis & Schilbach 2018; Karvelis, Seitz, Lawrie & Seriès, 2018; 
Pellicano & Burr, 2012; Sevgi et al., 2020). This suggests that the ability to learn from 
probabilistic contingencies within the environment may give rise to at least some autism-
spectrum symptoms and traits.   
The work in this chapter investigates how self-reported autism-spectrum traits (as 
measured by the Autism-spectrum Quotient [AQ]; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) are linked 
to individuals’ ability to learn from social and non-social stimuli and rewards that are 
either deterministically or probabilistically reinforced, in the context of either social or 
non-social stimuli/feedback. Some of the data in this chapter was collected in conjunction 
with studies in Chapters 2 and 5.  
4.1 Learning from Social and Nonsocial Feedback 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Participants 
These data were collected in the same study as reported in Chapter 2 (see Table 1 
for details). Participants completed a probabilistic selection task (Solomon et al., 2011) 
alongside the questionnaires and asymmetric reinforcement task presented in Chapter 2. I 
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removed seven participants’ data from the task due to inattentive responding. I defined a 
participant as being inattentive on the task if their responses were either faster than 
250ms or slower than 5000ms on over 30% of trials (e.g., Jain, Bansal, Kumar & Singh, 
2015; Welford, 1980).  
4.2.2 Procedures  
In addition to the tasks and questionnaires outlined in Chapter 2 sections 2.2.2. 
and 2.2.3, participants completed a Probabilistic Selection Task (Frank, Seeberger & 
O'Reilly, 2004) under social and nonsocial reinforcement. 
4.2.2.1 Probabilistic Selection Task  
Participants completed a modified version of a Probabilistic Selection task (Frank 
et al., 2004; Solomon et al., 2011). The goal of this task was to measure participants' 
ability to learn probabilistically reinforced response contingencies from both social and 
non-social feedback conditions. Participants received social feedback in one session and 
monetary (non-social) feedback in another session, with session order counterbalanced 
across participants.   
The task consisted of a training phase followed by a test phase. I informed 
participants that on each trial of the training phase, they would see a pair of images 
appear side-by-side on the screen (see Figure 6). The same two images would always 
occur in a pair. I instructed participants to try to choose the “correct” image in each of the 
pairings. They were also told that one of the stimuli in any given paring was “more 
likely” to be correct than the other and that they should use the feedback they received, to 
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select the stimulus that was more likely to be correct. Participants were aware that they 
would sometimes receive invalid feedback after choosing the typically correct stimulus.  
The training phase of the task contained four possible stimulus pairings (8 images 
total) “AB,” “CD,” “EF,” and “GH.” The stimulus pairs within the task each had different 
reward contingencies. In the AB pair, the “A” object was reinforced at a rate of 80%, 
meaning that on 80% of trials (randomly determined), the A object was reinforced and on 
20% of trials, the B object was reinforced. Thus, participants received invalid feedback 
on 20% of trials. The CD pair was reinforced at 70/30 (C was reinforced on 70% of 
trials). The EF pair had a 60/40 reinforcement rate and was therefore the most difficult to 
learn. For the first two presentations with each pairing, the computer ensured that the 
feedback was valid to reduce the possibility that early invalid reinforcement did not 
ultimately determine task performance (for an explanation of this issue, see Baker, 
Stockwell, and Holroyd, (2013)). In addition, to examine learning from deterministic 
feedback, the training phase included a 4th stimulus pairing (the GH pair) that was 
deterministically reinforced (100/0), such that “correct” selections were always 
reinforced. This pairing was not included in the original task (Frank, et al., 2004; 
Solomon et al., 2011). 
On each trial, participants viewed a fixation cross (500ms duration), followed by a 
pair of stimuli (ordinary object images such as a bird or an apple), presented side-by-side 
on the computer screen. The computer randomly assigned images to pairs. In each task 
block, the computer presented 20 trials of each pairing in random order, with each 
stimulus appearing on the left side of the display on 50% of trials. Participants then 
selected one of the two images in the pair by pressing a key corresponding to the location 
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of the stimulus they wished to select (the images remained on the screen until they made 
a selection). After participants selected a stimulus, a frame appeared (for 500ms) around 
the stimulus they chose, to highlight their selection. Participants then received feedback 
(1000ms) that was either monetary or social in nature. For social feedback, participants 
saw an attractive, genuinely smiling face for correct choices and a frowning face for 
incorrect choices. For non-social feedback, they viewed a text display showing either, 
“Correct! +3 cents” or “Incorrect! +0 cents”. I counterbalanced feedback type across 
study sessions and participants viewed a new selection of object stimuli in each session 
(see Figure 6). 
Participants completed up to four blocks of 80 trials in the training phase. To 
ensure that participants learned the criteria but were not over-trained, those who guessed 
the correct stimulus on 65%, 60% and 40% for the AB, CD, and EF trials respectively 
proceeded to the test phase at the end of the block in which they achieved these scores, as 
in previous research (e.g., Frank et al., 2004; Solomon et al., 2011). Participants who 
failed to meet these criteria by the final training block also moved onto the test phase, 
however their test-phase data were excluded from analyses (Total Removed Sessions: 
n=23; Social = 16; High AQ = 8). These criteria ensured that participants had achieved 
similar levels of learning when they entered the test phase.  
 During the test phase of the task, participants viewed familiar and novel pairings 
of the “A” through “F” stimuli from the training phase (they viewed all possible pairings 
of the AB, CD and EF pairs; e.g., AB, AC, AD, AE, AF; BC, BD, BE, BF, etc.) and 
continued to attempt to choose the “best” stimulus in each pairing. In this phase, 
participants viewed each of the possible stimulus pairings 6 times in random order. They 
76 
  
received no reinforcement during this task phase. The GH stimuli were excluded from the 
test phase, as these stimuli were not present in the original task (Frank et al., 2004). 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Probabilistic Selection Task.  
Example trials for the probabilistic selection task training phase. Subjects viewed 
four stimulus pairs that provided valid feedback with different frequency (100% valid 
reinforcement, 80% valid reinforcement, 70% valid reinforcement, and 60% valid 
reinforcement). The same stimuli always occurred in a pair and pairs appeared in 
random order. Participants chose which of the two stimuli was most likely to be 
correct. Positive feedback was either a monetary reward (non-social) or a smiling 
face (social), whereas negative feedback consisted of a monetary reward of 0 cents or 
a frowning face. In the test phase of the task, participants saw all possible stimulus 
pairings and received no feedback.  
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4.2.3 Data Analysis 
The probabilistic selection task examined a series of research questions. To 
examine participant overall performance, I used ‘proportion correct’ of the task trials. To 
examine how quickly participants learned the different pairings and how this related to 
reward type, I calculated a measure of learning speed for each of the different stimulus 
pairings. This measure, “trials to criterion”, was calculated as the number of trials 
participants needed to make five consecutive selections of the most frequently rewarded 
image in a given pair (e.g., choosing the 80% stimulus five times in a row in the 
80%/20% stimulus pair). To analyze proportion correct and trials to criterion I used a 
linear mixed-model in SPSS 24.0 (IBM Corp, 2016) to account for missing data (recall 
that only 47% of participants completed both sessions; see Chapter 2 for details). 
Participants were entered as a random effect in the model and I used a restricted 
maximum likelihood estimation for the fixed effects of pairs (AB, CD, EF, GH), and 
reward-type (social, non-social). Pairs and reward-type were included as fixed within-
subject measures, whereas AQ group (low AQ [<=17] versus high AQ [>17]) was 
included as a between-subjects factor in the model.  
Research additionally suggests that individuals with ASD may have difficulty 
exploiting rewarded stimuli under probabilistic response contingencies (Solomon et al., 
2011; Zeeland et al., 2010). I therefore investigated “win–stay” behavior (the frequency 
of choosing the same stimulus again on the next trial after receiving a reward for it on the 
previous) and “lose–shift” behavior (shifting to the alternative stimulus immediately 
following non-reward). As in previous studies (Solomon et al., 2011), I coded win–stay 
behavior as the percentage of trials following positive feedback in which the participants 
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chose the same stimulus, and lose–shift behavior as the percentage of trials following 
negative feedback in which participants avoided choosing the same stimulus. I analyzed 
‘win-stay’ and ‘lose-shift’ behavior using similar linear mixed-model analyses as above.  
I also ran an exploratory analysis on the test phase data to see whether participants 
differed in their ability to learn from novel stimuli pairings. I investigated how many 
correct choices participants made in the test phase defined as a participant choosing the 
most rewarding stimulus in the test pairings. In the model participants were entered as 
random effects and I used a restricted maximum likelihood estimation for the fixed effect 
for reward-type (social, non-social).  Reward-type (social, non-social) was included as 
fixed within-subject measures, whereas ASD traits (low AQ [<=17] versus high AQ 
[>17]) was included as a fixed between-subjects factor.   
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4.3 Results/Discussion 
4.3.1 Probabilistic Selection Task: Learning Phase Results 
    
  
Figure 7. Probabilistic Selection Task Learning Block.  
(A) Proportion Correct as a function of pairing, ASD traits and feedback. (B) Trials to 
Criterion as a function of pairing, ASD traits and feedback. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals.  
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In the learning phase of this task, my goal was to assess how individuals differed 
in their ability to learn from social and non-social feedback. To examine this, I examined 
the ‘trials to criterion’ measure in the linear mixed-model described above. I found no 
significant effects for feedback type or ASD traits but I did find a significant main effect 
Table 8. Exact ANOVA Results for the Effects of Behavior Type, AQ, Feedback Type 
on Participant Performance ‘Trials to Criterion’ and Win-Stay, Lose-Shift Behavior 
Variable  
df F p B SE 
Proportion Correct      
   Pairing 3, 381.4 44.06 <.001 0.11 0.03 
   AQ 1, 671.3 0.34 .562 0.03 0.04 
   Feedback Type 1, 671.3 1.05 .305 0.05 0.03 
   AQ*Feedback 1, 671.3 0.12 .729 -0.01 0.04 
   Pairing*AQ 3, 381.4 1.47 .224 -0.05 0.05 
   Pairing*Feedback 3, 381.4 1.19 .312 -0.04 0.04 
   
Pairing*AQ*Feedback 
3, 381.4 0.24 .867 0.03 0.06 
‘Trials to Criterion’      
   Pairing 3, 381.4 7.50 <.001 2.11 3.07 
   AQ 1, 671.3 1.21 .272 -1.78 2.71 
   Feedback Type 1, 671.3 3.22 .073 3.56 2.02 
   AQ*Feedback 1, 671.3 <0.01 .951 1.64 2.84 
   Pairing*AQ 3, 381.4 1.39 .247 5.73 4.32 
   Pairing*Feedback 3, 381.4 1.08 .359 4.67 3.90 
   
Pairing*AQ*Feedback 
3, 381.4 0.59 .620 -3.64 5.49 
Win-Stay Behavior      
   ASD Traits 1, 222.9 4.10 .044 -2.65 1.04 
   Feedback Type 1, 222.9 1.23 .269 -0.48 1.08 
   ASD Traits*Feedback 1, 222.9 3.23 .074 2.50 1.39 
Lose-Shift Behavior      
   ASD Traits 1, 222.9 0.02 .902 -0.31 0.87 
   Feedback Type 1, 222.9 3.74 .054 -1.37 0.91 
   ASD Traits*Feedback 1, 222.9 0.17 .170 0.48 1.17 
Note. AQ is the Autism-spectrum Quotient. Feedback Type refers to whether 
participants received social or non-social feedback during the task. Pairing refers to 
the proportion of valid feedback within a given pairing (i.e., 100/0, 80/20, 70/30, or 
60/40).  
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for the proportion of valid feedback within a pairing. As anticipated, the greater the 
proportion of invalid feedback, the longer it took participants to learn the correct image in 
the pairing (F(1,452) = 8.87, p = .003). There were no significant interactions (see Figure 
7B and Table 8 for results). These findings suggest that the more often people receive 
invalid feedback, the more difficult it is for them to learn from that feedback but that 
learning rates do not depend on ASD-traits. When analyzing proportion correct, the 
findings were the same with only a main effect of pairing existing (See Figure 7A). 
 
I also tested participants’ win-stay and lose-shift behavior, as the literature 
suggests that this may be an important reason for why those with high AQ scores perform 
   
 
  
Figure 8. Probabilistic Selection Task Learning Block Behavior.  
(A) Proportion of Win-Stay behavior as a pairing, AQ and feedback. (B) Proportion of 
Lose-shift behavior as a pairing, AQ and feedback. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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more poorly in tasks such as this (Solomon et al., 2011). For win-stay behavior, analysis 
suggested that individuals with greater ASD traits engaged in more win-stay actions 
compared to those with fewer ASD traits (see Table 8 for Linear mixed-model results). 
There were no significant effects when using lose-shift behavior as the dependent 
variable (See Figure 8). 
4.3.2 Probabilistic Selection Task: Test Phase 
In the test phase, my goal was an exploratory analysis to see whether participants 
differed in their ability to select the “best” stimulus in novel stimuli pairings. As above, I 
conducted a linear mixed-model analysis using total correct choices as the dependent 
variable. I found no significant effects for feedback type or ASD traits. Additionally, the 
interaction was non-significant (see Table 9 for results). 
Table 9. Exact ANOVA Results for the effects of AQ and Feedback Type on 
Performance 
Variable  
df F p B SE 
Performance (Total 
Score) 
     
   ASD Traits  1, 210.7 0.203 .653 -0.83 1.72 
   Feedback Type 1, 210.7 0.836 .362 0.85 1.91 
   ASD Traits*Feedback 1, 210.7 0.050 .824 0.55 2.46 
Note. ASD traits as measured by the Autism-spectrum Quotient. Feedback Type 
refers to whether participants received social or non-social feedback during the 
task.  
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4.3.3 Discussion 
Overall, and in contrast to previous reports using a similar task (Solomon et al., 
2015, Solomon et al., 2011), there were no significant differences between AQ groups 
when it came to task performance in the probabilistic selection task. In addition, 
reinforcement condition did not seem to affect results differently across the groups.  
There are several possible reasons for my failure to replicate previous results in 
this study (see Baker et al., 2013; Fritz & Scherndl, 2014; Schutte et al., 2017 
Simonsohn, 2015). These have to do with modifications made to the original task that 
might have interfered with the replication. First, unlike the original task, my version of 
the task ensured that participants received valid feedback on the first two presentations of 
each stimulus pairing when participants were initially sampling the environment. I opted 
for this because of work suggesting that early invalid feedback may cause participants to 
learn the “wrong” selection, which they must then unlearn, thereby changing the nature 
of the task (see Buekers, & Magill, 1995; Ernst, & Steinhauser, 2015; Muller-Gass, 
Duncan, Tavakoli & Campbell, 2019). There is some evidence for this idea in the data. 
Specifically, the present participants performed substantially better than did participants 
in previous research (see Solomon et al., 2011). For example, over a third of participants 
in prior versions of this task were excluded from the test phase for poor learning 
performance, suggesting the possibility that early invalid feedback may change the nature 
of the task. Second, I used photos of recognizable everyday objects as stimuli in this task, 
rather than the Hiragana characters used previously. Evidence suggests that some 
Hiragana characters are easier to remember than others meaning that the random 
assignment of characters to pairing may impact learning independent of the more 
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important aspects of the task itself (Baker et al., 2013; Schutte et al., 2017). Together, 
these modifications may have affected my ability to replicate previous findings. In 
addition, choice behavior in the test phase of task has been shown to have poor test-re-
test reliability (Baker et al., 2013), calling into question what exactly this phase of the 
task measures.  
4.4 Probabilistic Learning: Replication 
To follow up on these results and correct confounds associated with the 
Probabilistic Selection task, I ran a conceptual replication of the task, with several key 
changes. My predictions were identical to those above.  
4.5 Methods 
4.5.1 Participants 
I recruited 298 participants from the Western Psychology Participant Pool to 
complete the study in exchange for partial course credit. I removed 13 participants from 
the analysis due inattentive responding in the task leaving a total of 285. I defined a 
participant as being inattentive to the task if on over 30% of the trials their response was 
faster than 250ms or slower than 5000ms. Using a median split approach, I classified 
participants who scored 18 or lower as low AQ participants and those who scored above 
18 as high AQ participants (see Table 10 for demographic characteristics and group 
comparisons). The Western University Nonmedical Ethics Board approved all study 
procedures and participants documented their informed consent prior to participating. 
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4.5.2 Procedures 
The study occurred in a single session. Participants completed a series of 
questionnaires (the AQ and several personality measures; see Table 3) and a new version 
of the Probabilistic Selection Task. In this version, participants experienced task blocks 
Table 10. Demographic Information for Probabilistic Selection Task replication 
AQ Group 
High AQ 
(AQ > 18) 
Low AQ 
(AQ ≤ 18) 
F df p 
n 147 138    
Score Range 19-37 7-18    
Sex (Female:Male) * 112:35 101:36 0.23 1,279 .631 
Age in years 18.9 (3.1) 18.4 (0.9) 3.27 1,280 .071 
Autism-spectrum 
Quotient 
     
     Total Score 23.4 (3.6) 14.2 (2.7) 604.92 1,283 <.001 
     Social Skills 4.0 (2.2) 1.4 (1.3) 144.67 1,283 <.001 
     Attention Shifting 6.3 (1.6) 4.17 (1.7) 118.37 1,283 <.001 
     Attention to Detail 6.1 (2.1) 5.0 (2.0) 23.31 1,283 <.001 
     Communication 3.8 (1.9) 1.5 (1.2) 151.51 1,283 <.001 
     Imagination 3.2 (1.7) 2.1 (1.5) 30.73 1,283 <.001 
Big Five Inventory      
     Extraversion  31.4 (8.6) 38.8 (7.3) 61.54 1, 283 <.001 
     Agreeableness 46.1 (7.5) 49.1 (7.2) 11.95 1,283 .001 
     Conscientiousness 42.4 (7.9) 43.1 (8.0) 0.42 1,283 .519 
     Neuroticism 35.4 (8.5) 30.6 (9.0) 21.31 1,283 <.001 
     Openness 46.4 (7.7) 47.8 (8.7) 2.19 1,283 .140 
Behavioral Inhibition/ 
Behavioral Activation 
Scales (BIS/BAS) 
     
     BIS 23.0 (3.4) 21.3 (3.9) 16.60 1,283 <.001 
     Fun Seeking 11.8 (2.2) 12.7 (2.4) 9.67 1,283 .002 
     Drive 11.2 (2.3) 11.4 (2.1) 0.52 1,283 .471 
     Reward 
Responsiveness 
18.0 (1.9) 17.9 (1.9) 0.37 1,283 .545 
Note. Table reports means (SDs in parentheses) and comparison test statistics. 
Comparisons tested with ANOVA except where noted. Three participants did not 
report their ages; one did not report sex information.  
*Comparison tested with Chi-Squared. 
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with both social and non-social reinforcement, in counterbalanced order, allowing for 
direct comparison across these feedback types. Windows computers running E-prime 2.0 
(Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) presented the stimuli and collected 
responses.   
This version of the task included several methodological changes. First, to make 
the social feedback directly relevant to the experimental context, participants received 
social feedback from the experimenter. That is, the computer showed them photos of 
their experimenter’s face, either genuinely smiling for positive feedback or frowning for 
negative feedback. In order to enhance the salience of this feedback, the experimenter 
informed participants that in one of the study conditions they would see feedback from 
“me,” (the experimenter) that would indicate performance. Experimenters also 
demonstrated each expression for participants and noted its meaning in the task. Pilot 
testing suggested that this manipulation carried some real social value. In addition, I also 
changed the non-social feedback to simple green ticks or red crosses depending on 
whether participants got the answer correct or incorrect, respectively. This is more 
consistent with the previous research (Frank et al., 2004) and eliminated the monetary 
feedback component. 
Second, to address the possibility that I had made the task too easy by 
guaranteeing that participants received valid feedback during the first two trials, I 
eliminated this contingency and simply randomized feedback order. This change is 
consistent with the methodology of the original study (Frank et al., 2004). All participants 
completed two blocks of 80 trials each, under both social and non-social reinforcement 
conditions, thereby equalizing the number of trials across participants. In order to reduce 
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experimental fatigue, I eliminated the test phase because of associated methodological 
and interpretational concerns (Baker et al., 2013). The stimuli remained as above, 
including the same images, randomly assigned to pairings and feedback types.  
4.5.3 Questionnaires  
With the exception of the BFNE, which did not suggest differences in social 
concerns across the groups, the questionnaires remained exactly the same as those 
reported in the previous study. They were: The Autism-spectrum Quotient, the Big-Five 
Inventory and the Behavioral Inhibition/Behavioral Activation Scales.  
4.5.4 Data Analysis  
Here, because all participants completed the task under both feedback conditions, 
I examined task hypotheses with a standard mixed-model ANOVA (SPSS 24.0; IBM 
Corp, 2016). Similar to the previous analysis, proportion correct and trials to criterion 
(defined as above) were the dependent variables in the first two analyses. Pairs (100/0, 
80/20, 70/30, 60/40), and reward-type (social, non-social) were included as fixed within-
subjects measures, whereas ASD grouping (AQ score low (<=18) versus high (>18)) was 
included as a between-subjects factor in the models. Additional mixed-model ANOVAs 
also examined “win–stay” and “lose–shift” behavior as it related to reinforcement type 
(social/non-social; within-subjects) and ASD group (High/Low; between subjects).  
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4.6 Probabilistic Selection Task Results 
With respect to overall task performance, using proportion correct, results were 
consistent with the previous analysis and besides the expected main effect of pairing, no 
significant effects or interactions were found (See Figure 9A). With respect to the rate at 
Table 11. Exact mixed-ANOVA Results for the Effects of Behavior Type, 
AQ, Feedback Type on Participant Performance ‘Trials to Criterion’ and 
Win-Stay, Lose-Shift Behavior Usage 
Variable  
df F p ηp
2 
Proportion Correct     
    Pairing 3,283 284.28 <.001 .501 
    AQ 1,283 0.26 .607 .001 
    Feedback Type 1,283 0.71 .399 .003 
    AQ*Feedback 1,283 1.08 .299 .004 
    Pairing*AQ 3,283 0.37 .778 .001 
    Pairing*Feedback 3,283 1.44 .231 .005 
    Pairing*AQ*Feedback 3,283 0.38 .765 .001 
‘Trials to Criterion’     
    Pairing 3,283 87.20 <.001 .236 
    AQ 1,283 0.79 .375 .003 
    Feedback Type 1,283 0.04 .848 <.001 
    AQ*Feedback 1,283 1.51 .220 .005 
    Pairing*AQ 3,283 1.25 .291 .004 
    Pairing*Feedback 3,283 0.92 .964 <.001 
    Pairing*AQ*Feedback 3,283 2.30 .086 .008 
Win-Stay Behavior     
    AQ 1,283 0.29 .592 .001 
    Feedback Type 1,283 1.28 .258 .005 
    AQ*Feedback 1,283 0.21 .648 .001 
Lose-Shift Behavior     
    AQ 1,283 0.06 .814 <.001 
    Feedback Type 1,283 7.57 .006 .026 
    AQ*Feedback 1,283 1.82 .179 .006 
Note. AQ is the Autism-spectrum Quotient. Feedback Type refers to 
whether participants received social or non-social feedback during the task. 
Pairing refers to the proportion of valid feedback within a given pairing (i.e., 
100/0, 80/20, 70/30, or 60/40).  
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which participants learned, using ‘trials to criterion’ as the dependent measure, results 
were consistent with the previous analysis. There were no significant effects for AQ or 
feedback type. As above, I found a significant main effect for pairing (see Figure 9B for 
exact results) such that it took longer for participants to learn the correct response as the 
proportion of invalid feedback increased (F(3, 258) = 225.02, p = <.001). The null main 
effects of feedback and AQ-level suggest that individuals, regardless of self-reported AQ 
and feedback type, acquire probabilistic contingencies at similar rates (see Table 11 for 
 
Figure 9. Probabilistic Selection Task. 
 (A) Proportion Correct as a function of pairing, AQ and feedback. (B) Trials 
to Criterion as a function of pairing, AQ and feedback. Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals. 
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exact results).  
Analysis of participants’ win-stay behavior revealed no significant effects for AQ 
or feedback type, suggesting that there were no differences associated with this type of 
task decision-making (see Figure 10A). However, for ‘lose-shift’ behavior there was a 
significant effect for feedback type, such that participants made more lose-shift behaviors 
during non-social feedback compared to social feedback (see Figure 10B). The null 
findings for ASD traits suggest that individuals, regardless of self-reported ASD traits 
engage in similar win-stay, lose-shift behavior patterns when learning probabilistic 
contingencies (see Table 11 results). 
 
   
 
Figure 10. Probabilistic Selection Task Learning Block Behavior.  
(A) Proportion of Win-Stay behavior as a pairing, AQ and feedback. (B) Proportion of 
Lose-shift behavior as a pairing, AQ and feedback. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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4.7 Discussion 
Overall, I found no relationship between performance and participants’ self-reported 
AQ levels in the probabilistic selection task. This replicated result is contrary to the 
predictions proponents of the probabilistic learning hypotheses make as well as previous 
research findings (Solomon et al., 2011). However, these null results are consistent across 
our larger and certainly reasonably powered samples and suggest that self-reported ASD 
traits are not predictive of performance on the probabilistic selection task, regardless of 
feedback type. Thus, learning differences do not seem to be associated with self-reported 
traits of autism, unlike previous reports (Baker et al., 2013; Schutte et al., 2017; Solomon 
et al., 2011).  
4.8 Learning from the Environment 
Despite the fact that learning from social versus non-social feedback did not seem 
to differentially affect performance across ASD-trait groups, it is also the case that 
success in face-to-face interactions involves using social cues to predict others’ behavior 
(Fawcett, & Liszkowski, 2012; Levesque & Kenny, 1993; Sacheli, Aglioti & Candidi, 
2015; Sauppé & Mutlu, 2014). This is the question to which I now turn. Here, I assess the 
degree to which participants learn to use social and non-social cues as they make choice 
decisions. Importantly, as in real social interactions, the cues that served to predict the 
“correct” behavior on a trial-to-trial basis had contingencies that changed over the course 
of the task. Thus, participants in this study needed to integrate information from multiple 
cues, each of which had different likelihoods of providing “correct” advice that changed 
over time. I was interested in the degree to which variation in the reliability of natural 
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reward contingencies related to participants’ ability to integrate and make use of different 
types of environmental stimuli (e.g., social vs. non-social stimuli). To assess this, I used 
an associative learning task (Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich & Rushworth 2008; Sevgi et al., 
2020) that included both social and non-social stimuli. This task was used for two 
reasons. First, it allowed a test of the prediction that if probabilistic learning is associated 
with autism-spectrum traits, participants reporting high levels of autism-spectrum traits 
should perform worse under conditions of volatility (i.e., periods in which reinforcement 
contingencies fluctuate in the degree to which they are reliable) and perhaps to a greater 
degree when the stimuli are social. Second, a critique of the previous probabilistic 
selection task might be that the task is too easy to learn. This task is more challenging 
because it requires participants to learn from two contingencies that change over the 
course of the task. If low task difficulty was obscuring autism-trait group differences, this 
more challenging task should correct that problem.  
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4.9 Methods 
4.9.1 Participants  
I recruited participants (N=195) from the Western University psychology 
participant pool (SONA) to complete the study in exchange for partial course credit and a 
small monetary bonus. I classified participants as either low or high AQ based on a 
median split. Participants who scored 17 or lower were the low ASD trait participants and 
those who scored above 17 were high ASD trait participants (see Table 12 for 
demographic information). The Western University Nonmedical Ethics Board approved 
Table 12. Demographic Information for the Associative Learning Task Participant 
Sample 
AQ Group 
Low ASD 
Traits 
(AQ ≤ 17) 
High ASD 
Traits 
(AQ > 17) 
F df p 
n 92 99    
Score Total 4-17 18-35    
Sex (Female:Male)* 65:27 63:33 0.35 1, 188 .556 
Age (Years) 18.5 (1.7) 18.2 (0.9) 1.92 1, 190 .168 
Autism-spectrum 
Quotient  
     
    Total Score 13.7 (2.7) 21.9 (3.9) 280.75 1, 190 <.001 
    Social Skills 1.43 (1.3) 3.63 (2.1) 75.17 1,190 <.001 
    Communication 1.33 (1.2) 3.33 (1.7) 88.09 1,190 <.001 
    Attention to detail 5.10 (2.0) 5.81 (1.9) 6.27 1,190 .013 
    Attention Switching 4.36 (1.7) 6.23 (1.6) 63.94 1,190 <.001 
    Imagination 1.57 (1.1) 2.87 (1.6) 81.02 1,190 <.001 
Systematizing Quotient 47.8 
(18.1) 
50.2 
(13.8) 
0.86 1, 190 .356 
Empathy Quotient   41.8 (7.9) 36.3 (8.4) 19.68 1, 190 <.001 
Note. Table reports means (SDs in parentheses) and comparison test statistics. 
Comparisons tested with ANOVA except where noted. Two participants did not 
provide their age. I removed four participants who failed to follow the instructions of 
the task. * Comparison tested with Chi-Squared. 
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all study procedures and participants documented their informed consent prior to 
participating.  
4.9.2 Procedures 
Participants completed the study in a single session. Participants first completed a 
series of questionnaires (the AQ, as above). Participants then completed two versions of 
an associative learning task, in which they learned task contingencies based on a non-
social (i.e., arrow), or a social stimulus (i.e., face). Participants experienced both types of 
stimuli within the same task session and I counterbalanced the stimulus order across 
participants. 
4.9.2.1 Associative Learning Task1 
Participants completed an associative learning task (Sevgi, Diaconescu, 
Tittgemeyer & Schilbach, 2016; adapted from Behrens, et al., 2008). Each trial of this 
 
1
 This work was originally intended to examine the task developed by Behrens, et al., 2007, using the gaze 
stimuli and modeling as implemented in Sevgi, et al., 2016. However, Sevgi, et al.’s original report was 
unclear with respect to all the task parameters. I therefore relied on both groups’ descriptions of the task. 
My task replicates the design of the task by Behrens, et al., 2007, with one exception. Instead of the 
original graphical depiction of the “advice” given by the fictitious confederate as in the Behrens task, I used 
a central gaze cue (a face that looked at one of the cards), as in the Sevgi task, for the “social” condition. 
However, the reinforcement parameters (i.e., the card values) sampled in the task were drawn randomly 
from a uniform distribution ranging from 0 to 100 (rather than 1-9 as in Sevgi et al., 2016). My task 
differed from both previous versions because I included a non-social condition (absent in both the Behrens 
and Sevgi tasks) in which an arrow, rather than a social stimulus, provided the central cue. Participants 
completed these conditions in counterbalanced order. Due to a mathematical error that appeared to change 
the task results, Sevgi, et al., voluntarily retracted their 2016 paper. Since that time, they have significantly 
revised their modeling, republishing both the data (Sevgi, et al., 2020) and the full set of analysis scripts 
(available at https://gitlab.ethz.ch/dandreea/mltm). The present analysis implements the Sevgi, et al., 2020, 
modeling routines within the dataset with one slight change. I scaled the reward parameter down by a factor 
of 10, to bring it into the range of that reported in Sevgi, et al. (2016; 2020).  
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task began with a centrally presented fixation cross (1000ms duration). The fixation cross 
was then replaced with a cueing stimulus in the center of the screen and a pair of colored 
cards (either blue and red or gold and green) located on the left and right sides of the 
screen (1000ms duration; Figure 11). Each card contained a number between 0 and 100 
(randomly selected from a uniform distribution). Located between the cards was a 
stimulus (this was either a face [social condition] or an arrow [non-social condition]) that 
cued them to one of the two cards. In the social task block, the face (which first looked 
directly at the participant) averted its gaze toward either the left or the right card (750ms) 
before looking back at the participant. The arrow followed a similar pattern pointing first 
up and then at one of the cards. Once the face/arrow returned to the center position, 
participants were able to choose one of the cards by selecting a left or right button press. 
This display remained visible until the participant selected a card. The computer then 
framed the selected card for 750ms before providing feedback. If the participant made the 
correct choice on that trial, the computer displayed a green tick beneath the choice, and 
the computer added the reward value of the correctly chosen card to a participant’s total 
score. If the choice was incorrect, the computer displayed a red cross beneath the choice, 
and the score remained the same. The feedback display was present for 1000ms (see 
Figure 11).  
At the start of the experiment, the experimenter informed participants that the 
goal of the task was to select the “winning” card from a pair of cards and to try to acquire 
as many points as possible. Participants were told that if they chose the winning card, 
they would earn the number of points marked on the face of the card, with their end-of-
game monetary bonus determined by their total points. However, the instructions also 
96 
  
informed them that sometimes the 
blue (or gold) card was more likely 
to be correct and sometimes the 
red (or green) card was more likely 
to be correct and that the 
probability of the blue (gold) or 
red (green) card being correct on 
any given trial might change 
during the experiment. For 
simplicity, I refer to card color 
probability going forward as the 
probability of the blue card being 
correct. I also note that card color 
pairings were counterbalanced 
across stimulus order and 
participant. Finally, the 
instructions informed participants 
that in one block they would see a face in the center of the screen and in another block, 
they would see an arrow in the center of the screen, both of which would move 
periodically. The instructions informed them this was to make the experiment more 
visually appealing for them. They received no additional information about this stimulus 
(as in Sevgi et al., 2020). 
 
Figure 11. Associative Learning Task. 
Figure shows examples of social and non-social trials.  
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During the task, the arrow/face stimulus sometimes indicated the correct selection 
for the trial, and sometimes indicated the incorrect choice. The arrow/face stimulus 
shifted between reliable cueing (indicating the correct choice on 75% of trials within a 
task period) and reliably cueing the incorrect choice location (75% of trials). This 
contingency shifted (e.g., from mostly correct cues to mostly incorrect cues and vice 
versa) on trials 30, 40, 50, 60, and 70. I refer to Trials 30-70 as the “volatile” period for 
cue accuracy. 
The probability that the blue card was the correct or winning card also varied 
across the task. Specifically, for the first 60 trials within a block, the probability of the 
blue card being correct remained constant. However, on trials, 60, 80 and 100 the 
probability that the blue card was correct changed (i.e., from being correct on 80% of 
trials to being incorrect on 80% of trials). I refer to this period (trials 60-120) as the 
volatile period for the probability that the blue card was correct, as participants must alter 
their estimates of the likelihood that the blue card is correct (independent of any cue) 
every 20 trials. Positions of the winning card (left or right) were determined randomly, 
based on the probability of the blue card being correct in any given period of a task. 
Overall, participants needed to learn three things in the task: 1) whether the reward was 
generally associated with the blue card or the red card at any given task trial; 2) the 
probability that the central cue reliably indicated the card that was rewarded; 3) how 
these probabilities shifted over time.  
Participants completed one block of 120 trials in which the face was the central 
cue and one block in which the arrow was the central cue in counter balanced order. 
Additionally, I counterbalanced both the probabilistic schedule for cue accuracy across 
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participants (whether the starting contingency for the central cue was more likely to be 
accurate or inaccurate) and for the probability of blue being correct (whether blue was 
more or less likely to be correct). I used E-prime 2.0 to present the stimuli and collect 
responses (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). 
4.9.3 Questionnaires 
As reported above, participants completed the Autism-spectrum Quotient. They 
were included in the “low” ASD trait group if they scored 17 or less. If they scored 18 or 
higher, they were classified as “high” in ASD traits. 
4.9.4 Data Analysis  
To understand the presumably parallel learning systems that guide participants’ 
choice behavior in this task, as well as how participants map different task states to 
outcomes, I employ an “observing the observer” approach (Daunizeau, Den Ouden, 
Pessiglione, Kiebel, Stephan & Friston, 2010). This approach is designed to model the 
integration of environmental stimuli with responses and outcomes to estimate how agents 
observe the consequences of their actions, given environmental states, and from those 
consequences, make inferences about the underlying cause-effect relationship(s) active in 
the environment. Because inferences or predictions based on stimulus-outcome 
contingencies can be noisy, inaccurate, and can change over time/context, I model 
uncertainty using a set of one-step update equations, derived from Bayesian principles. 
This approach relies on a Hierarchical Gaussian Filter (HGF; Mathys, Daunizeau, Friston 
& Stephan, 2011), which estimates a hierarchical generative model of the environment 
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and its uncertainty (Mathys et al., 2014). The model assigns a probability (likelihood) to 
each input, by estimating environmental states (e.g., the current probability with which 
the advice is correct that changes over time) and underlying parameters, given an agent’s 
prior beliefs about how sensory inputs are generated by the external world.  
The observing the observer framework assumes two differentiated model 
components (beliefs about environmental states and responses; Daunizeau et al., 2010; 
Mathys et al., 2014; Schilbach et al., 2013; Sporns, Chialvo, Kaiser & Hilgetag, 2004) 
modeled across three integrated levels. Model results are based on the estimation of 
hierarchically coupled hidden states that describe how agents learn about environmental 
statistics (in this case, the probability that the blue card is correct, the probability that the 
gaze advice is valid, and the volatility of both these states). Based on the outcomes of 
observed decisions (i.e., responses) the model maps an agent’s predicted outcome 
probabilities based on observations of decision outcomes (i.e., accurate/inaccurate gaze, 
blue or green card correct; level 3). Predicted outcome probabilities or an agent’s beliefs 
about the current state of its environment (level 2), are a function of both observed trial 
outcomes and the estimated volatility within the current environment (level 1). Together, 
this model predicts an agent’s decisions based on estimates of the agent’s beliefs about 
how the environment gives rise to stimuli, the degree to which those cause-effect 
relationships are stable, and an agent-specific parameter that estimates the degree to 
which the agent updates prior beliefs based on decision outcomes. Thus, the model 
accounts for the deterministic and probabilistic relationships between perceptions of 
environmental states, the beliefs agents hold about how those states arise and how agents 
make decisions as a consequence.  
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From a theoretical standpoint, this model accounts for phasic volatility in the 
environment (level 1), modeled as: 
𝑝(𝑥1
(𝑡))~𝒩(𝑥1
(𝑡−1)
, 𝜗) 
the participants’ belief about the likelihood of congruent gaze or the blue card being 
correct (level 2): 
𝑝(𝑥2
(𝑡))~𝒩 (𝑥2
(𝑡−1)
, 𝑒𝜅𝑥1
(𝑡−1)
) 
as related to predictions about decision outcomes (i.e., whether the gaze advice is actually 
valid/blue card is actually correct; level 3). 
𝑝(𝑥3
(𝑡)
= 1) =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝑥2
(𝑡)  
According to this model, on any trial (t), 𝑥1
(𝑡)
 follows a Gaussian random walk described 
by a probability distribution with a mean of 𝑥1
(𝑡−1)
 and a precision of 𝜗, a hidden 
parameter describing environmental volatility. Outcome likelihood on a trial (𝑥3
(𝑡)
) is 
modeled as a sigmoid transform of the level-2 model state (𝑥2
(𝑡)
), which follows the 
Gaussian distributed estimate of the prior level 2 state (𝑥2
(𝑡−1)
) whose variance is based 
on both estimated volatility on the previous trial and a parameter, 𝜅, describing the 
coupling between model-levels 1 and 2 for the previous time step. A final response 
prediction layer maps predicted outcomes to responses using a softmax function. 
Practically, this work models the dynamics of belief trajectories (i.e., the accuracy 
and volatility estimates, as well as the precision of these estimates) using four learning 
parameters. Across stimulus modalities, these parameters represent the coupling between 
levels of the model for gaze advice (κg) and card outcomes (κc), as well as the volatility 
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estimates of gaze (ϑg) and card outcomes (ϑc). The HGF models belief-updating as a 
precision-weighted prediction error, which can be conceptualized as the surprise an agent 
experiences upon receiving outcome feedback (e.g., this error is smaller if the observed 
outcome is either similar to the predicted outcome or if the prediction has low-precision 
and increases as the outcome differs from prediction and estimated precision of the 
prediction grows). This belief precision weighting (π) of the prediction error at each trial 
(t) depends on the low-level volatility estimate (for gaze advice [g] and correct card [c], 
respectively) and the inferred gaze/card accuracy: 
𝜋2,𝑔
(𝑡)
= ?̂?2,𝑔
(𝑡)
+ ?̂?3,𝑔
(𝑘)
(1 − ?̂?3,𝑔
(𝑘)
), 𝜋2,𝑐
(𝑡)
= ?̂?2,𝑐
(𝑡)
+ ?̂?3,𝑐
(𝑘)
(1 − ?̂?3,𝑐
(𝑘)
) 
Precision is estimated as: 
?̂?2,𝑔
(𝑡)
=
1
1
𝜋2𝑔
(𝑡−1)
+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜅𝑔𝜇1,𝑔
(𝑡−1)
)
, ?̂?2,𝑐
(𝑡)
=
1
1
𝜋2𝑐
(𝑡−1)
+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜅𝑐𝜇1,𝑐
(𝑡−1)
)
 
where 𝜇1
(𝑡−1)
 represents the participant’s prediction about current environmental volatility 
based on the previous trial.  
The model derives subject-specific precision-weighted estimates for outcome 
likelihood and volatility in parallel, for a given trial t, where 𝑤𝑔
(𝑡)
 and 𝑤𝑐
(𝑡)
 are the current 
precision estimates of gaze and card cues.  
𝑤𝑔
(𝑡)
=
𝜁?̂?3,𝑔
(𝑡)
𝜁?̂?3,𝑔
(𝑡)
+?̂?3,𝑐
(𝑡), 𝑤𝑐
(𝑡)
=
?̂?3,𝑐
(𝑡)
𝜁?̂?3,𝑔
(𝑡)
+?̂?3,𝑐
(𝑡) 
Using these estimates, the model generates a combined belief state, b(t), that integrates 
posterior expectations for the accuracy inferences associated with both gaze advice and 
card.  
𝑏(𝑡) = 𝑤𝑔
(𝑡)
?̂?3,𝑔
(𝑡)
+ 𝑤𝑐
(𝑡)
𝜇3,𝑐
(𝑡)
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?̂?3,𝑔
(𝑡)
 is the logistic sigmoid of the current expectation about gaze accuracy  
?̂?3,𝑔
(𝑡)
= 𝑠(𝜇2,𝑔
(𝑡−1)
) =
1
1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜇2,𝑔
(𝑡−1)
)
 
and 𝜇3,𝑐
(𝑡)
 is the transformed belief about current card color (i.e., the probability that the 
correct card is blue based on the current gaze cue), as inferred from the active gaze cue. 
For example, during a phase were the gaze advice is generally inaccurate, a gaze toward 
the blue card would decrease the agent’s estimated likelihood that the blue card is correct, 
and consequently reduce the likelihood of blue card selection.  
The parameter 𝜁 represents the additional bias an agent might have toward the 
social cue (i.e., a participant may have a tendency to follow the social cue) and serves to 
weight the precision estimates in the model. ?̂?3,𝑔
(𝑡)
 and ?̂?3,𝑐
(𝑡)
 are the inverse variances 
(precision estimates) for the expected gaze (g) and card (c) accuracies. The model 
assumes that these estimates follow a Bernoulli distribution and calculates the precision 
on each trial as: 
?̂?3,𝑔
(𝑡)
=
1
𝑢3,𝑔
(𝑡)
(1−?̂?3,𝑔
(𝑡)
)
, ?̂?3,𝑐
(𝑡)
=
1
?̃?3,𝑐
(𝑡)
(1−?̃?3,𝑐
(𝑡)
)
 
Finally, a participant’s likelihood of taking the gaze advice was estimated as a 
softmax transformation of the combined belief state 
𝑝(𝑦(𝑡) = 1|𝑏(𝑡)) =
𝑏(𝑡)
𝛽
𝑏(𝑡)
𝛽
+ (1 − 𝑏(𝑡))𝛽
 
where β > 0 was an inverse thermodynamic parameter describing a participant’s decision 
randomness. The prior mean and variance for each model parameter, along with the 
model itself, were exactly as described in Sevgi, et al., (2020). I fit the model on a 
participant-by-participant and block-by-block (social cue, non-social cue) basis. All 
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model fitting was implemented using purpose written scripts in MATLAB 2020a (The 
MathWorks, Inc. Natick, MA). The estimates for each model parameter, as well as 
overall performance metrics, were subsequently analyzed to test the set of proposed 
hypotheses.  
4.10  Results/Discussion 
First, I checked to see if participants had performed above chance in all phases of 
the task to ensure the task properly worked. I found all groups performance differed 
significantly from chance (see Appendix D for more details). Based on the previous 
results by Sevgi, et al. (2020), and a wide range of research reports showing difficulties 
Table 13. Exact ANOVA Results for the AQ and Advice Type on Participant 
Performance, and the Modeling Parameters Fit of the Coupling Parameter, Precision 
Estimates, and Decision Randomness 
Variable  
df F p ηp
2 
Performance (Accuracy)     
    AQ 1,181 0.17 .673 .001 
    Advice Type 1,181 0.69 .405 .004 
    AQ*Advice Type 1,181 3.91 .049 .021 
Coupling Parameter (κ)     
    AQ 1,181 0.25 .617 .001 
    Advice Type 1,181 1.65 .201 .009 
    AQ*Advice Type 1,181 0.25 .617 .001 
Precision Estimates (π)     
    AQ 1,181 0.03 .866 <.001 
    Advice Type 1,181 1.31 .253 .007 
    AQ*Advice Type 1,181 0.11 .745 .001 
Decision Randomness (β)     
    AQ 1,181 0.86 .356 .005 
    Advice Type 1,181 0.51 .475 .003 
    AQ*Advice Type 1,181 3.58 .060 .019 
Note. AQ is the Autism-spectrum Quotient. Advice Type refers to whether 
participants received social or non-social feedback during the task.  
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with social versus non-
social stimuli (Dawson et 
al., 1998; Lin et al., 2012; 
Scott‐Van Zeeland et al., 
2010), I anticipated that 
there would be a 
relationship between ASD 
traits and task performance 
such that participants who 
scored high on the AQ 
would generally have 
more difficulty on the task, 
especially in the social 
condition. Figure 12, 
which appears for descriptive purposes, shows the correlation between AQ score and task 
performance for both social (r (183) = .142, p=.055) and non-social stimuli (r (183) = -
.004, p=.960). Results show that neither relationship reaches the threshold for statistical 
significance. I then employed my standard median split on AQ scores in a mixed-model 
ANOVA framework with advice condition (social or non-social) to explicitly test for the 
presence of an interaction between group (high versus low AQ score) and advice type. 
Results showed no significant main effects for either AQ group, F(1,181) = .179, p = 
.673, or advice condition, F(1,181) = .697, p = .405. Interestingly, the interaction term did 
reach the threshold for statistical significance. Contrary to prediction, results showed a 
 
Figure 12. Relationship between AQ and task 
performance.  
Social and non-social conditions plotted in orange and 
blue respectively.  
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group x advice type interaction, F(1,181)=3.912, p = .049, ⴄ2=.021, such that the high 
ASD trait individuals showed slightly better performance in the social condition (Figure 
13A).  
I additionally hypothesized that model parameters associated with how 
participants treat the advice cue might differ across the groups, depending on whether the 
advice was social or non-social (the gaze cue or the arrow cue). In particular, I 
anticipated that the κ parameter, which represents coupling across the levels of the model 
would show this effect, as would the precision estimates π. I additionally investigated the 
model parameter β, which is an inverse thermodynamic estimate of decision-randomness. 
Contrary to prior research and my predictions, I found neither main effects nor 
interactions for either the coupling parameters or the precision estimates. Interestingly, I 
did find a marginally significant interaction on the β parameter, F(1,181) = 3.584, p = 
 
Figure 13. Associative learning of social and non-social value.  
(A) Accuracy across AQ grouping (B) Model Fit across AQ grouping.  
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.060, ⴄ 2=.019, suggesting that the model estimated somewhat higher decision 
randomness for participants in the high-ASD trait group (see Figure 13B or Table 13). 
4.11 Chapter Discussion  
Across all the hypotheses tested in Chapter 4, I found little relationship between 
task performance and participants’ ASD traits on either the probabilistic selection task or 
the associative learning task. Moreover, performance did not seem to reliably depend on 
whether the feedback was social or non-social. Where results did show slight group 
differences and group x task interactions, these differences tended to hover around the 
thresholds for statistical significance, making it difficult to state with certainty that real 
and replicable differences existed in the sample. These results, much like in previous 
chapters, are contrary to previous theoretical assumptions and research findings (Sevgi et 
al., 2020; Solomon et al., 2011).  
However, as in previous chapters, there is an important limitation with respect to 
the present findings. As with previous chapters, there is an unusual association between 
AQ and extraversion in one of the three samples. Interestingly, however, the findings 
from that sample are similar to findings from the other samples in which the association 
is more typical. Thus, it is possible that this does not affect task results.  
Thus, it is worthwhile to consider the possibility that self-reported autism-
spectrum traits may not be effective indicators of learning in deterministic and 
probabilistic environments. I now change focus to investigate how ASD traits and task 
performances are related to social outcomes and social behavior.   
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5 ASD Traits and Naturalistic Social Interaction 
5.1 Introduction 
Deficits in social performance are a hallmark symptom of ASD (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013; Baron-Cohen, 1990; Fountain et al., 2012; Landa et al., 
2007; Travis & Sigman, 1998). Indeed, many of the earliest ASD indicators that appear 
in infancy and early childhood are social in nature, including reductions in joint attention, 
reduced social gaze, and delayed social smiling (Jaswal & Akhtar, 2019; Lockyer & 
Rutter, 1970; Sigman, Dijamco, Gratier & Rozga, 2004). Interestingly, differences in 
social behavior may even be present in non-diagnosed individuals who endorse ASD-
related traits (Beuker et al., 2013; Goldstein, Naglieri, Rzepa & Williams, 2012; Jobe & 
White, 2007; Robertson & Simmons, 2013; Rosbrook & Whittingham, 2010). Thus, these 
individuals may also show alterations in behavior during social interactions. Here, I aim 
to explore how ASD-related traits manifest in terms of both low-level differences in real 
social behavior and in social outcomes (i.e., a social partner’s perceptions of an 
interaction). In addition, where possible, I ask how behaviors and social outcomes 
correlate with task performance to begin the process of relating real social behavior and 
outcomes with their potential social cognitive underpinnings.  
Based on previous theoretical formulations of the social deficits in ASD, one 
should expect individuals with more ASD-related traits to experience worse social 
outcomes, and those outcomes should be related to particular types of social behavior. 
Additionally, one should expect tasks that measure relevant social conditions/motivations 
to relate to social outcomes. To investigate these ideas, I turn now to data from 
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naturalistic social interactions in which participants “got acquainted” with another 
participant or, in cases where scheduling did not allow it, an experimenter. These data 
were collected in the context of the Line Discrimination Task and the original 
Probabilistic Selection Task (see Chapters 2 and 4) or the Leuven Embedded Figures 
Task (L-EFT; Chapter 3).  
Table 14. Demographics for Social Interaction 
Participant Sample 
Variables 
 
n 333 
Sex (Female:Male)  227:103 
Age in years 20.80 (6.3) 
Autism-spectrum Quotient  
     Total Score 19.5 (6.3) 
     Social Skills 3.2 (2.5) 
     Attention Shifting 5.3 (2.1) 
     Attention to Detail 5.9 (2.1) 
     Communication 2.6 (2.0) 
     Imagination 2.6 (1.7) 
     Score Range 6-45 
Big Five Inventory  
     Extraversion  34.0 (10.2) 
     Agreeableness 45.3 (8.6) 
     Conscientiousness 41.6 (7.9) 
     Neuroticism 32.0 (9.6) 
     Openness 46.8 (9.1) 
Behavioral Inhibition/ Behavioral 
Activation Scales (BIS/BAS) 
 
     BIS 22.7 (3.8) 
     Fun Seeking 12.7 (2.7) 
     Drive 11.8 (2.5) 
     Reward Responsiveness 17.9 (2.4) 
Note. Age and questionnaire measures show means 
(standard deviations in parentheses). Three participants 
did not report sex, four participants did not report age 
and seven participants did not complete the BFI.  
109 
  
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Participants 
Recruited in the context of previous samples within this dissertation (see Chapter 
2.2.1. and Chapter 3.1.1 for participant details), 333 participants completed a naturalistic 
“getting acquainted” social interaction alongside either the line discrimination and 
probabilistic selection tasks (n = 127) or the Leuven embedded figures task (n = 206). For 
demographic information on this sample refer to Table 14.   
5.2.2 Procedure 
Participants completed a “getting acquainted” type naturalistic social interaction 
in the context of a longer laboratory session. Interactions were 5-minutes long, unscripted 
and completed with either an experimenter (if another participant was unavailable; 
N=69), or another participant (N=264). When participants interacted with an 
experimenter, the experimenter behaved as naturally as possible. Immediately after the 
social interaction, both interaction partners (including the experimenter when applicable) 
completed a 16-item questionnaire in which they reported how much they liked their 
social partner (e.g., “I would like to get to know my conversation partner better”; , α = 
.97) and about the quality of their interaction (e.g., “The interaction felt natural”; , α = 
.98; see Gilder & Heerey 2019). These questions are based on a modified Desire for 
Future Interaction scale (Coyne, 1976). This measure shows excellent cross-participant 
correlations suggesting that these ratings are reliable and valid measures of perceptions of 
a social partner and interaction (e.g., Gilder & Heerey 2019; Heerey & Crossley, 2014). 
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Participants rated each item on a visual analogue scale anchored with ‘strongly agree’ to 
‘strongly disagree’.  
Participants completing this task in the context of the Leuven Embedded Figures 
Task (N=206; Chapter 3) were video-recorded for offline analysis and the interaction data 
electronically coded (technical difficulties caused a save failure for 4 participants’ video 
data so these participants were excluded from video analyses). Noldus FaceReader 8.0 
software (Noldus, 2019) automatically coded participants facial behavior. FaceReader 
models expressive behavior on a frame-by-frame basis and classifies that behavior in 
terms of Facial Action Coding System (FACS; Ekman & Friesen, 1976; Ekman, Friesen 
& Hager, 2002) “action units” (AUs). Each action unit represents the contraction of a 
single muscle group and simultaneously displayed action units contribute to facial 
expressions (e.g., the contraction of the zygomaticus major and orbicularis oculi muscles 
that characterize the genuine smile; Ekman & Friesen, 1976; Ekman et al., 2002). 
To detect AUs, FaceReader processes information from video input in three key 
steps. First, it relies the Viola-Jones face detection algorithm to “find” the face within the 
frame (Viola & Jones, 2001). Second, it creates a 3D model using the Active Appearance 
Method (AAM) described by Cootes and Taylor (2000). Briefly, the AAM is trained on a 
database of images that describes 500+ points in the face. Key facial aspects include 1) 
points that enclose the face and 2) facial points that enclose easily recognizable features 
like lips, eyes and nose. Third, facial expression classification relies on an artificial deep-
learning neural network (Bishop, 1995), trained on a database with over 10,000 images; a 
method known as ‘Deep Face’ classification system (Giarelli et al., 2010). Additional 
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detail on the functioning of this classification system is available in the FaceReader 
Methodology Note (Loijens & Krips, 2019).  
FaceReader has been shown to have good convergent validity with its ability to 
recognize and correctly classify between 80-88% of emotions within the Warsaw Set of 
Emotional Facial Expression Pictures (WSEFEP) and Amsterdam Dynamic Facial 
Expression Set (ADFES), which is comparable to human classification (85%; Lewinski, 
den Uyl & Butler, 2014; Skiendziel, Rösch & Schultheiss, 2019). Additionally, 
FaceReader shows similar levels of reliability to the interrater reliability of expert human 
coders (.69 versus .7; Lewinski et al., 2014). Once FaceReader coded the data, I 
calculated composite scores to examine the proportion of frames that were active (activity 
greater than 10% of baseline) for each Action Unit as a metric of “expressivity”.  
5.2.3 Data Analysis 
This study has three main goals: 1) to examine how ASD-related traits predict 
social outcomes; 2) to correlate task performance with social outcomes; and 3) to explore 
ASD-related differences in social behavior. For the first question, I analyzed all 
participants who had completed both the AQ and partner-rated interaction scale (n = 
333). Due to the large sample size for whom both AQ data and partner-rated interaction 
quality and liking measures were available, I examined the data using linear regression, 
rather than the high versus low symptom groupings from previous chapters. I 
implemented two regression models, with partner-rated interaction quality and partner-
reported liking of participants as the criterion variables. I then entered the individual 
subscales of the AQ to examine how the different types of ASD-related traits predict 
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social outcomes. I also ran a parallel version of these analyses using the subscales of the 
Multidimensional Social Competence Scale (MSCS) to examine the consistency of these 
results in a different self-reported ASD-related traits scale. However, as the MSCS was 
only presented to one participant sample (those who completed the L-EFT), this 
exploratory analysis includes only 206 participants.  
To answer the second question, about the link between social outcomes and task 
performance, I used a correlational analysis to examine the relationship between social 
outcomes (i.e., partner-reported likeability and interaction quality) and task performance 
in the Line Discrimination Task (discriminability and criterion), the Probabilistic 
Selection Task (trials to criterion, win-stay, and lose-shift behavior) and the Leuven 
Embedded Figures Task (response time and error rate). These tasks were completed by 
different participant samples. Therefore, 127 participants were involved in the 
correlational analysis between social outcomes and task performance in the Line 
Discrimination Task and the Probabilistic Selection Task, and 206 participants were 
involved in the correlational analysis between social outcomes and task performance in 
the Leuven Embedded Figures Task.  
Lastly, based on anecdotal observations of social behavior amongst high and low-
AQ scoring pilot participants, one of the striking observations our laboratory group has 
noticed is that people who report greater levels of ASD-related traits appear to be less 
expressive during their interactions (Kleberg, Högström, Nord, Bölte, Serlachius & 
Falck-Ytter, 2017; Stagg, Slavny, Hand, Cardoso & Smith, 2014). Using this idea as an 
exploratory hypothesis, I examined participants’ expressivity by calculating the 
proportion of time (in frames) that various action units are active during the interaction. 
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To examine ASD-related differences in social behavior, I then correlated AQ scores with 
these activity scores, as well as examining the relationship between these activity scores 
with partner-reported liking, interaction-quality and L-EFT performance. 
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Social Interaction Outcomes 
 
Figure 14. Associations between AQ Social Skills and Communication subscales with social 
outcomes compared to other AQ subscales. 
 (A) Participant combined AQ subscale scores correlation with Partner Rated Liking (B) Participant 
combined AQ subscale scores correlation with Partner Rated Interaction Quality  
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Results from the linear regressions predicting partner-rated liking and interaction 
quality from the AQ subscales showed that together the AQ subscales explained a 
significant amount of the variance in how much a social partner liked a participant (F(5, 
332) = 6.745, p < .001, R2 = .094) and the partner’s perception of interaction quality (F(5, 
332) = 6.480, p < .001, R2 = .090). The AQ’s social skills and communication subscales, 
both of which generally assess social communication competency, significantly predicted 
partner-rated liking and interaction (see Table 15, Figure 14; Table 16 shows the same set 
Table 15. Regression Analysis for Social Interaction Ratings and AQ subscales 
Model 
B 95% CI  β t p 
Partner Rated 
Liking 
     
  AQSocial Skills -1.409 -2.379;  
-.439 
-.195 -2.857 .005 
  AQAttention Shifting -0.096 -1.189; 
.996 
-.011 -0.174 .862 
  AQAttention to Detail -0.074 -.988;  
.841 
-.008 -0.159 .874 
  AQCommunication -1.500 -2.737;  
-.264 
-.161 -2.387 .018 
  AQImagination 0.881 -.291; 
2.053 
.082 1.478 .140 
Partner Rated 
Interaction Quality 
     
  AQSocial Skills -1.354 -2.182; 
-.526 
-.220 -3.219 .001 
  AQAttention Shifting 0.136 -.796; 
1.068 
.018 0.288 .774 
  AQAttention to Detail -0.481 -1.261; 
.226 
-.065 -1.213 .226 
  AQCommunication -1.150 -2.205; 
-.095 
-.145 -2.145 .033 
  AQImagination 0.633 -.367; 
1.633 
.069 1.246 .214 
   Note. AQ = Autism-spectrum Quotient. 
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of analyses using the MSCS subscales). However, none of the other AQ subscales 
predicted differences in either social outcome variable. 
 Using a linear regression with the MSCS sub-scales entered, I found that together 
the MSCS subscales explained a significant amount of the variance in how much a social 
Table 16. Regression Analysis for Social Interaction Ratings and MSCS subscales 
Model 
B 95% CI  β t p 
Partner Rated Liking      
MSCS Social Monitoring 0.488 -0.01; 
0.99 
.187 1.938 .054 
MSCS Social Inferencing -0.264 -0.85; 
0.32 
-.080 -0.885 .377 
MSCS Demonstrating 
empathic concern 
0.711 0.15; 
1.27 
.234 2.503 .013 
MSCS Social knowledge 0.161 -0.57; 
0.89 
.040 0.436 .663 
MSCS Verbal 
conversation skills 
0.163 -0.38; 
0.71 
.050 0.589 .556 
MSCS Nonverbal 
conversation skills 
0.070 -0.50; 
0.64 
.024 0.241 .810 
MSCS Emotion regulation -0.215 -0.68; 
0.25 
-.073 -0.907 .366 
Partner Rated 
Interaction Quality 
     
MSCS Social Monitoring 0.149 -0.25; 
0.55 
.074 0.738 .461 
MSCS Social inferencing .036 -0.44; 
0.51 
.014 0.152 .879 
MSCS Demonstrating 
empathic concern 
-0.082 -0.53; 
0.37 
-.035 -0.362 .718 
MSCS Social knowledge -0.102 -0.69; 
0.48 
-.033 -0.343 .732 
MSCS Verbal 
conversation skills 
-0.165 -0.60; 
0.27 
-.065 -0.742 .459 
MSCS Nonverbal sending 
skills 
0.563 0.11; 
1.02 
.247 2.428 .016 
MSCS Emotion regulation 0.148 -0.23; -
0.52 
.065 0.778 .438 
 Note. MSCS = Multidimensional Social Competency Scale 
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partner liked a participant (F(7, 205) = 4.847, p < .001, R2 = .084) and the partner’s 
Table 17. Correlation Analysis for Social Interaction Ratings, Line Discrimination 
Task Probabilistic Selection Task, L-EFT, Letter Number Sequencing Task and the 
RMIET 
Task  
Partner Rated Liking Partner Rated Interaction 
Quality 
Line Discrimination Task   
  Social    
    Criterion Difference -.052 (.633) .002 (.987) 
  Non-Social   
    Criterion Difference .017 (.875) .133 (.218) 
Probabilistic Selection 
Task 
  
  Social   
    Trials to Criterion   
        100/0 Pairing -.031 (.768) -.016 (.878) 
        60/40 Pairing -.100 (.338) .051 (.625) 
    Win-stay Behavior .215 (.035) .083 (.419) 
    Lose-shift Behavior -.120 (.244) -.036 (.729) 
  Non-Social   
    Trials to Criterion   
        100/0 Pairing .031 (.762) -.029 (.777)  
        60/40 Pairing .052 (.611) .060 (.560) 
    Win-stay Behavior .027 (.792) .052 (.606) 
    Lose-shift Behavior -.042 (.679) -.059 (.560) 
L-EFT   
  Response Time (RT)   
    Total  -.114 (.103) -.022 (.753) 
Error Rate   
  Total Error Rate .023 (.741) -.001 (.986) 
Letter Number 
Sequencing  
  
    Total Score .015 (.829) .025 (.721) 
RMIET   
    Total Score .017 (.806) .052 (.453) 
         Note. L-EFT = Leuven Embedded Figures Task. RMIET = Reading the Mind In 
the Eyes Task. p-values are in parentheses. Bold correlations indicate significant 
correlations using an uncorrected decision criterion. Notably, after accounting for 
multiple correlations, none of these analyses reached statistical significance. The 
correlational analyses that include the Line Discrimination Task and the Probabilistic 
Selection task used an N of 127, while the correlational analyses that included the L-
EFT, Letter Number Sequencing Task and the RMIET used an N of 206.  
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perception of interaction quality (F(7, 205) = 4.177, p < .001, R2 = .076). The MSCS 
Demonstrating Empathetic Concern subscale was a significant predictor of partner rated 
liking (p = .013) and the Social Monitoring subscale was a marginally significant (p = 
.054). The MSCS Nonverbal Conversation Skills subscale was the only subscale to be a 
significant predictor of partner rated social interaction quality. None of the other MSCS 
subscales predicted differences in social outcomes (see Table 16). 
To assess whether partner-rated interaction ability linked to task measures, I 
examined the correlations between partner-rated liking and interaction quality and task 
performance in the line discrimination task (response bias) the probabilistic learning task 
(trials to criterion, win-stay behavior, and lose-shift behavior), the L-EFT (Response 
Times and Error Rate), the Letter Number Sequencing task from the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Inventory (Wechsler, 1997) and the RMIET (see Table 17).  
5.3.2 Social Interaction Behavior 
To examine the video data, I reduced the many possible comparisons by 
excluding action units that were active less than 10% of the time in the full sample. In a 
sample this small, examining statistics such as proportion of activation time for low-
frequency behaviors can generate spurious findings. I began by examining the 
relationships between two important action units and the social outcome variables 
(partner-rated liking and interaction quality). These action units included AU12 
(associated with zygomaticus major activity or smiling) and AU43 (eye closure; which is 
active both when the eyes are fully closed, as with a blink, or when they are fully 
downcast, as when the eyes are cast directly down toward the floor). I selected these 
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action units because evidence suggests that both smiling and gaze behavior are important 
in face-to-face social interaction (Ho, Foulsham & Kingstone, 2015; Johnston, Miles & 
Macrae, 2010; Kampe, Frith, Dolan & Frith, 2001; Shore & Heerey, 2011; Vernetti et al., 
2018). Neither of these action units was significantly associated with liking. Interestingly, 
AU43 was significantly negatively associated with Interaction Quality (r (198) = -.169; 
p=.017), such that the more time participants spent with a downcast gaze the worse their 
Table 18. Correlations between AQ subscale scores, MSCS subscale scores, L-EFT 
performance, and Action Unit activation 
Variable  
AU12: 
Lip Corner 
Puller 
AU43: 
Eyes Closed 
Autism-spectrum Quotient 
(AQ) 
  
Social Skills -.147 (.041) .168 (.020)  
Communication -.088 (.220) -.036 (.618) 
Multidimensional Social 
Competency Scale (MSCS) 
  
Social Monitoring  .072 (.318) -.018 (.797) 
Social Inferencing  .052 (.470) -.032 (.655) 
Demonstrating Empathetic 
Concern 
.091 (.204) -.085 (.237) 
Social Knowledge .115 (.109) .003 (.968) 
Verbal Communication Skills .104 (.146) -.001 (.986) 
Non-Verbal Communication 
Skills 
.075 (.298) -.132 (.065) 
Emotion Regulation .109 (.129) -.038 (.592) 
Leuven Embedded Figures 
Task (L-EFT) 
  
Response Time -.008 (.912) -.024 (.743) 
Error Rate .142 (.049) -.187 (.009) 
   
Note. Table shows Pearson correlations (p-values are in parentheses). Bold typeface 
indicates statistically significant correlations. 
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social partners rating the interaction quality. This suggests that altered gaze behavior is 
associated with partner interaction quality ratings.  
Next, I examine how these behaviors relate to autism-spectrum quotient scores. 
Because the Social Skill and Communication subscales of the autism-spectrum quotient 
were the only subscales that were significantly associated with social outcomes, I 
excluded the other autism-spectrum quotient subscales and focused only on these to 
reduce the number of statistical tests. Notably, the data showed that AU12 (associated 
with zygomaticus major activity or smiling) was significantly less active for participants 
reporting with higher levels of ASD Social Skill-relevant traits. Additionally, the Social 
Skills subscale was positively associated with AU43 (eye closure), suggesting that 
participants endorsing more ASD social traits spend greater amounts of time with the 
eyes either closed or significantly downcast. Table 18 shows exact statistics. 
Additionally, I explored possible associations between the MSCS and facial activity. I 
found no MSCS subscales associated with action units of interest (AU 12 and 43; see 
Table 18).  
Finally, I explored the data for the presence of any relationships between action 
units and performance on the L-EFT. There was no significant relationship between these 
action units and response times on the L-EFT. Interestingly, I did find associations 
between error rates on the L-EFT and action units. AU12 (smiling) showed a positive 
relationship with error rate such that participants who made more errors on the task, also 
smiled more during the social interaction. AU43 (eye closure) showed the inverse 
relationship, such that participants who made more L-EFT errors engaged in less eye 
closure or downcast gaze with their partners (see Table 18). 
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5.4 Chapter 5 Discussion  
In the face-to-face social interaction, participants who reported higher levels of 
ASD-related traits, specifically those associated with social communicative skill, 
experienced worse social outcomes, as operationalized by partner ratings of interaction 
quality and liking. This suggests that there are subtle differences in social behavior across 
the spectrum of ASD-related traits. This idea is supported by findings from the social 
behavior analysis, that show that those reporting more in ASD-related traits appeared to 
smile less and were more likely to show abnormal patterns of eye-gaze behavior – more 
specifically, closing or casting the eyes downward to the floor positively correlated with 
self-reported ASD-related traits. Taken together, these data suggest that the subtle 
behavioral differences in face-to-face behavior associated with the higher end of the 
ASD-trait spectrum may lead to poorer perceptions of social interaction between 
participants and their interaction partners. 
Unfortunately, the social behavior and social outcome results showed little 
relationship with task performance. Interestingly however, there was evidence of a 
relationship between the action unit associated with gaze lowering and performance on 
the L-EFT. Altered gaze behavior may well be associated with global versus local 
processing biases, however, due to the exploratory nature of this analysis, it will be 
important to replicate this result. Nonetheless, these results suggest that researchers 
should be cautious about linking laboratory task performance to social behavior in the 
absence of data that lends these direct comparisons empirical support.  
Although interesting, there are limitations to the present findings. Specifically, 
these interactions took place only between strangers in the laboratory context. Although 
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they were unmanipulated and unscripted, it is therefore possible that participants’ 
behaviour was not the same as it is typically in non-laboratory contexts. Additionally, 
because participants had the opportunity to talk to only one other partner, the simple 
random assignment of participants to partners might have affected results. Future studies 
might attempt “round robin” interaction designs in which participants speak with several 
partners. In such designs, it is possible to distinguish “actor”, “partner” and dyad-level 
effects (Kenny, 1996; Kenny, Kashy & Cook, 2006). This would certainly provide a 
more wholistic picture of how ASD-related traits might impinge on naturalistic 
conversation.  
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6 General Discussion 
Contrary to expectations, the data in this dissertation fail to confirm almost all the 
previous predictions with respect to how they should relate to self-reported autism-
spectrum traits. Thus, although there was clear evidence that the tasks functioned as 
intended (e.g., participants took longer to learn more probabilistically reinforced 
contingencies), none of the main tasks showed the anticipated differences between those 
scoring high and low on the AQ. That is, the present data failed to replicate previous 
results in the literature. Indeed, the only clear and consistent evidence for ASD-group-
related differences in this entire dissertation comes from the naturalistic social interaction 
task. I address each individual research question in turn. 
6.1 Current Findings and the Social Motivation Hypothesis 
In Chapter 2, I investigated the link between ASD-traits and social and nonsocial 
reward sensitivity and the link between ASD-traits and the value attributed to social and 
non-social rewards. I examined participants’ general sensitivity to reinforcement using an 
asymmetric reinforcement task (Pizzagalli, Jahn, & O’Shea, 2005) that allowed the 
quantification of reward sensitivity based on the development of response bias in the 
presence of social versus non-social rewards. To examine how the subjective value of a 
smile relates to ASD-traits, I conducted a secondary analysis of a smile valuation task 
developed by our lab (e.g., Heerey & Gilder, 2019). Overall, I found no relationship 
between task performance and participants’ ASD traits on either the line discrimination 
task or the smile valuation task for non-social rewards or, surprisingly, for social rewards.  
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The results from this chapter are therefore contrary to much of the literature 
examining the social motivation hypothesis (Chevallier et al., 2012; Clements et al., 
2018; Demurie et al., 2011, Galli et al., 2019; Klin et al., 2002; Miligan et al., 2007; 
Mundy, 2009; Rozga et al., 2011; Scheeren et al., 2013). While some of the findings were 
consistent with previous literature, such that I found individuals are more sensitive to 
non-social asymmetric reinforcement, compared to social asymmetric reinforcement 
(Kohls, Peltzer, Herpertz‐Dahlmann & Konrad, 2009; Bottini, 2018), the majority of the 
findings were inconsistent with many of the theoretical predictions of the social 
motivation hypothesis. For example, I found no link between ASD-traits and the rate at 
which one sensitizes to monetary rewards or social rewards. Additionally, I found no 
evidence for the prediction that individuals who report many ASD traits should have 
‘deficits representing social rewards’ and should therefore value social rewards less 
(Chevallier et al., 2012). Taken together, none of the findings in this chapter support a 
potential social motivational mechanism as a feasible explanation for the behavioral 
differences seen across the autism-spectrum, especially, in the general population. 
While this is some limited literature that shows no difference in how children with 
ASD value smiles (Ewing, L., Pellicano & Rhodes, 2013), the current investigation is one 
of the first to do so using a large double-blinded general population sample. The current 
failure to confirm predictions is deeply concerning for the validity of the social 
motivation hypothesis, because if ASD traits have no impact on the value individuals 
ascribe to social and non-social rewards, then the hypothesis holds little impact or 
importance to ASD literature.  
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 One possibility for the present failure to confirm prior results may relate to the 
general-population sampling methodology. Interestingly, however, a meta-analysis by 
Bottini (2018), found that only 57% of the literature that uses clinically diagnosed 
populations find the outcomes predicted by the social motivation hypothesis. While 
Bottini suggests that this may be because the current hypothesis is too restrictive, the 
failure of this result in the present, reasonably well-powered samples suggest that perhaps 
the speculation that ASD is associated with reduced social reward valuation is not 
correct.  
 Lastly, and what should be most concerning to proponents of the social 
motivation hypothesis, are the findings from Chapter 5, where I was unable to find any 
association between reward sensitivity and social outcomes. As the social motivation 
hypothesis was created to explain how deficits in social motivation result in the social 
deficits seen in ASD (Abrams et al., 2013; Chevallier et al., 2012, Kohls et al., 2012;  
Mundy, 2019), then it should be deeply concerning when tasks used to measure concepts 
like reward sensitivity have no relation to real life outcomes. The absence of an 
association between task performance and real-life social outcomes suggests that many of 
the predictions and assumptions of the social motivation hypothesis, might be limited to 
laboratory settings and not transfer to naturalistic settings.  
 While it was not my goal, the absence of any sort of support for the social 
motivation hypothesis in this dissertation, combined with concerns about this theory in 
the existing literature (e.g.,‘social deficits’ having non-social explanations, findings better 
explained with different frameworks etc.; Jaswal & Akhtar, 2019; Kapp, et al., 2019; 
Uljarević et al., 2019), raises questions about the validity and importance of this 
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hypothesis. Considering all of this, the social motivation hypothesis, does not appear to 
be a fruitful or productive theory to explain the symptoms of ASD.  
6.2 Current Findings and the Weak Central Coherence 
Hypothesis of Autism  
The weak central coherence hypothesis is predicated on the idea that individuals with 
ASD have local processing biases at the cost of global processing (Frith 1989; Plaisted, 
2015). In Chapter 3, I investigated the link between ASD-traits and participants’ 
preference for global versus local processing using the Leuven Embedded Figures Task, 
which has been shown to relate to ASD-related traits (de-Wit, et al., 2017). As with 
previous literature I found that task performance declined as the task became harder (e.g., 
the target image became more complex, asymmetrical, or blended into the background 
image more; de Wit et al., 2017, Van der Hallen et al., 2018). However, unlike previous 
literature I was unable to find strong support for the idea of weak central coherence.  
The current findings are therefore consistent with a growing pool of literature that 
is unable to find local processing biases in individuals with ASD, or with high levels of 
ASD traits (Hayward et al., 2018; Hoy et al., 2004; Mottron et al., 2003; Muth et al., 
2014). The current findings are therefore inconsistent with the predictions of the weak 
central coherence hypothesis. One reason for this might be that the tasks being used to 
test for processing biases are inefficient and inconsistent (Lawson, 2011; Milne & 
Szczerbinski, 2009; Van der Hallen, Evers, Brewaeys, Van den Noortgate & 
Wagemans,2015), or that the weak central coherence hypothesis of ASD, is a much more 
limited and narrow in scope than previously proposed. Overall, none of the findings in 
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Chapter 3 support the idea that processing biases are likely to underpin ASD-traits across 
the autism spectrum.  
 Interestingly, although I was unable to find any sort of association between 
performance on the L-EFT and social outcomes (i.e., partner-rated liking and interaction 
quality), I did find a small but significant correlation between errors on the L-EFT and 
social behavior, such that those who made more errors were also those individuals who 
smiled more and engaged in more typical eye gaze behavior. However, the fact that L-
EFT performance was not related to ASD traits makes this particular finding difficult to 
interpret. Overall, it appears that while there is some support for local/global processing 
relating to social interaction data, it is very limited in scope and is therefore unlikely to be 
a strong explanation for ASD traits (Muth et al., 2014).  
6.3 Current Findings and the Probabilistic Learning 
Hypotheses of Autism  
In Chapter 4, I investigated the link between ASD-traits and an individuals’ 
ability to learn from social and non-social rewards that are either deterministically or 
probabilistically reinforced as well as the link between ASD-traits and the degree to 
which people could learn to integrate information from multiple cues with changing 
contingencies. To test the link between ASD traits and probabilistic learning from 
rewards I used a probabilistic selection task (Frank, Seeberger & O'Reilly, 2004; 
Solomon et al., 2011). To investigate the link between ASD-traits and participants’ 
ability to integrate information from a changing environment I used an associative 
learning task (Sevgi, Diaconescu, Tittgemeyer & Schilbach, 2016; Behrens, et al., 2008). 
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Overall, I found no strong relationships between task performance and participants’ 
ASD-traits on either the probabilistic selection task or the associative learning task.  
One of the key predictions made by some models of probabilistic learning is that 
individuals with ASD, or those high in ASD traits, learn more slowly from probabilistic 
environments/feedback compared to deterministic environments/feedback. In my first 
investigation, I examined whether ASD traits impacted the rate which participants 
learned from probabilistic and deterministic feedback using both social and non-social 
feedback in a probabilistic selection task that has been previously used (D'Cruz et al., 
2013; Solomon et al., 2015; Solomon et al., 2011). Contrary to previous results, I found 
no support for the idea that ASD traits affected the rate at which individuals learn from 
probabilistic feedback, regardless of whether the feedback was social or non-social. The 
only behavioral difference I found in the probabilistic selection task was individuals with 
more ASD-traits engaged in less win-stay behavior compared to individuals with fewer 
ASD traits, which is consistent with previous literature in this field (Solomon et al., 
2011).  
In addition to looking at how individuals learned from probabilistic feedback, I 
was also interested in the degree to which participants learned from environmental cues 
using an associative learning task. Previous results suggest that individuals with ASD 
traits learn more slowly in periods of environmental volatility (i.e., when reinforcement 
contingencies fluctuate in the degree to which they are reliable; Sevgi et al., 2020). 
Unfortunately, I was unable to replicate those findings in the current dissertation. It 
should be noted that compared to the previous findings, using a sample of 18 high and 18 
low AQ participants, the current sample had far greater statistical power (over five times 
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the sample size) and was double-blind in design. These findings therefore suggest that 1) 
these tasks are not sensitive enough to measure the hypothesis within a general 
population sample; 2) for the general population, conclusions about people’s abilities to 
learn from probabilistic environments/feedback, cannot be tied to ASD traits; 3) that the 
previous smaller sample sizes and non-double-blind methods affected prior results; or 4) 
that learning mechanisms are not sufficient explanations for ASD-related traits.  
6.4 ASD Traits and Social Interactions 
 Finally, Chapter 5, investigated the link between ASD-traits and social behavior 
in a naturalistic interaction and subsequent interaction outcomes as well as the link 
between social interaction outcomes and several tasks (i.e., line discrimination task, 
probabilistic selection task and the L-EFT). I additionally explored potential links 
between social behavior and ASD-traits as well as L-EFT performance.  
As predicted, there were clear associations between the ASD traits as measured 
by both the AQ and the MSCS and social outcomes. It is also important to note that these 
relationships only existed for the social skills and communication subscale for the AQ 
and the empathetic concern and nonverbal conversation skills subscales of the MCSC. 
Thus, these measures of ASD-related traits do appear to show some validity with respect 
to naturalistic social behavior – even though they failed to predict task outcomes.  
These data showed that ASD-traits associated with social skill and 
communication abilities appear to predict partner liking and interaction quality, such that 
the more ASD-traits an individual endorsed, the less likable their partner thought they 
were and the more effortful the partner thought the interaction was. Results also showed 
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that ASD-traits related to behavioral differences across individuals such that individuals 
who reported more ASD-traits were less expressive during their interactions. Specifically, 
they smiled less and spent more time with their eyes cast downwards compared to those 
who endorsed fewer ASD-traits.  
 Interestingly, the only task that related to naturalistic social behavior was the L-
EFT. Specifically, errors on the L-EFT were associated with smiles and eye gaze 
behavior during the interaction, even though the L-EFT itself did not correlate with 
interaction outcomes. Overall, there was a clear relationship between ASD-traits and 
social interaction behavior and outcomes, but no conclusive association between social 
behavior and cognitive and motivation-based tasks in the general population samples I 
recruited. Thus, it appears that the AQ and its social subscales (social skills and 
communication) are reasonable measures of both social outcomes and important social 
behaviors like smiling and eye gaze. 
6.5 Implications and Limitations 
This dissertation contains several critical implications for research into autism 
spectrum diagnoses. First, it appears that ASD traits, as measured by the AQ, are clearly 
related to social outcomes and naturalistic social behavior in the general population. This 
finding is even more significant considering first, that the participants within the samples 
examined here did not have autism spectrum diagnoses. That is, even the high-AQ 
individuals were socially high functioning enough to be classified as members of the 
general population. Of course, that does not rule out the possible presence of ASD 
diagnoses within the sample, however, given the AQ score distributions, diagnosed 
131 
  
individuals were unlikely to comprise a large number of participants. Second, the social 
interaction task, in which people engage in the basic social “chit-chat” that people use as 
they get to know one another, was entirely naturalistic and not designed to measure 
contrived sets of “social skills” in acted scenarios (e.g., Haring & Lovinger, 1989; 
Mcintosh, Vaughn & Zaragoza, 1991; Schumaker & Ellis, 1982; Simpson, Langone & 
Ayres, 2004; Truzzi, Setoh, Shinohara & Esposito, 2016; von dem Hagen & Bright, 
2017). Nonetheless, evidence show clear associations between ASD traits and important 
social behaviors (i.e., smiling and eye gaze behavior). These findings suggest that even 
non-clinical differences in ASD traits can result in differences in social outcomes 
(partner-perceived interaction quality and liking) and social behaviors. Thus, results lend 
support to the idea that autism traits may indeed occur on a spectrum and that those traits, 
even where mild, may have implications for the quality of social support, work 
relationships, and other domains in which social ability plays a significant role. Further 
understanding of these symptom/outcome relationships will certainly be important 
moving forward.  
 In contrast with the strong associations between ASD traits and natural social 
behavior and outcomes, the absence of clear associations between ASD traits and task 
outcomes is both surprising and concerning. Several potential explanations arise from 
these findings. First, it might be the case that despite wide speculation that such skills 
underpin basic social behavior (e.g., Jaswal & Akhtar, 2019; Kapp et al., 2019; Muth  et 
al., 2014), that these tasks have little real association with social behavior. It is possible 
that these tasks do not measure the constructs they claim to measure with adequate 
sensitivity and/or precision. That is, it remains possible that there are theoretical links, 
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but that these tasks do not underpin natural social behavior. Similarly, it is certainly 
possible that these tasks are not sensitive enough to capture performance differences 
between high and low AQ groups used in the present dissertation. For example, the 
individuals in the high AQ groups may have the ability to achieve equal performance on 
such tasks as their low-AQ peers, despite their endorsement of ASD-related traits.  
Second, I have only used a small number of tasks to answer each of the questions 
I have asked in this dissertation. While each of the tasks I have used in this dissertation 
has generated support for the idea of ASD-related differences, there are a variety of other 
tasks in each theoretical domain that might have showed these associations (Bottini, 
2018; Carr & Walton, 2014; Chatzisarantis et al., 2006; Conson et al., 2013; Dawson et 
al., 1998; Deruelle et al., 2006; Elsabbagh et al., 2013; Gliga et al., 2009; Grinter et al., 
2009; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999; Lin et al., 2012; Manning et al., 2017; Muth et al., 
2014; Pellicano et al., 2006; Snowling & Frith, 1989). Nonetheless, it is unclear whether 
these other existing tasks are more sensitive to high- low-ASD-trait group differences, 
and if so, which ones.  
A second possibility is that there are fundamental problems with task methods in 
the general literature. Specifically, these may relate to small sample sizes which are 
almost universal in this literature (e.g., Bottini, 2018; Dawson et al., 1998; Lin et al., 
2012; Manning et al., 2017; Muth et al., 2014; Sevgi et al., 2020; Solomon et al., 2015; 
Solomon et al., 2011, Van der Hallen et al., 2018). Evidence shows that when sample 
sizes are smaller, results may be more prone to Type I error (Lin, 2018; Rom & 
McTague, 2020; Simonsohn, 2015), poor generalization across samples (Tipton, 
Hallberg, Hedges & Chan, 2017; Turner, Paul, Miller & Barbey, 2018), and other 
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statistical issues (Button et al., 2013; Camerer et al., 2018; Kühberger, Fritz & Scherndl, 
2014; Simonsohn, 2015; Varoquaux, 2018). In addition, many of the findings from the 
literature are produced in the context of non-double-blind designs, which create 
additional methodological difficulties. Coupled with small sample sizes, inadvertent 
experimenter effects may lead to the perfect conditions for false findings (see Gilder & 
Heerey, 2018; Ioannidis, 2019; Ioannidis, 2008; Mayer, 2019; Stevens, 2017; Trafimow 
& Earp, 2016). Finally, many of these tasks are subject to other methodological critiques, 
including poor re-test reliability, biased task stimuli, and incorrect operationalization of 
the constructs (Baker et al., 2013; Cribb et al., 2016; Jaswal & Akhtar, 2019; Muth et al., 
2014; Schutte et al., 2017).  
 A third possibility exists for why the present results were not successful at 
replicating past results. Specifically, it is possible that the failure to find differences in the 
general population on these tasks is because I have used the wrong models when 
considering ASD. In this dissertation, and consistent with previous work (e.g., 
Constantino, 2011; Horder et al., 2014; Ingersoll, 2010; Jones et al., 2013; Sevgi et al., 
2020; Trikalinos et al., 2006), I used a spectrum model of ASD as the framework for 
predictions and questions. While I did this based on the current literature, perhaps this 
was unwise, and I should have recruited a sample with clinically confirmed ASD 
diagnoses. That is, it is certainly possible that individuals who are diagnosed with ASD 
are qualitatively different from those who merely endorse ASD-traits in the general 
population. Additionally, literature suggests the presence of a great deal of heterogeneity 
in ASD profiles/causes (Happé & Frith, 2020; Lenroot & Yeung, 2013; Masi, DeMayo, 
Glozier & Guastella, 2017). If this is the case, then the tasks that are often used for 
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clinical populations may be inappropriate for general populations studies, as such 
heterogeneity may be magnified as traits become more sparse.   
The fourth and final possibility for my findings is that each of these theories, 
while provocative and seemingly explanatory, may not be correct. Evidence within each 
of these literatures suggests the presence of mixed findings, with some groups confirming 
theoretical predictions and other failing to do so (e.g., Bottini, 2018; Brown et al., 2010; 
Chevallier et al., 2012; Grinter et al., 2009; Happé & Frith, 2006; Hayward et al., 2018; 
Hoy et al., 2004; Jaswal & Akhtar, 2019; Muth et al., 2014; Nemeth et al., 2014; Sevgi et 
al., 2020). Thus, findings generally support the idea that the foundations of ASD are not 
as clear as proponents of these theoretical positions would like.  
In addition to these limitations, there is also a caveat associated with the 
assessment of autism traits within this work. Specifically, a common critique of the AQ is 
that it has poor internal consistency. Even though the internal consistency of the AQ in 
the present samples is similar to that reported in previous studies, it is still somewhat low 
compared to traditional standards within the assessment domain (Hoekstra et al., 2008; 
Hurst et al., 2007; Streiner, 2003; Wakabayashi et al., 2006).   
Another limitation in this work relates to the decision to use a median split 
strategy for most of the analyses. Although the goal of using this analytic strategy was to 
make these results comparable to the literature, in which a median split strategy is 
common, splitting the samples does reduce statistical power. In addition, it is not 
consistent with the idea of the spectrum model of autism introduced at the beginning of 
this document, potentially obscuring significant results with smaller effect sizes within 
the sample. Regardless, a number of other more nuanced exploratory analyses (e.g., 
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regression analyses, Bayesian analyses) were conducted during this work that were not 
included in this document suggest that the fact that I found mainly null results does not 
lie solely in the analytic strategy.   
Lastly, an important aspect of this work that is both a limitation and a strength lies 
in my choice to use a general population sample. Although the benefits of using this 
sample were discussed earlier in the document, I now address some limitations to my 
sampling strategy as well. For example, although I did recruit from the general 
population of the London Ontario area, the majority of participants were undergraduate 
psychology students. This fact limits the generalizability of results much beyond this 
group. Second, without access to a clinical population, it is difficult to make conclusions 
about how these findings might apply to diagnosed individuals. It might be the case that a 
properly powered and double blinded study involving diagnosed individuals would have 
shown results even though the present samples did not have the sensitivity to detect 
differences. Thus, these conclusions should only be generalized beyond the sample with 
caution.  
6.6 Future Directions 
 One important area that future research should examine is the idea that ASD-
related traits affect social behavior. Specifically, the participants in this work only 
interacted with one person. It might be the case that more subtle differences would 
emerge if interactions could have been repeated with multiple partners or with friends as 
well as strangers. Additionally, due to time constraints, the current dissertation was 
limited to looking only at the social behavior of one partner. In the future, research 
should look at the integrated behaviors of both social partners, and how a participant’s 
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behavior at one time-point within an interaction might predict their partner’s behavior at 
time two. This would provide the ability to provide a real understanding of how people 
sequence social behavior across time and where the behaviors of individuals with high 
levels of ASD-traits diverge from expected patterns.  
 Second, for proponents of any of the theories discussed in this dissertation, these 
data should be a call to replicate previous findings in large, double-blind samples to 
provide support for theoretical claims. Additionally, work should be conducted to 
demonstrate an association between predicted cognitive/motivational differences and 
real-life outcomes. Previous research has made many claims and assumptions about how 
in-lab findings will translate into real-life social outcomes but almost none have tested 
this. Rather than merely providing theoretical linkage between ASD theory and social 
behavior, researchers should seek to describe the empirical relationships between their 
tasks and naturalistic social behavior. Although the current dissertations findings are 
limited in that they did take place in a lab, the social findings were from an unscripted, 
highly naturalistic ‘get-to-know-you’ type interaction. Data from all the tasks did not 
seem to correlate with social outcomes although the one study that included both social 
behavior and task performance did show the anticipated behavioral associations. 
Additional data related to this linkage would certainly be helpful in understanding task 
outcomes.  
6.7 Conclusion  
The current dissertation has generated important support for the concept that ASD 
related traits affect social behavior across the general population in predictable ways, 
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thereby supporting the idea of a spectrum-based model. Although the aim of this project 
at its beginning was to add nuance to the set of deficits, both social and social cognitive, 
within the ASD spectrum, it has instead produced many findings that add to a growing 
pool of literature that critiques the social motivation, central coherence, and probabilistic 
learning theories of ASD. Finally, this dissertation emphasizes the importance of 
collecting well-powered and double-blinded studies, whenever possible. Thus, the 
conclusion from these data may be that more robust theoretical tests are long overdue in 
the field of autism research. 
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Appendix B: Power Analyses 
Reward Sensitivity Task  
 Previous research that uses this task (or a modified version of it), reports medium 
to large effect sizes (η2: .12 - .46; Pizzagalli, Jahn, & O’Shea, 2005). To obtain 95% 
power using a conservative estimate of medium effect size and at the standard .05 alpha 
error probability, G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner & Lang, 2009) estimates a sample 
of 88 per group (176 in total). 
 
Smile Valuation Task 
 This task did not receive a power analysis as it was a secondary analysis on a set 
of data and an a priori estimate of effect size was not made.  
 
Leuven-Embedded Figures Task 
For this task we ran an a-priori power analysis. Previous research has shown 
learning differences between individuals classified as endorsing high levels of ASD traits 
on the AQ and those endorsing low ASD-trait levels. Using an embedded figures task, 
research suggests a Cohen’s d of .759 for error rate performance, and .973 for response 
time performance (Cribb, Olaithe, Di Lorenzo, Dunlop & Maybery, 2016). As I was 
testing both, I used the more conservative estimate. To obtain 95% power with an 
estimated effect size of .759 and at the standard .05 alpha error probability, G*Power 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner & Lang, 2009) estimates a sample of 39 per group. However, 
because it is likely that this effect size overestimates the true effect, I opted to increase 
the desired sample size to 200 participants (100 per group).  
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Probabilistic Selection Task (Replication) 
For this task we ran an a-priori power analysis. Using a similar probabilistic 
selection task as my own, research suggests a Cohen’s d of .41 (Solomon et al., 2011). To 
obtain 95% power with an estimated effect size of .4 and at the standard .05 alpha error 
probability, G*Power (Faul et al., 2009) estimates a sample of 136 per group. However, 
because it is likely that this effect size overestimates the true effect, I opted to increase 
the desired sample size to 300 participants (150 per group). 
 
Associative Learning Task  
For this task we ran an a-priori power analysis. Using an associative learning task, 
much like the one I used in this dissertation, research suggests at least a medium effect 
size (Sevgi et al., 2020). To obtain 95% power with an estimated effect size of .5 and at 
the standard .05 alpha error probability, G*Power (Faul et al., 2009) estimates a sample 
of 88 per group. However, because it is likely that this effect size overestimates the true 
effect, I opted to increase the desired sample size to 200 participants (100 per group). 
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Appendix C: Chapter 3 MSCS Descriptive Statistics Table 
 
Table C1. Demographic Information for high and low social competency groups 
MSCS Group 
Low MSCS 
(MSCS ≤ 286) 
High MSCS 
(MSCS > 286) 
F df p 
n 107 96    
Score Range 209-286 287-346    
Sex (Female:Male) * 76:31 80:16 4.31 1,201 .038 
Age in years 20.2 (4.4) 21.2 (9.2) 1.02 1,201 .314 
Autism-spectrum Quotient      
     Total Score 23.19 (5.7) 16.4 (4.7) 85.46 1,202 <.001 
     Social Skills 4.7 (2.4) 2.0 (1.7) 87.45 1,202 <.001 
     Attention Shifting 6.1 (1.8) 4.6 (2.1) 28.00 1,202 <.001 
     Attention to Detail 5.6 (2.2) 6.0 (2.0) 1.92 1,202 .167 
     Communication 3.7 (1.9) 1.6 (1.5) 76.77 1,202 <.001 
     Imagination 3.0 (1.8) 2.2 (1.5) 15.17 1,202  <.001 
Big Five Inventory      
     Extraversion  34.4 (9.7) 26. 6 (8.4) 36.42 1,202 <.001 
     Agreeableness 29.4 (7.4) 22.3 (6.1) 54.46 1,202 <.001 
     Conscientiousness 32.3 (7.4) 25.5 (7.1) 44.30 1,202 <.001 
     Neuroticism 27.6 (8.8) 33.3 (8.7) 21.59 1,202 <.001 
     Openness 34.7 (8.1) 31.3 (8.9) 8.09 1,202 .005 
Behavioral Inhibition/ 
Behavioral Activation Scales 
(BIS/BAS) 
     
     BIS 22.5 (3.3) 22.3 (3.6) 0.10 1,202 .753 
     Fun Seeking 11.7 (2.4) 12.6 (2.1) 7.32 1,202 .007 
     Drive 11.0 (2.3) 11.4 (2.7) 1.35 1,202 .247 
     Reward Responsiveness 17.5 (1.6) 18.2 (1.7) 8.03 1,202 .005 
Multidimensional Self Concept 
Scale (MSCS) 
     
Total 263.8 (16.4) 310.5 (16.5) 406.93 1,202 <.001 
Social Motivation 34.2 (6.3) 42.7 (5.8) 99.29 1,202 <.001 
Demonstrating Empathetic 
Concern 
40.6 (5.9) 47.5 (4.6) 148.39 1,202 <.001 
Nonverbal Sending Skills 38.6 (5.8) 45.8 (4.7) 85.70 1,202 <.001 
Social Inferencing 37.2 (2.5) 44.8 (3.9) 104.86 1,202 <.001 
Social Knowledge 43.6 (4.6) 49.2 (3.1) 40.84 1,202 <.001 
Verbal Conversation Skills 35.8 (5.1) 40.6 (5.7) 99.43 1,202 <.001 
Emotion Regulation 34.1 (6.3) 39.9 (5.5) 48.41 1,202 <.001 
Reading the Mind In the Eyes 
Task (RMET) 
     
Total Score 24.7 (4.7) 27.0 (4.2) 13.06 1,202 <.001 
Letter Number Sequence Task 
(LNS) 
     
Total Score 14.5 (4.6) 14.8 (4.2) 0.31 1,202 .578 
Note. Table reports means (SDs in parentheses) and comparison test statistics. Comparisons tested with 
ANOVA except where noted. 1 participant did not report their ages; 1 did not report sex information. * 
Comparison tested with Chi-Squared. 
191 
  
Appendix D: Associative Learning Task Additional Analyses 
 
This is the analysis to determine if participants performed above chance on the 
associative learning task. As reported in the table below, participants performed 
statistically above chance on the associative learning task. See Table D1 and Figure D1 
for more details. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table D1. Exact t-test results for performance compared to chance 
Variable  
df t p 
Low AQ    
Nonsocial Advice    
    Trials 1-30 112 11.31 <.001 
    Trials 31-70 112 6.48 <.001 
    Trials 71-120 112 11.06 <.001 
Social Advice    
    Trials 1-30 112 10.10 <.001 
    Trials 31-70 112 8.21 <.001 
    Trials 71-120 112 10.36 <.001 
High AQ    
Nonsocial Advice    
    Trials 1-30 69 7.61 <.001 
    Trials 31-70 69 7.35 <.001 
    Trials 71-120 69 7.82 <.001 
Social Advice    
    Trials 1-30 69 8.83 <.001 
    Trials 31-70 69 7.11 <.001 
    Trials 71-120 69 9.76 <.001 
Note. AQ is the Autism-spectrum Quotient. Advice Type refers to 
whether participants received social or non-social advice during the task. 
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Figure D1. Proportion Correct in the associative learning task. 
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